



The Suryong Dictatorship Mechanism

Who Is Ultimately Responsible for Crimes Against Humanity?

수령독재 메커니즘 연구: 북한의 반인도적범죄 최종책임자 규명을 위한 시사점

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NK Watch 2023 Report

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Foreword

머리말

NK Watch is a civil society organization founded on June 3, 2003, by victims of political prison camps in North Korea and their families. The founding purpose of NK Watch is to advocate for human rights in North Korea based on the dignity of the person, with the goals of promoting freedom, democracy, the realization of human rights, and the abolition of political prison camps.

Over the past 20 years, the international community has made continuous and multifaceted efforts in advocating for North Korean human rights. Furthermore, the international community has emphasized the need for accountability regarding North Korea's grave human rights violations for the past decade. Unfortunately, the movement for accountability appears to be at a standstill at the moment. Moreover, it is challenging to assess the movement's current state including strategies employed by the international community towards achieving the goal of accountability, the obstacles we face, and the future alternatives.

Accountability for crimes against humanity in North Korea is one of the key activities undertaken by NK Watch. This report presents the research results conducted as part of this endeavor. NK Watch is just one of many relevant stakeholders, but the process of formulating and implementing strategies to achieve our objectives is similar to that of other institutions and organizations.

Over the past 10 years, NK Watch has collected and documented evidence and identified witnesses to substantiate the pursuit of accountability. This report, along with the evidence and testimonies, will serve as a critical link to shed light on why Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un are key suspects and the figures ultimately responsible for crimes against humanity. Moving forward, NK Watch will utilize these crucial pieces of evidence to take one step closer to the final goal of accountability.

As a family member of victims of enforced disappearances by the North Korean authorities and as a civil society activist, I express my deep gratitude to Dr. Kwanghyung Lee, for his long-term dedication to NK Watch and countless hours devoted to this research. I also extend my appreciation to Dr. In Su Kwak from KAS Consultancy, who painstakingly obtained important documents and participated as

a coresearcher. Above all, I would like to thank Professor Kelly Hur from Duksung Women's University for translating this report and Mr. David R. Kay, NK Watch's international affairs manager, who has worked tirelessly on this project from beginning to end.

Finally, I would like to express gratitude to the friends and colleagues at the NDI and the US Congress, government, and the American people who have contributed to the publication of this report.

엔케이워치는 2003년 6월 3일, 북한의 정치범수용소 피해자와 그 가족들이 설립한 북한인권 시민사회단체입니다. 엔케이워치의 설립 목적은 북한인권 피해자의 단체로서 인간에 대한 존엄을 바탕으로 북한 내 자유, 민주주의, 인권 실현과 정치범수용소 철폐입니다.

주지하듯 지난 20여년 동안, 국제사회는 북한인권 옹호활동을 위해 지속적으로 다방면으로 노력해 왔습니다. 그리고 국제사회는 10년 전부터 북한의 반인도적범죄에 대한 책임 규명의 필요성에 대해 강조해 오고 있습니다. 그러나 안타깝게도 이 책임규명의 실행은 현재까지 담보상태로 판단됩니다. 더욱이 국제사회가 책임규명이라는 목표를 위해 어떠한 전략으로 현재는 어느 단계까지 왔고, 어떠한 문제점에 봉착하고 있는지, 그에 따른 대안은 무엇인지에 대해서도 파악하기 힘든 상태입니다.

북한의 반인도적범죄 책임규명은 엔케이워치가 수행하고 있는 주요 활동들 중 하나이기도 합니다. 그리고 이 보고서는 이 활동의 일환으로 수행된 연구 결과입니다. 엔케이워치는 여러 시민사회단체들 중 하나일 뿐입니다. 하지만, 목표 달성을 위해 전략을 수립하고 실행하는 것은 일반적인 기관, 조직들과 동일합니다.

엔케이워치는 지난 10년간 책임규명의 실질적인 실행을 위해 문서화된 증거들을 취합하고, 증인들을 발굴해 왔습니다. 그리고 이 보고서는 증거, 증언자들과 함께 책임규명의 핵심 열쇠가 될 것입니다. 이 보고서는 국제사회에 김일성, 김정일, 김정은이 왜 반인도적범죄의 핵심 피의자이고 최종 책임자인지를 밝혀주는 논리적 링크가 될 것입니다. 앞으로 엔케이워치는 이 핵심 열쇠들을 통해 책임규명이라는 최종 관문에 한 발자국 더 다가가게 될 것입니다.

저는 북한 당국에 의한 강제실종 피해자 가족들 중 한 명으로서 그리고 시민사회 활동가들 중 한 명으로서 오랜 기간 이 연구에 헌신해 준 엔케이워치 이관형 박사님에게 깊은 감사를 표하고 싶습니다. 또한 중요 문헌들을 어려운 과정들을 통해 입수하고 공동연구자로 참여해 준 카스 컨설턴시의 광인수 박사님께도 감사합니다. 무엇보다 이 보고서가 국제사회와 공유될 수 있도록 번역해 주신 덕성여자대학교 켈리 허 교수님, 이 프로젝트의 처음부터 마지막

까지 애써준 엔케이워치 데이비드 R. 케이 매니저님에게도 감사의 말씀드립니다.

끝으로 이 보고서가 세상에 나올 수 있도록 도와준 NDI의 친구들과 동료들 그리고 미국 시민들과 의회, 정부에게 감사의 인사를 보냅니다.

2023년 7월

Myeongchul Ahn
Executive Director of NK Watch

엔케이워치 대표
안명철



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Glossary of Terms

Acronyms & Abbreviations

CC	Central Committee
CMC	Central Military Commission
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea / North Korea
GPB	General Political Bureau
KCNA	Korean Central News Agency
KPA	Korean People's Army
MPAF	Ministry of People's Armed Forces
MPS	Ministry of People's Security
MSB	Military Security Bureau of the Korean People's Army
MSS	Ministry of State Security
OGD	Organization and Guidance Bureau
PAD	Propaganda and Agitation Department
RGB	Reconnaissance General Bureau
ROK	Republic of Korea / South Korea
SPA	Supreme People's Assembly
SPSD	State Political Security Department
SSD	State Security Department
WPK CC	Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea
WPK	Workers' Party of Korea, also written as Korean Workers' Party (KWP)

North Korean Terminology

Central Party

The Workers' Party of Korea's Central Committee is also known as the Central Party.

Ministry of People's Security (MPS)

The Ministry of People's Security (MPS) is responsible for maintaining public order and functions as a police organization. However, its primary role is to surveil the general population for the purpose of maintaining the regime. It carries out surveillance activities on the general population, criminal trends, people's livelihoods, and various aspects of economic life. This institution was initially established as the Bureau of Internal Affairs under the Ministry of Internal Affairs when the North Korean regime was established in September 1948. In March 1951, it became an independent organization and was reorganized into the Ministry of People's Security (MPS). With the enactment of the Socialist Constitution in December 1972, it was restructured as the Social Security Department under the Cabinet. Since then, it has undergone several name changes, including Ministry of Social Security, Ministry of People's Security, and People's Security Department. In 2016, it was renamed as the Ministry of People's Security (MPS), and in 2020, it was renamed once again as the Ministry of Social Security (MSS). The abbreviation for the Ministry of Social Security is the same as the abbreviation for the Ministry of State Security. Therefore, this report uses MPS as the unified term to refer to the Ministry of Social Security.

Military Security Bureau of the Korean People's Army (MSB)

The Military Security Bureau of the Korean People's Army is a military institution that investigates and punishes political and espionage incidents in the military based on the Ten Principles. However, it also intervenes in audits, inspections and punishment related to civilian sectors when instructed by the suryong. This institution started as the Political Security Department under the Ministry of National Security when the North Korean regime was first established in September 1948. It was later incorporated into the Political Security Bureau under the General Political Bureau, and in the late 1960s, it was promoted to an independent department. In the early 1970s, it was renamed as the Military Security Bureau of the Korean People's Army, and after the establishment of the Ministry of State Security on February 15, 1973, it was placed

under the jurisdiction of that department. It operated as an independent institution after the mid-1970s. The Military Security Bureau of the Korean People's Army was renamed as the Military Security Command in late 1995 but changed back to the Military Security Bureau of the Korean People's Army in 2015.

Ministry of State Security (MSS)

The Ministry of State Security is an institution that investigates and punishes political and espionage incidents based on the Ten Principles. This institution existed as the Political Security Bureau under the Ministry of Internal Affairs when the North Korean regime was first established in September 1948. The Political Security Bureau was absorbed by the Ministry of People's Security in October 1962. On February 15, 1973, it was promoted to an independent institution and retitled as the State Political Security Department (SPSD). It later got absorbed into the Ministry of State Security and renamed as the State Security Department (SSD). In 2016, it was once again renamed as the Ministry of State Security (MSS). This report uses MSS as the unified term for the Ministry of State Security.

Political Prison Camp or "Gulag"

In North Korea, political prisoners are referred to as "emigrants" (*yijumin*) instead of political prisoners and political prison camps are referred to as a gulag or (*yijumin kwanliso*, 이주민관리소). In this report, we refer to them consistently as political prison camps. Until the 1950s, political prisoners were confined in remote mountainous areas with boundaries set up for collective detention. The nationwide establishment and operation of political prison camps throughout North Korea began in 1966. Before the establishment of the Ministry of State Security (MSS), political prison camps were managed by the Security Bureau of the Ministry of People's Security (MPS). After the establishment of the MSS on February 15, 1973, the management of political prison camps was transferred to the Farm Guidance Bureau (Division 7) of the MSS. Since then, political prison camps have been classified into Revolutionary Zones and Total Control Zones. Revolutionary Zones were closed after 2012. However, Total Control Zones are still in operation today where life imprisonment and forced labor are applied. These facilities are not typical prisons. They are established and operate as secluded confinement zones in highly elevated mountainous areas that are inaccessible from the outside.

Suryong

According to North Korea's Grand Korean Dictionary, suryong (首領, 수령) is defined as “the center who unifies the autonomous demands and understanding of the people through comprehensive analysis and directs the creative activities of the masses to realize them in a unified manner.” The current usage of this term in North Korea appears to have originated from “vozhd” (вождь), referring to the ancient Slavic term used to depict ‘chieftain’ who stands above history, one who embodies the enduring will of the entire nation. The term was embraced by Joseph Stalin as the core of his personality cult, but was eschewed by his successors. However, North Korea uses this term to refer only to Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un. Initially, suryong was used only for Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, but from September 4, 1950, Kim Il Sung was officially declared as “the respected suryong” in the *Rodong Sinmun*.

Transliteration of Names

The English transliteration of personal names mentioned in this report follows the Korean convention of placing the surname name before the given name. As much as possible, this report will use North Korea's preferred spellings for names and places in North Korea while using South Korean spelling for names and places of South Korea. The following are examples: Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Un, Kim Kyong Hui, Kim Yo Jong, Kim Young Il (Kim Jong Il's half-brother), Kim Pyong Il (Kim Jong Il's half-brother), Kim Kyong Jin (Kim Jong Il's half-brother), Jang Song Thaek, Pyongyang, Ryanggang Province. Kangwon Province is a preferred spelling in North Korea while Gangwon Province is preferred in South Korea (referring to the same region). In this report, South Korea is used instead of ROK and North Korea instead of DPRK.

We dedicate this book to the countless souls who lost their lives from the brutality and violence of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un, as well as the countless North Koreans who are still being tortured, abused, and detained at this very moment.

김일성, 김정일, 김정은의 잔혹한 폭력에 목숨을 잃게 된 셀 수 없는 영령들과 이 순간에도 고문과 학대, 구금을 당하고 있는 수많은 북한 주민들을 위해 이 글을 바칩니다.

Executive Summary

This study provides an in-depth analysis of the authoritarian mechanism executed by the North Korean leader known as the “supreme leader” or the “suryong” and aims to derive implications for determining the direct responsibility of the suryong for crimes against humanity. The conclusion is simple and clear. North Korea operates under a dictatorship system where all power is concentrated in the hands of the suryong, and the ultimate responsibility for the crimes against humanity resulting from this dictatorship lies with the suryong.

The mechanism of the suryong dictatorship is complex and sophisticated. The suryong dominates all areas of the regime, including national strategy and policies through maximizing his own will and authority through the mechanism of party guidance (당적지도). Moreover, the suryong effectively executes the dictatorship through intricate surveillance, control, and severe punishments that go beyond imagination.

The study employs literature analysis and in-depth interviews as the primary research methods. The primary sources for this report are confidential documents from North Korea, such as Kim Jong Un’s “Instructional Remarks” (교시말씀) (Appendix I-A) and the “WPK Policy Implementation Directives” (당의 방침집행대장) (Appendix I-B), produced by the Central Committee of the WPK. The *WPK Policy Directives* is a bound compilation of authorized policy documents with Kim Jong Un’s approval. All of North Korea’s national strategies and policies are controlled through the party guidance of the suryong. The North Korean authorities refer to this as “internal party affairs,” (당 내부사업) and the Policy Directives is one of the various types of documents related to this operation. In addition, in-depth interviews were conducted with four high-ranking North Korean defectors and one former diplomat from the German Embassy in Pyongyang.

Chapter II of the report discusses the ideology of the suryong dictatorship and its driving force. North Korea’s ideology is not socialism or communism.

In North Korea, the “will (thoughts) and teachings of the suryong” are the sole ideology and fundamental driving force of totalitarian power. North Korea finds the origin of the regime’s existence in individuals like Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un. Accordingly, the suryong’s teachings and instructions, as well as the Ten Principles which institutionalizes the establishment of the monolithic leadership system serve as absolute norms in North Korea. Kim Jong Il, starting from the late 1960s, developed the mechanism of the suryong dictatorship based on the monolithic ideology and the Ten Principles, which became ingrained as the operating standards and punishment criteria for national goals, interests, and the functioning of all organizations, including the party, state, and military.

Chapter III discusses the functioning of the suryong dictatorship mechanism, namely the monolithic leadership system. All areas of the North Korean regime are organized and combined organically to form the structure of the system. The reason why the dictatorship can be efficiently and systematically executed by the suryong is that the suryong controls and regulates all areas of organization through the Workers' Party. This power is referred to as the suryong’s “organizational authority.” The suryong controls all organizations in North Korea through the Central Committee of the Workers' Party (also known as the WPK CC or the Central Party). Among the institutions belonging to the Central Party, the Organization Guidance Bureau (OGD) is particularly crucial as the suryong intervenes in the formulation and decision-making of national strategies and policies through the OGD. Moreover, the suryong exercises direct control over individuals and even micro aspects of society to an astonishing extent.

Chapter IV discusses the elements that constitute the completion and sustainability of the suryong dictatorship. Even with a perfect mechanism, the suryong cannot personally intervene in and control every situation and event. However, the suryong is directly involved in the personnel appointment of party members and officials and executing discipline and punishment. Additionally, even when the suryong does not intervene directly, North Korea has a system of horizontal surveillance among party members, officials, and ordinary citizens. This system of mutual surveillance has been institutionalized and become a crucial element that enables automatic operation of the suryong dictatorship mechanism over the last 78 years.

The punishment system in North Korea is also controlled by the Workers' Party.

The suryong intervenes in and commands the punishment system through the Workers' Party, and orders and commands directly when necessary. The suryong's direct involvement in punishment serves as evidence that he is the ultimate responsible person and the authority in charge of crimes against humanity. The suryong sometimes makes decisions on summary executions and the imprisonment of political prisoners based on his arbitrary and subjective judgment. Thus, the suryong possesses absolute dictatorial power to control and punish dignified individuals freely and at will.

In Chapter V, this research concludes with simple and straightforward implications. These implications are addressed to the international community, South Korea, and North Korea's suryong, officials, and people.

The first recommendation is addressed to the international community.

To begin, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un are not only the key perpetrators but also the ultimate responsible figures for North Korea's systematic and widespread crimes against humanity. It is contradictory to demand Kim Jong Un, who currently holds all the power as the actual leader of North Korea, to resolve crimes against humanity. It is akin to asking a criminal to act as a judge.

Second, the international community and South Korea should formulate their North Korea strategies under the premise of acknowledging the inalterability of the suryong dictatorship mechanism. In other words, if we want to completely eliminate not only crimes against humanity, but also transnational organized crime and nuclear weapons threats of North Korea, we must clearly recognize that this is only possible when Kim Jong Un dictatorship ends. If the international community and South Korea fail to hold Kim Jong Un accountable and passively let the succession of the fourth generation to take place, these threats will continue to haunt future generations.

Third, there is a need to improve the methods and content of information inflow into North Korea. The suryong has emphasized to party officials, "people come first." Similarly, the international community should focus on all North Korean people—except the Kim family—to induce a change in Kim Jong Un's attitude. The information should include the message that "you and the suryong are not a community with a shared destiny, but are separate beings, and even if the forced bond that the suryong created is destroyed, you will suffer no harm."

Lastly, there is a recommendation regarding China. China must immediately

stop the arrest, detention, and torture of individuals seeking freedom, human rights, and dignity. Furthermore, unconditional forced repatriation of North Korean defectors is in itself crimes against humanity. North Korea is not a vassal state of China, and China does not need to emulate North Korea's suryong dictatorship.

Next are the recommendations for North Korea.

First, this is a recommendation to Kim Jong Un. It is hoped that he will acknowledge the crimes committed by his predecessors and himself, such as murder, torture, abuse, and enforced disappearances, and offer apologies to the victims. Furthermore, he should be willing to face the appropriate punishment. The time has come for him to return the power and dignity that his predecessors have taken away to the 25 million people of North Korea.

Second, this is a recommendation for the North Korean authorities currently engaged in crimes against humanity, such as the Central Party's Organization and Guidance Department, Ministry of Social Security, KPA Ministry Security Bureau, and the Ministry of People's Security. To protect your own dignity, this is only possible when you treat all people as equal human beings without discrimination regardless of their background—not based on your political allegiance to Kim Jong Un. The target of "leading by example" is not the suryong or the party but the people in political prison camps, remote areas, and citizens of Pyongyang, provinces, cities and counties. There is no need to become an accomplice to the Kim family destroying your own dignity to the very end.

Third, this is a recommendation for individuals who, in the capacity of overseas laborers, workers, businessmen, diplomats or secret operative agents that engage in money laundering, hacking, weapons and drug trafficking, and underground espionage activities outside of North Korea. Please stop the actions that threaten the property and lives of righteous individuals and quietly disseminate the messages of this report to the families back home. The place in need of revolution is not South Korea or the international community but North Korea itself. The targets of patriotism and loyalty are your own families and neighbors. If you genuinely value them, I hope you will be the first to initiate the flow of freedom.

Lastly, this message is addressed to all the North Korean people. Many members of the international community are concerned about each and every one of you. Therefore, we want to convey this message: Please do not sacrifice your lives, safety, and human dignity. It is difficult for us, who do not live in North

Korea, to dare to speak of not letting go of the thread of hope. We understand that it may not be possible to overturn the situation immediately. However, we can certainly promise that there are countless people who want to change the current situation and are making efforts to change it for the better.

연구 요약

본 연구는 “수령” 이라고 불리는 북한 최고지도자에 의해 실행되고 있는 독재 메커니즘에 대해 심도 있게 고찰하고, 이를 통해 반인도적범죄에 대한 수령의 직접적인 책임 여부 규명을 위한 시사점 도출을 목적으로 한다. 연구 수행 결과, 결론은 단순 명료하다. 북한은 수령이라는 개인에게 모든 권력이 절대적으로 집중되어 있는 독재체제이며, 이 독재에서 기인하는 반인도적범죄의 최종 책임도 수령에게 있다는 것이다.

수령독재 메커니즘 작동 방식은 매우 복잡하고 정교하다. 수령은 자신의 의지와 교시를 유일사상으로 절대화하고, “당적지도”라는 메커니즘을 통해 국가 전략 및 정책뿐 아니라 체제의 모든 영역을 지배한다. 또한 수령은 당적지도라는 메커니즘 외에도 복잡하고도 정연한 감시 및 통제 그리고 상상을 초월하는 처벌들을 통해 체계적이고 효율적으로 독재를 실행하고 있다.

본 연구는 문헌 분석과 심층 면접을 주요 연구 방법으로 활용한다. 이 연구에서 활용할 주요 문헌들은 조선노동당 중앙위원회가 생산한 김정은 “교시말씀” 자료(부록 I-A)와 “당의 방침집행대장”(부록 I-B) 같은 비밀 문헌들이다. 특히 ‘김정은의 비준 방침 문서’들을 묶은 바인더이다. 북한의 모든 국가 전략 및 정책은 수령의 당적지도를 통해 통제된다. 북한 당국은 이것을 “당 내부사업”이라고 하며, 당의 방침집행대장은 이 사업의 여러 문서 종류들 중 하나이다. 한편, 이 연구의 심층 면접 대상자들은 고위급 탈북민 4명과 전 평양 주재 독일 대사관 소속 외교관 1명이다.

이 보고서의 II장에서는 수령 독재권력의 동력으로 작동하는 유일사상체제가 무엇인지

에 대해 논의했다. 북한의 사상은 사회주의나 공산주의가 아니다. 북한에서는 “수령의 의지(생각)와 교시”가 유일한 사상이자 독재권력의 근본적인 동력이다. 북한은 체제 존립의 근원을 김일성, 김정일, 김정은이라는 개인에서 찾고 있다. 이에 따라 수령의 교시와 말씀과 이것들의 관철을 명문화 한 당의 유일적령도체계확립의 10대원칙은 북한의 절대적 규범이라고 할 수 있다. 김정일은 1960년대 후반부터 유일사상과 10대원칙을 바탕으로 수령독재 메커니즘을 완성시켜 나갔으며, 이 절대적 규범들은 북한의 국가 목표와 이익 그리고 당과 국가, 군대를 포함한 모든 조직들의 운영 기준이자 처벌 기준으로 각인되었다.

III장에서는 수령 독재권력 메커니즘의 작동 방식 즉 유일영도체계에 대해 논의했다. 북한체제의 모든 영역들은 조직화되어 있다. 북한의 조직들은 유기적으로 결합되어 체제라는 구조를 이루고 있다. 수령 개인에 의해 독재가 효율적이고 체계적으로 실행될 수 있는 이유는 수령이 모든 영역의 조직들을 노동당을 통해 장악하고 통제하기 때문이다. 그리고 바로 이 권력이 수령의 “조직권”이다. 수령은 북한의 모든 조직들을 노동당 중앙위원회(이른바 중앙당)를 통해 통제한다. 특히 조직지도부는 중앙당에 속해 있는 기관들 중에서도 가장 핵심적인 기관이다. 수령은 조직지도부를 통해 국가 전략 및 정책 수립과 결정에 개입하고 있다. 또한 수령은 최고지도자의 통치 행위라고 믿기 힘들 정도로, 개인들과 사회의 각 영역의 미시적인 부분까지 직접적으로 통제하고 있다.

IV장에서는 수령독재의 완결과 지속의 근간을 이루고 있는 요소들에 대해 논의했다. 수령독재 메커니즘이 메커니즘이 아무리 완벽하더라도 수령이 모든 상황과 사건들을 직접 개입하고 통제할 수 없다. 그래서 수령은 당원 및 간부 인사와 처벌만큼은 직접적으로 개입하고 있다. 또한 북한에는 수령이 직접 개입하지 않더라도 당원, 간부, 일반 주민들이 상호간에 횡적으로 감시하는 체계가 존재한다. 이 상호 감시 체계는 지난 78년간 메커니즘에 의해 관성화 되어 수령독재 메커니즘이 자동적으로 실행될 수 있는 핵심적인 요소가 되었다.

북한의 처벌 체계도 노동당에 의해 통제된다. 수령은 노동당을 통해 처벌 체계에 개입하며 필요할 경우 직접 명령하고 지휘한다. 수령의 직접적인 처벌 개입은 수령이 반인도적 범죄의 최종책임자이자 지휘권자라는 것을 증명하는 근거이다. 수령은 자신의 자의적, 주관적 판단을 통해 즉결 처형과 정치범수용소 구금을 직접 결정하기도 한다. 이렇듯 수령은 존엄한 인간들에 대한 통제와 처벌을 자유자재로 할 수 있는 절대적인 독재 권력을 보유하고 있다.

V장에서는 이 연구의 결론이 단순한 만큼 시사점들도 단순하다고 강조한다. 그리고 국제사회와 한국 그리고 북한의 수령, 당국자들, 주민들에게 아래와 같이 제언을 했다.

먼저 국제사회에 대한 제언으로는,

첫째, 김일성, 김정일, 김정은은 북한의 조직적이고 광범위한 반인도적범죄의 핵심 피의자인 동시에 최종 책임자이다. 현재 김정은이 북한의 실질적인 최고통치자로서 모든 권력을 보유하고 있다고 해서 그에게 반인도적범죄를 해결하라고 촉구하는 것은 모순이다. 즉 범죄자에게 판사 역할을 맡아달라는 것과 동일한 의미이다.

둘째, 국제사회와 한국은 수령독재 메커니즘의 불변성을 전제한 상태에서 대북전략을 수립해야 한다. 즉, 북한의 반인도적범죄뿐 아니라 초국가적 조직범죄, 핵무기 위협을 완전히 제거하고 싶다면, 김정은의 독재가 종식되어야만 가능하다는 것을 분명하게 인지해야 한다. 국제사회와 한국이 김정은에 대한 책임규명을 실행하지 않고 나아가 4대 세습이 이루어질 수 있도록 방관한다면, 이러한 위협들도 함께 안고 가겠다는 각오를 해야 한다.

셋째, 대북 정보 유입의 방법과 내용을 보완할 필요가 있다. 그동안 수령은 노동당 간부들에게 “사람과의 사업이 먼저다”고 강조해 왔다. 국제사회도 김정은의 태도 변화를 위해서는 “사람” 즉 김씨 일가를 제외한 모든 북한 주민들에게 초점을 맞춰야 한다. 그들에게 전달해야 할 정보에는 “수령과 당신들은 운명공동체가 아니며 별개의 존재이며, 수령이 강제로 형성한 유대가 소멸되어도 당신들에게는 그 어떤 피해도 없다”는 메시지가 포함되어야 한다.

끝으로, 중국에 대한 제언이다. 중국은 자유, 인권, 존엄을 찾으려는 사람들에 대한 체포, 구금, 고문을 당장 중단해야 한다. 더욱이 탈북민들에 대한 무조건적인 강제복송은 그 자체가 반인도적범죄이다. 북한은 중국의 속국이 아니며, 중국도 북한의 수령독재를 닮아갈 필요는 없다.

다음으로 북한에 대한 제언으로는,

첫째, 김정은에 대한 제언이다. 그간 선대 수령들과 본인이 자행한 살해, 고문, 학대, 강제실종 등의 범죄 행위들을 인정하고 피해자들에게 사죄하기를 바란다. 그리고 그에 따른 처벌을 받기를 바란다. 이제는 선대 수령들이 빼앗은 권력과 존엄을 2,500만명의 주민들에게 다시 돌려줄 때가 왔다.

둘째, 지금 이 순간에도 반인도적범죄를 현장에서 실행하고 있는 중앙당 조직지도부, 국가보위성, 군 보위국, 사회안전성 등의 당국자들에 대한 제언이다. 당신의 존엄을 지키기 위해서는 김정은의 정치적 신임이 아니라 성분 차별 없이 모든 주민들을 동등한 인격체로 대할 때에만 가능하다. 이신작칙(以身作則)의 대상은 수령과 당이 아니라 이주민관리소(정치범수용소), 심심산골, 평양과 지방에 살고 있는 모든 주민들이다. 무엇보다 스스로의 존엄을 파괴하면서 마지막 순간까지 김씨 일가와 공범이 될 필요는 없다.


셋째, 노동자, 상사원, 외교관, 공작원 신분으로 북한 바깥에서 돈세탁, 해킹, 무기 및 마

약밀매, 지하당 공작을 하고 있는 대외 일꾼들에 대한 제언이다. 선량한 사람들의 재산과 생명을 위협하는 행위들을 멈추고, 이 지면의 메시지들을 고향의 가족들에게 조용히 전파해 주기를 바란다. 혁명이 필요한 곳은 한국과 국제사회가 아니라 바로 북한이다. 그리고 애국과 충성의 대상은 당신들의 가족과 이웃들이다. 그리고 그들을 진정으로 위한다면, 당신들이 먼저 자유의 물꼬를 터 주길 바란다.

끝으로, 모든 북한 주민들에게 말씀드립니다. 국제사회의 수많은 구성원들이 여러분들을 걱정하고 있습니다. 그래서 말씀드리고 싶습니다. 여러분들의 생명과 안전 그리고 인간으로서의 존엄을 스스로 포기하지 마십시오. 북한에서 살고 있지 않은 저희들이 감히 희망의 끈을 놓지 말아달라는 언급을 하기는 어렵습니다. 지금 당장 받을 갈아엎을 수 없다는 것도 잘 알고 있습니다. 하지만 현재의 상황을 바꾸고 싶어하는 수많은 사람들이 노력을 지속할 것이라는 약속은 분명히 드릴 수 있습니다.

I

Introduction



1.1 Purpose and Background

The purpose of this study is to conduct an in-depth examination of the dictatorial mechanism implemented by the North Korean supreme leader referred to as the suryong (수령) and derive implications for determining the direct responsibility of the suryong for crimes against humanity.

Over the years, various discussions about the nature of the North Korean regime have emerged. In the case of the South Korean academic community, Dr. In Deok Kang (former head of the North Korea Department of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency and ROK Minister of Unification) perceived North Korea as an extreme leftist totalitarianism, with its prototype being the Stalinist regime.¹ Dr. Kihl-jae Ryoo (former Minister of Unification) identified it as a suryong-based authoritarian regime where policy decisions and execution systems operate under the will of the suryong. Dr. Jong Seok Lee (former Minister of Unification) focused on the characteristics of North Korean political structure, culture, and ideology and presented the monolithic system theory using the same term that North Korea used.

In the international academic community, Dr. Bruce Cumings argued that North Korea imitated Stalinist socialism while combining it with North Korea's cultural characteristics, forming a corporatist system. Dr. Gavan McCormack criticized corporatism and defined North Korea as totalitarianism. On the other hand, Dr. Haruki Wada perceived Kim Il Sung as the sole supreme commander of a guerrilla state with the entire population being guerrilla members, based on the foundation of state socialism.²

Regarding the power mechanism in North Korea, there are also perspectives that the actual power lies not with the suryong. Some view North Korea as a party-state system where decisions of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) and senior officials converge, or as a system where hardline and moderate factions within North Korea engage in power struggles, or where the military is considered equal

1. In Deok Kang, *The Life of a Central Intelligence Analyst 2*. (Paju: Kyungin Publishing, 2022), pp. 165-167.

2. Jong Seok Lee, "Trends and Challenges in North Korean Research in the Post-Cold War Period: The New Era of North Korean Research," *Korean History* 27, (Gwacheon: National Institute of Korean History, 1997), pp. 362-365.

or superior to the WPK in power due to its military-first politics.³ On the other hand, Dr. Haewoo Koo (former Overseas and North Korea Planning Director of the National Intelligence Service) concluded, through analysis of an article in a media outlet that the Secretariat is considered the substantive ruling group in North Korea, and even if the leadership is removed, the Secretariat will establish a new leadership and take the lead in various decision-making, including war.⁴ Furthermore, F-1, an interviewee of this study and a former German diplomat who worked in Pyongyang argued, “The politics of North Korea, observed by North Koreans and watchers from the outside, are staged. It is a show, distinct from reality. This also includes Kim Jong Un's role. Contrary to what many people, including North Koreans believe, there is no evidence that Kim Jong Un is an absolute ruler. On the other hand, there are quite a few indirect indications from the past 10 years that can provide clues to his position within the power structure of North Korea.”

While various perspectives exist regarding the nature of the North Korean regime and the power mechanism, this study assumes that North Korea is more accurately described as an evolved one-person dictatorship system from a Stalinist regime, adopting the perspective of Dr. In Deok Kang. In other words, the suryong dominates all areas of the regime, including national strategy and policies through maximizing his own will and authority through the mechanism of party guidance (당적지도). Moreover, this study identifies the reason behind how an individual known as the suryong can efficiently and systematically execute his dictatorship, which is made possible through not only the mechanism of the WPK but also through complex yet intricate surveillance, control, and severe and unthinkable punishments.

This study focuses on elucidating the connection between the ongoing crimes against humanity in North Korea and the suryong. Since the adoption

3. Although many studies explain that North Korea is a party-state system, it does not explain how the leader or a third party operates the Workers' Party. Of course, these detailed mechanisms are not specified in North Korea's Workers' Party Rules, Ten Principles, or Constitution. In other words, it can be said that there are few studies or materials that clearly explain the mechanism of North Korea's system operation. Accordingly, there are many indirect evidence that make North Korea appear to have a collective leadership system or a third ruling power, but there is a lack of concrete evidence that show dictatorship mechanisms by the suryong.

4. Haewoo Koo, "The Secretariat Will Conduct Nuclear Counterattacks If Kim Jong Un is Beheaded," *Shin Dong-ah*, November 2017.

of the Commission on Human Rights Resolution at the 59th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights on April 16, 2003, the international community has been taking measures to advocate for North Korean human rights.⁵ As a result, members of the international community have shown great interest in the issue of North Korean human rights and acknowledge the “heavy responsibility” of the North Korean authorities in committing crimes against humanity. The report published by the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (COI) on February 7, 2014, states that “systematic, widespread, and gross human rights violations have been and are being committed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, its institutions, and officials.”⁶

The COI report specifically mentions the situation of human rights abuses suffered by North Koreans, emphasizing that security forces like Ministry of State Security (MSS, 국가보위성) and Ministry of People’s Security (MPS, 사회안전성) responsible for national defense and social safety, are the main perpetrators. COI recommended North Korea to “undertake profound political and institutional reforms without delay to introduce genuine checks and balances upon the powers of the Supreme Leader and the Workers’ Party of Korea” and to “prosecute and bring to justice those persons most responsible for alleged crimes against humanity.”⁷ However, if North Korea is indeed a suryong dictatorship system, these recommendations by the COI contradict each other. In other words, if the suryong holds supreme power over the military, legislation, judiciary, and administration, the person who should be held criminally responsible is the suryong himself. In other words, there is no possibility of the suryong prosecuting himself.

Of course, the COI seems to have taken these aspects into sufficient consideration. As the COI mentioned, “The commission is neither a judicial body nor a prosecutor. It cannot make final determinations of individual criminal responsibility.” Therefore, even if the suryong is suspected of having ultimate responsibility for conducting “systematic and widespread attack pursuant to State policy,” the suryong cannot be designated as a criminal responsible party without

5. United Nations Commission on Human Rights, “Situation of human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (E/CN.4/RES/2003/10),” 16 April 2003.

6. UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, (A/HRC/25/CRP.1),” 7 February 2014, p. 365.

7. UN, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, p. 367, 369.

direct evidence related to this. In other words, documents containing orders and signatures instructing the suryong to send individuals or groups to political prison camps or carry out executions have not been exposed to the outside world. Furthermore, North Korea thoroughly conceals and destroys any evidence of crimes against humanity.⁸

Similar to the COI, NK Watch also is not a judicial body. Moreover, the mechanism of the suryong dictatorship does not provide direct evidence that can fully confirm Kim Jong Un's criminal responsibility. However, the problem is rooted in the fact that there have been no attempts to identify the party ultimately responsible for crimes against humanity and explain the basis of this argument through the power mechanism of North Korea. Moreover, such a mechanism is not explicitly stated in North Korea's Ten Principles, the Workers' Party Charter, nor the Constitution.⁹ In other words, there has been no attempt to thoroughly explain the functions of the preexisting system of the suryong's orders, control, or the operations of various organizations and officials.

Considering these factors, this study focuses on the discussion of the direct relationship between the mechanism of the suryong dictatorship and crimes against humanity and through the suryongs of North Korea: Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un. This report utilizes primary resources from North Korea such as confidential documents produced by the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK CC) (Appendix I-A and Appendix I-B), testimonies from interviews conducted with individuals closely associated with the North Korean regime, and open-source intelligence (OSINT) produced from inside and outside of North Korea. Based on this information, the study examines how the "will and instructions of the suryong" has become the sole ideology of North Korea and how the suryong exercises control over policies (including strategies, laws, and systems) and personnel through specific mechanisms.¹⁰ Furthermore, this report discusses

8. Kwanhyung Lee et al. *Effects of International Advocacy toward Human Rights of North Korea* (Seoul: NK Watch, 2020), p. 54.

9. Refer to Appendix II for the Ten Principles. Refer to the National Intelligence Service (NIS) website in Korea for various North Korean laws such as the WPK Charter, the Constitution, the Criminal Law, and the Criminal Procedure Act. National Intelligence Service website, https://www.nis.go.kr/AF/1_2_1.do (accessed 19 May 2023).

10. This report does not deal with the dictatorship of the economic sector. However, it should be made clear that the fundamental cause of North Korea's serious economic crisis, which has continued

how the suryong directly intervenes in punishment and killings through specific cases.

The expected outcomes of this study are as follows.

First is to provide a clearer understanding that Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un, referred to as the suryong, are the fundamental causes and keys to systematic and widespread crimes against humanity.

Second, this report is meaningful in that it can supplement and reconfirm the findings of the Commission of Inquiry (COI). The NK Watch research focuses on illuminating the “relationship between crimes committed and the parties ultimately responsible” that the COI did not include in its report. Therefore, this report can assist judicial and prosecutorial authorities in making reasonable judgments when a court is established in the future to hold North Korea accountable for crimes against humanity, even if direct evidence and witnesses are lacking or destroyed.

Third, there are various types of crimes led by the North Korean authorities. For example, there are transnational organized crimes such as kidnapping and terrorism of South Koreans and foreigners, drug production and trafficking, hacking, and money laundering. This report is expected to serve as an important reference for victims and their families who are currently pursuing lawsuits against the North Korea or planning lawsuits in the future, as well as all judicial and prosecution agencies related to the lawsuits. In other words, it can demonstrate that targeting Kim Jong Un as the ultimate responsible party—as the defendant in civil and criminal cases— would be a more reasonable judicial decision than targeting the broad entities of the Workers' Party or the State.

Fourth, this report can convey a message that can change the attitudes and mindset of the frontline officials of North Korea towards the suryong's leadership

from the late 1960s to the present, is caused by the suryong dictatorship. From the late 1960s, the suryong encroached on all of North Korea's resources, interests, and foreign currency. As a result, North Korea's per capita real GDP growth rate in the 1970s and 1980s was the lowest compared to those of the socialist countries at the time such as the Soviet Union, Czech Republic, Romania, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland. Also, in 1973 alone, trade with non-Communist countries recorded a deficit of \$165 million. Since 1973, North Korea has faced serious balance-of-payments problems and has been unable to finance a hard currency deficit since 1974. Eventually, North Korea became the first communist country to default on massive debts to Western debtors. For more information in this regard, see: CIA, “North Korea: Internal (CIA-RDP81T00700R000100050003-6),” July 27, 1976; Kwanhyung Lee, “North Korea's ‘Drug Business’ Operation and Expansion: Focusing on the 1970s and 1980s,” *Strategic Studies*, 29(1) (2022), pp. 272-279.

and human rights. It is expected that this report will be reported to the top and finally to the suryong via the first vice minister of foreign affairs through North Korean embassies abroad. Additionally, North Korean overseas workers (i.e., diplomats, intelligence agents, foreign currency earners) who come across this report will be able to disseminate the messages of this report upon their return to North Korea.

Fifth, this report is expected to provide significant implications for scholars studying totalitarianism and dictatorship. Although this report does not encompass all the content related to the mechanism of suryong dictatorship and may contain some errors, the contents of the report alone will contribute to a better understanding of the level of intensity and complexity of the suryong dictatorship in comparison to totalitarianism and dictatorship in modern and contemporary nation-states. Furthermore, this report can be a valuable resource to researchers and experts of North Korea. In order to explain issues related to North Korea's politics, economy, society, military, and culture, an understanding of the functioning mechanisms of the regime is necessary. In other words, it is difficult to approach the structural causes and consequences of the desired research topic solely based on superficial phenomena. Therefore, this report can serve as one of the fundamental tools for those who research and analyze issues related to North Korea.

1.2 Research Methods and Data

This project utilizes literature analysis and in-depth interviews as the primary research methods. Unlike general humanities and social sciences fields, research on North Korea faces fundamental limitations in terms of credible and reliable information and literature (or data). While academic papers, reports, monographs, and articles are continuously published based on various methodologies and perspectives, research that provide an unfiltered view of North Korea is scarce. Particularly, studies that utilize intuitive data directly revealing the intentions of the leadership, such as the suryong, are very rare.

Additionally, the North Korean authorities release various publications and media reports. For example, articles published in *Rodong Sinmun* and *Korean*

Central News Agency (KCNA), academic journals and magazines, *Kim Il Sung Works* and *Kim Jong Il: Selected Works*, websites such as *Uriminzokkiri* and *Maeari*, and social media platforms like YouTube and Twitter contain numerous materials directly authored and published by the North Korean government. As North Korea admits that all its publications serve as “powerful ideological weapons under the control of the party” and are crucial in “performing revolutionary tasks” solely dependent on the “leadership of the party and the suryong.” In other words, the main mission and purpose of these publications is propaganda.¹¹

It is impossible for independent private media to exist in North Korea, and all publicly released information by North Korea requires approval from the General Publication Guidance Bureau under the Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD). Therefore, publicly available open source intelligence (OSINT) materials produced by the North Korean authorities contain distortions and deceptions. Of course, not all documents published by North Korea are entirely fabricated. Editorial opinions and commentaries as well as statements made in the names of Kim Jong Un or Kim Yo Jong published on the front page of *Rodong Sinmun*, contain important contents and straightforward expressions compared to general publications. However, it does not mean that the intentions behind the published texts are explicitly evident.¹² Moreover, distortions and deceptions are always present even in Kim Jong Un's public remarks.¹³ In addition, many senior North Korea researchers in South Korea emphasize the importance of “reading the

11. “(Editorial) Our Party's Publications are a Powerful Weapon to Uphold the Strength of Socialist Ideology,” *Rodong Sinmun*, November 1, 1995, p. 1.

12. On August 19, 2019, North Korea's spokesperson for the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland mentioned that “even a boiled beef head would laugh out loud,” (삶은 소 대가리가 양천 대소할 노릇) after President Moon Jae-in made his Liberation Day speech on August 15, 2019. Also, on April 29, 2023, North Korea's WPK CC Vice Minister Kim Yo Jong called President Yoon Suk Yeol “a fool” who was attending a summit with the United States. Of course, the South Korean government or civil society organizations of North Korean human rights have not made any public statement with direct expressions such as “boiled pig head” and “crystal meth addicts” toward Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong.

13. According to John Bolton, former National Security Advisor of the United States, Kim Jong Un told President Donald Trump at the Singapore summit in June 2018 that there are hardliners that cannot be easily overcome even in North Korea, so he needed to build public support internally. John Bolton portrayed Kim Jong Un as if he had “confessed” the truth at the time, but this is a wrong interpretation. There are no elites or officials in North Korea who can risk their lives and make a direct, hard line claim to Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Un's “confession” is just one of deception tactic used to block the US-ROK joint exercises.

context behind the text,” but there is no theory or methodology to serve as a basis of analysis.

For any research context, collected data and information must be accurate to ensure that research findings and results are valid. However, possessing accurate data does not guarantee great results. Nevertheless, in North Korean research, overcoming the limitations of data collection and acquiring intuitive and accurate data and information are essential to ensure quality research with credible outcomes.

Literature Analysis: Confidential Documents Produced by the WPK Central Committee

The primary sources for this report are confidential documents, such as Kim Jong Un's *Teachings and Instructions* (교시말씀) (Appendix I-A) and the *WPK Policy Implementation Directives* (당의 방침집행대상) (Appendix I-B), produced by the Central Committee of the WPK. According to Article 2 of North Korea's Confidentiality Law, documents are classified into security levels such as “top secret,” (절대비밀) “secret,” (비밀) and “restricted to agencies” (기관안에 한함) based on their importance. The *WPK Policy Implementation Directives* is classified as the highest security level, top secret, while the *Teachings and Instructions* are classified as either secret or top secret based on the importance of its content. Additionally, open source information produced inside and outside of North Korea will be appropriately used.¹⁴ In particular, Dr. In Su Kwak's published article in 2004, which focused on the WPK's party guidance (당적지도), is one of the key references used in this report.¹⁵

The *WPK Policy Implementation Directives* (also referred to as *Policy Directives*) produced by the WPK CC, is a bound compilation of authorized policy documents with Kim Jong Un's approval. All of North Korea's national strategies and policies are controlled through the party guidance of the suryong. The North Korean authorities refer to this as “internal party affairs,” (당 내부사업), and the *Policy*

14. The information from open sources to be used in this report is mainly the *Rodong Sinmun* published in North Korea, books, and memoirs written by high-ranking North Korean defectors. When necessary, papers and news articles published in the international community and South Korea are also appropriately used and cited.

15. In Su Kwak, *A Study of the Party's Guidance of the Korean Workers Party* (Seoul: Graduate School of North Korean Studies of Kyungnam University, M.A. dissertation, 2004).

Directives is one of the various types of documents related to this operation. Core departments such as the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) and the Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD) of the WPK CC report their respective matters to Kim Jong Un and distribute the documents to subordinate Party organizations after receiving approval.¹⁶ It appears that party organizations receive around 700 policy documents approved by Kim Jong Un annually, and they are collected and compiled on a yearly basis in the form of a binder called the *WPK Policy Implementation Directives*.¹⁷ These documents contain all the general national strategies and policies excluding counterintelligence, espionage, and military matters. They also include instructions and policies from Kim Jong Un to intervene in micro-level social phenomena and the private lives of citizens.

Next, the *Teachings and Instructions* (교시말씀) consist of documents that contain full text or selected excerpts of Kim Jong Un's remarks made in front of the “chief officials” (책임일군) (referring to high-ranking officials above the level of WPK deputy director or deputy chief of the Cabinet) and his closest aides. Kim Jong Un is the sole entity who can determine North Korea's national strategies and policies and directly criticize issues and shortcomings. Such remarks by Kim Jong Un are made only to a very limited number of his closest aides in closed-door settings, and most of these remarks are not made public. However, in some cases, the full text may be disclosed to selected officials in the Party, Cabinet, and military if necessary. The *Teachings and Instructions* distributed from the WPK Central Committee to the county party committees mostly consist of excerpts from Kim Jong Un's remarks, excluding sensitive parts. These documents are used as fundamental materials for formulating North Korea's policy strategies.

The *WPK Policy Implementation Directives* and the *Teachings and Instructions* are classified as “Top Secret” or “Secret” level documents and have the following

16. In North Korea, this is called the “lower control guidance system (하부 장악지도체계).” This system will be discussed in detail in Section 1 of Chapter 3.

17. The *WPK Policy Implementation Directives* is one of the most important types of security documents that the primary party committee, one of the basic organizational units of the WPK, and the upper party organizations have in common. In addition to the *WPK Policy Implementation Directives*, the party's internal affairs documents include: executive project guidance guideline, implementation directives for teachings and instructions (*Yuhun Gyoshi*), daily report directives, list of prospective party members, list of visitors (Note: This is a list of individuals who met the suryong privately. These visitors are considered the “core group” or the highest class), and a list of convicted criminals. (Interview with D-1).

security measures:

- i) Not all top-secret documents contain the full text. All information produced within North Korea is strictly classified and stratified. As presented in Appendix I, Kim Jong Un's approved policies, evaluations, and instructions included in the documents, are distributed after omission of certain words, sentences, or paragraphs indicated with ellipses "...". However, modifications are not possible since the documents contain content directly mentioned and approved by Kim Jong Un.
- ii) All secret documents of North Korea can only be accessed by designated units (포치단위) and designated targets (포치대상), as well as infiltration units (침투단위), and infiltration targets (침투대상), specified in the document. Appendix I-A-4 titled *Dear Comrade Kim Jong Un's Remarks, April to June 2016* (Juche 105) is an excerpt of distributed documents of Kim Jong Un's remarks made from April to June 2016. The last paragraph of Appendix I-A-4 (3) specifies the following:

Infiltration Targets:

All workers (including university, technical college, and vocational school students)

※ Only transmit common content, as well as content related to one's own sector and unit.

The workers specified above refer to officials and workers belonging to North Korean labor organizations such as the Socialist Patriotic Youth League, the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, the Union of Agricultural Workers of Korea, and the Socialist Women's Union of Korea. Since these labor organizations are classified as peripheral organizations of the WPK, it appears that documents of a secret classification are distributed more frequently than top secret documents.

Furthermore, the last page of Appendix I-A-5 titled *Dear Comrade Kim Jong Un's Remarks to the Party and Military Chief Officials on February 22, 2016* (Juche 105) specifies the following:

Infiltration Unit	Infiltration Target
Central Committee of the WPK	Guidance officials or higher ranks of each department
Party Committee of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly	Party officials, guidance officials or higher, or other officials of each relevant department
Political Bureau of the Cabinet	Guidance officials or higher ranks
Party Committee of the Cabinet Secretariat	Party officials, guidance officials or higher, or other officials of each relevant department
Primary party committees of political bureaus, committees, ministries, and central agencies where documents are distributed	Party officials, bureau chiefs, deputy chiefs or higher, or other officials of each relevant committees
Provincial party committees where documents are distributed	Guidance officials or higher of provincial party committees; provincial people's committees; provincial agricultural accounting committees; provincial prosecutor's offices; provincial court bureau chiefs, deputy chiefs or higher ranks; party and administrative officials, party guidance local groups, and other relevant officials of provincial level agencies
County party committees (or party committees that functions as the county party committee) where documents are distributed	Guidance officials or higher ranks of county party committees; county people's committees; county cooperative farm management committees; deputy directors, section chiefs or higher-ranking officials in the county cooperative farm management committees; party and administrative officials, party guidance local groups, and other relevant officials of county level agencies

The term “unit” refers to the organization, and “target” refers to the workers within that organization. Being an infiltration target (침투대상), or a designated target (포치대상), does not grant direct access to classified documents. Therefore, lower-ranking officials, party members, and workers who belong to the target group can only become aware of the document’s content indirectly through higher-ranking officials. Even if the document is classified at a lower security level than

top secret, individuals can only be aware of the content that directly concerns themselves or their specific area of responsibility. Those who are not included in the target group are not allowed to know even the existence of such documents.

The individuals who can access the Party's approved policy documents and instructional materials are high-ranking officials within the respective units, such as chief secretary, secretary, organization chiefs, and propaganda chiefs. The storage and management of the *Policy Directives* are carried out in the party committee's respective archival offices at all levels, and access requires the approval of the chief officials of the party organization. Therefore, the *Policy Directives* and *Teachings and Instructions* not only serve as mechanisms of Kim Jong Un's dictatorship but also have high documentary value in directly confirming the situation inside North Korea, incomparable to the OSINT materials released by North Korea.

The documents of Kim Jong Un's approved policies and *Teachings and Instructions* produced by the WPK CC do not contain deceitful or distorted elements conscious of South Korea and the international community. In particular, Appendix I-A-1 and Appendix I-A-2 contain instructions for Kim Jong Un's extrajudicial punishments, allowing for the inference of a direct correlation between Kim Jong Un and crimes against humanity.¹⁸ Furthermore, these approved policy documents of Kim Jong Un provide direct evidence that he is actively involved in national strategies, policies, and even micro-level matters concerning ordinary citizens.¹⁹

Acquisition Process and Utilization of Classified Documents

The Kim Jong Un's *Teachings and Instructions* and the *WPK Policy Directives* (a bounded compilation of Kim Jong Un's approved policy documents) serves as the main foundational source for this report, which have been obtained by the non-profit private research organization, Korea Analysis & Strategy Consultancy (KAS), based in Seoul for the past five years. These documents are among the materials directly leaked by high-ranking officials currently working in various institutions in North Korea, who captured them using digital cameras and leaked them in a digital file format. KAS possesses a vast and diverse range of such materials. On July 19,


18. These materials are discussed more in detail in Chapter 2.

19. The Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) verifies through various methods whether or not the party organizations actually fulfilled the instructions specified in this policy document.

2020 (based on the date of online article publication), KAS publicly disclosed one of Kim Jong Un’s approved policy documents for the first time through a South Korean media outlet.²⁰ Subsequently, domestic and international media outlets have occasionally acquired several other documents of Kim Jong Un’s approved policies independently and reported on them.²¹

The following materials can be understood as follows. Firstly, the Kim Jong Un’s *Teachings and Instructions* come with a green cover even for a single page document. The left image in Figure 1 is a compilation of Kim Jong Un’s remarks from January to March 2013, classified as “secret.” Additionally, the image on the right represents remarks made by Kim Jong Un to Prime Minister Pak Pong Ju on May 10, 2016, and it is classified as “top secret.” The titles of these materials specify the period and the subjects mentioned by Kim Jong Un.

Figure 1. Example of Kim Jong Un’s *Teachings and Instructions* Covers




20. Sung ho Cho, “[Exclusive] North Korean ‘Top Secret’ Document Reported to Kim Jong-un by Key Departments of the Workers’ Party of Korea: 3,880 Officials from the Ministry of Nuclear Industry Received Dental Treatment Due to Radiation Exposure,” *Monthly Chosun*, August 2020.

21. Jiro Ishamaru, “<Full Text of North Korea’s Latest Internal Documents> Kim Jong Un Regime’s Eradication of Defectors and Hostility to South Korean Operations,” Asia Press, July 30, 2020; Ji won Kang and Jiro Ishamaru, “<North Korea> President Moon Referred to with Vulgar Swear Words such as ‘Fool’ and ‘Full of Shit’ in Obtained Documents...Why Educate Residents about Hate?” Asia Press, August 21, 2023; Gwang sung Jung, “[Exclusive] North Korean Organization and Guidance Department’s Census Data,” *Monthly Chosun*, February 2022 Issue; Young suk Song, “[Exclusive] ‘Enemies Spread the Virus...Quarantine is also a War without Guns,’” *KBS News*, June 14, 2022.

Secondly, Figure 2 below is documents released by KAS through the media on July 19, 2020. These documents serves as an example of Kim Jong Un’s approved policy documents within the 2017 WPK Policy Implementation Directives, and show the following information.

Figure 2. Examples of Kim Jong Un’s Approved Policy Documents included in the 2017 WPK Policy Implementation Directives



해주치고 하면서 ○○○기업소에 나가 낫에는 시료시일을 하고 밤에는 용이예 작과 다음날 치료준비를 한것을 비롯하여 30여일동안 주야전투를 벌려 140 여명에게 용이물, 200여명에게 보철을 성의껏 해주어 그들이 핵무력강화를 위한 투쟁에 적극 협조하시도록 하였습니다.

특히 의사 리용우(48살)는 지난해 8월 가시야비시가 사망하고 9월에는 안개 관병으로 병원에 입원하였다는 소식을 받았으나 친척들과 이웃들에게 부당하고 미용혹고중을 이겨내면서 최마치료에 전심전력하였으며 환자들이 늘어나면서 진료용자재가 부족되자 가정에서 마련한 700여USS로 치과의사들에게 최근 시료부품에서 이룩한 성과와 치료경험도 알려주면서 그들의 헌신적모수준을 높이준것을 비롯하여 지난 5년간 한번도 고대하지 않고 헌정치료성원으로 나가 원자력공업성 종업원들에 대한 치료에 자기의 모든것을 다 바치었습니다.

이와 관련하여 ○○○연구소 연구사 김일원(70살)은 《체대로 움직이지 못하는 나팔 위해 의자들이 집애치 왔다와 새 용이물 해주니 얼마나 고마운지 모르겠다, 10여년전에 귀운 부분틀이가 건튼지리는데다가 이금까지 다 빠져 고통이 많이 아니었는데 이제는 마음놓고 움직임을 정출수 있게 되었다.

이런 훌륭한 치료를 받도록 해주신 경에하는 최고병도사들에게 고마움의 인사말을 삼가 드리고싶다. 숨이 지는 마지막 순간까지 나라의 핵력제력강화를 위한 과학연구사일에 모든것을 다 바치겠다》고 하였으며

○○○기업소 모동자 김성배(57살)는 《방사선피해로 앞이발 3대까 빠져 남보기 부끄러웠으며 발음이 제대로 되지 않는것은 물론 곁사람이 키키키키 하였다. 게다가 이금까지 다 빠져 발음 제대로 먹출수 없어 얼마나 고통하였는지 모른다.

그런데 최종합병원 의사들이 치료를 잘 해주어 이모는 고통이 완전히 없어지고 10년보다 젊어진것 같다. 앞으로 더 많은 광자를 생산하여 나라의 핵병기장을 일격같이 밀어내자는 데 적극 이바지하겠다》고 하였었습니다.

김금단 원자력공업성 영위원장은 《보건성 최종합병원의 의료인원들이 지난 5년동안 핵물질생산장동과 연구소들에 내러와 3,600여명의 종업원들을 성실정의로 치료해주었는데 정말 고맙고 잊지 않은 일이다. 누가 알아 주진말진 당의 핵무력건설로신용을 높이 발받고 뛰쳐 앞은 일이다. 누가 알아 창성과 재조한 광성을 다 바치기 고집은 이들의 소행을 년비 소개선전하고 정치적으로 평가해주었으면 좋겠다》고 한것을 비롯하여 원자력공업성인의 일군들과 연구사, 모동자들속에서 좋은 반응들이 제기되었습니다.

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대체적의견: ...

...모진성 최종합병원 의료인원들의 소행을 널리 소개선전하도록 하였으면 합니다.

F 조처사실정황:

C 집행정황

등록: 578 - 2017.1.16.

경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지의 2017년 11월 1일 비준방침

모든 산과 별, 바다를 황금산, 황금벌, 황금해로 전변시키기 위한 투쟁에 모든 대중을 불러일으키기 위한 선전선동사업대책과 관련한 제의서 (선전선동부)

대체적의견:

1. 황금산, 황금벌, 황금해의 새 력사를 창조하고 빛내여나갈데 대한 당의 숭고한 뜻을 일군들과 근로자들속에 깊이 체득시키기 위한 선전교양사업을 힘있게 벌리려고 합니다.

※ The title of the sample documents above is "Documents and Measures on Healthcare Workers of the General Dental Hospital of the Ministry of Public Health Providing Sincere Treatment to Nuclear Industry Employees." This document was distributed to various levels of party organizations after the OGD of the WPK CC reported to Kim Jong Un on the exemplary cases of healthcare workers at the General Dental Hospital of the Ministry of Public Health and received his instruction to propagate these cases to institutions, organizations, and industrial establishments. According to this document, dentists at the General Dental Hospital provided dental treatment to approximately 3,600 individuals, including scientists, researchers, technicians, workers, and residents who were exposed to radiation while participating in the production of nuclear materials, nuclear weapons, and nuclear tests under the nuclear industry from 2013 to 2017. The individuals involved in nuclear material production, nuclear weapons, and nuclear tests received dental treatments, suggesting that they have suffered damages from radiation exposure.

Table 1. Explanation of Figure 2

Item	In Korean	Contents
A	등록: 577	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • It refers to the number registered in the <i>WPK Policy Implementation Directives</i> held by the relevant institution. This document is the 577th registered document among Kim Jong Un's approved policy documents distributed in 2017. • At the end of the document, the next document immediately follows below. That is, the 578th document begins right below.
B	2017.11.6.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is the date of registration in the <i>WPK Policy Implementation Directives</i> held by the relevant institution. This article was registered on November 6, 2017.
C	경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지의 2017년 10월 26일 비준방침	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • All approved policy documents are stipulated as "The Approved Policy by the Respected Supreme Leader Comrade Kim Jong Un (date approved by Kim Jong Un)." This document was approved by Kim Jong Un on October 26, 2017.
D	보건성 치과종합병원 의료일군들이 원자력공업성 종업원들을 성 심성의로 치료해주고있는 자료와 대책안	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This is the title of this document. The title of this document can be translated into English as the "Materials and Measures of Health Workers at the General Dental Hospital of the Ministry of Public Health Treating Workers of the Nuclear Industry with Sincerity." The documents in the <i>WPK Policy Implementation Directives</i> contain contents related to policy establishment, enforcement, and inspections in the fields of politics, economy, society, and culture. It also contains detailed trends of residents and cadres. However, these documents do not contain sensitive topics such as counterintelligence, espionage operations, or WMD. • In all documents reported to Kim Jong Un, there are statements that say, "I would like to (propose)," or "The plan is to..." The reason is that all policies and issues are reported in advance and put into action after receiving approval from Kim Jong Un. • The title of each document contains terms that define the nature of the report. In general, if the title of the document includes the phrases "Materials and Measures," "Report of Materials and Measures," and "Analyzed Materials and Measures," these are documents that have been instructed by Kim Jong Un in the past and are proposing measures after identifying the related phenomena, current situation, and trends. And if the phrase "Reported Materials and Measures" is included, it is a document that comprehensively reports the issues raised by the reporting entity itself in terms of policy or subordinate departments under its jurisdiction. Titles of other documents contain phrases such as "Proposal Related to Measures," "Action Report for Implementing Instructions," and "Report on the Implementation Status and Opinion of the Task to be Approved."

E	(조직지도부)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The name of the institution that received the report and approval is written here. This document has the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD) as the responsible institution. The OGD is responsible for not only political, economic and social policies, but also public safety and detailed trends of individual residents. Therefore, documents from the OGD occupy a considerable portion of the <i>WPK Policy Implementation Directives</i>.
F	조직사업정형	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The organizational standard refers to the result of holding a meeting to establish measures to implement and carry out the policy after each party organization receives Kim Jong Un's policy directions. The organizational work statement must be handwritten by the person in charge of the party organization that received this document.
G	집행정형	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Execution standard refers to the results of implementing Kim Jong Un's policy, and the plan established at the meeting. The execution standard must be handwritten by the person in charge of the party organization.

The *WPK Policy Implementation Directives* is the most significant document that the OGD thoroughly examines when conducting an inspection of the entire party organization in North Korea. Particularly, sections F (Organizational Execution Standard, 조직집행정형) and G (Execution Standard, 집행정형) in Table 1 serve as measures to determine whether the party organization has effectively implemented Kim Jong Un's policies. However, despite the importance of these two sections, they are not disclosed in this report. This is because publicly revealing these handwritten sections could lead to the identification and tracking of the document provider through handwriting analysis.

In-depth Interviews

The number of North Korean defectors entering South Korea has significantly increased since the 2000s. Subsequently, these defectors started to disclose various information about North Korea to South Korea and the international community.²² During this period, a wide range of information flowed into North

22. According to the Ministry of Unification (MOU), which is in charge of resettlement of North Korean defectors in South Korea, a total of 33,916 North Korean defectors entered South Korea as of March

Korea from various entities in South Korea and the international community, and at the same time, information from North Korea leaked to the outside world.²³ As a result, information about the previously unknown internal situation of North Korea became available, allowing for opportunities to examine the situation from multiple perspectives. However, there were also many side effects. Several instances of erroneous or false information, information that was difficult to verify or corroborate, were continually produced by defectors. In some cases, misinformation intentionally spread by North Korean authorities was also exposed without proper verification.²⁴ Additionally, while the general North Korean population has a strong desire for access to and acquisition of information, they typically encounter inaccurate information that is orally transmitted due to the tight information control within the system. Consequently, unless defectors have direct experience in officially producing and reporting information while working in North Korea, there is very little information available to ordinary citizens on

2023. Women account for 71.9%. Until 1998, only 947 North Korean defectors entered South Korea. However, since 2002, more than 1,000 people have entered the country every year, and since 2006, more than 2,000 people have settled in Korea every year. From 2012, the number decreased again to around 1,000 people. However, with the onset of the COVID-19, 229 people in 2020, 63 people in 2021, 67 people in 2022, and 34 people as of March 2023 entered South Korea. MOU website <https://www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/business/NKDefectorsPolicy/status/lately/> (accessed May 17, 2023).

23. The inflow and outflow of information to and from North Korea is made mostly between North Korean defectors whose names cannot be revealed, and ordinary citizens and officials living in North Korea. However, after the COVID-19, getting information in and out of North Korea became very difficult. Meanwhile, as a number of confidential documents leaked from North Korea increased, the North Korean authorities are taking various measures to reinforce document security. Young Jung, "North Korea Strengthens Crackdown on Confidential Leakage Through Electronic Media," RFA, June 5, 2014; Myung Chul Lee, "Censorship on North Korean Officials' Management of Secret Documents," RFA, April 1, 2021; Myung Chul Lee, "Party Secrets Leaked in Yanggang, North Hamgyeong, and North Pyeongan Provinces" RFA, May 5, 2021.
24. Jung Yeon Kim served as a secret agent for the Ministry of State Security (MSS)'s Overseas Counterintelligence Bureau as a part of Sonamu Team, while attending Pyongyang Medical University after being selected by the director of the Pyongyang City Bureau of the State Security Department, Kim Hak Pae in 1974. After entering South Korea in November 1992, she testified that departments were established within the State Security Department in the late 1980s that manipulated public opinion and produced disinformation. According to her memoirs, in 1986, Kim Jong Il ordered Ri Jin Su, director of the MSS, to set up a department dedicated to manipulating public opinion, emphasizing the importance of conspiracy tactics and strategies. After that, she said that the Operational Secretariat was newly established in the MSS, and the Operational Guidance Division, Psychological Tactics Division, and Counter-Utilization Division were established within it. She also said that in 1989, a conspiracy manipulation group was created to produce and distribute false information. Jungyeon Kim, *Pyongyang Women (Part 2): Testimony of the Secret Agent Escapee, Birobong*, (Seoul: Koryo Books, 1995), p. 42.

the mechanisms of the North Korean regime or other macro-level aspects of the country.

In North Korea, all information is thoroughly segmented based on affiliation and social hierarchy, and there is no organization or cadre serving as a control tower. The reason for this is that information itself is power. The concentration of information implies the concentration of power, and if information is concentrated in a particular department or individual, it means that there has been a leakage in the monolithic dictatorial power of the suryong. Accordingly, North Korea strictly segments all information. Even for high-ranking officials who have worked in the OGD (조직지도부) or the Secretariat (서기실), which allows direct reporting to Kim Jong Un, access to information is limited, and sharing is impossible. The same applies to intelligence agencies that require organic collection of information.²⁵

Despite such circumstances, in-depth interviews with North Korean defectors remain important because there is a wealth of information that cannot be accessed from outside the North Korean regime.²⁶ In other words, for researchers and analysts outside of North Korea to gain access of inside information, the testimonies of defectors with specific experiences in certain fields are essential. Of course, it is possible to obtain a certain level of information through technical intelligence (TECHINT) utilizing satellites or advanced equipment, as well as the sophisticated reasoning and deduction of researchers. However, to produce meaningful intelligence based on the confirmation of authentic and internal information that cannot be verified by advanced equipment the testimony of insiders is absolutely crucial.

Therefore, in-depth interviews with North Korean defectors, known as Human Intelligence (HUMINT), remain an important method in North Korean research. Above all, the interviewer must possess skilled capabilities to prevent intentional or unintentional falsehoods, errors, and distortions. First and foremost, the interviewer must have language proficiency and basic knowledge of North Korea, enabling them to cross-verify information themselves. Additionally, it

25. D-4, who worked as an overseas operative in the External Investigation Department and Operation Department of the WPK CC, testified that during the time he worked, there was no control tower department within each agency.

26. Among them, information on the personal affairs of Kim Jong Un and his family, inside information on "special areas" such as nuclear facilities or political prison camps, and information on spy agencies targeting South Korea and overseas are areas that are virtually inaccessible to private researchers.

is essential for the interviewer to have the capacity to selectively identify and contact defectors who have specific knowledge about the desired information. In other words, they should be able to find defectors who have firsthand experience with the information they seek, much like searching for information in a library or online. Furthermore, the interviewer should have the ability to cross-verify the personal backgrounds of the defectors through various networks.²⁷ Only when the interviewer possesses these two capabilities can they engage in relatively accurate and specific question-and-answer exchanges with the interviewees.

Considering these circumstances, this project selected interviewees as indicated in Table 2. The most important criterion for selecting interviewees was individuals who held leadership or significant positions in the party organization, beyond the level of a cell in North Korea. This is because the Workers' Party of Korea (WPK) is a core organization responsible for operating the North Korean regime. Therefore, individuals without work experience within the party organization would have limited knowledge of the party-centered dictatorial mechanism, including organization, ideology, cadres (personnel), as well as policy formulation, decision-making, and implementation structures. Furthermore, individuals who have served in the military or intelligence agencies were selected as interviewees because the *WPK Policy Implementation Directives* or official documents do not include details about military operations, training, espionage, and reconnaissance.

27. Without cross-verification of the specific and accurate background of the North Korean defectors, it is impossible to verify whether the words and writings of the defectors are true. Some South Korean civic and research groups that collect testimonies from North Korean defectors unilaterally accept the testimonies of North Korean defectors without conducting background checks, and in the end produce erroneous results different from the facts. If the number of these situations grows, it threatens the reliability of the testimonies of all North Korean defectors.

Table 2 In-depth Interviewee Status

Case Number	Year of Entry to ROK	Main Professional Experience	Highest Education Level
D-1	2020	Public Prosecutor, Ryanggang Provincial Prosecution Office, Land and Environmental Control Division General Advisor, Legal Affairs Division, Hyesan City People's Committee of Ryanggang Province Completed People's Economy College (in Pyongyang), Law Department Training Course Division Chief, Protection Supervision Division, Ryanggang Provincial Forest Management Office Guidance Officer, Organizing Department of Party Committee, Ryanggang Provincial Forestry Management Bureau	Bachelor's degree (DPRK)
D-2	2019	Chargé d'Affaires, DPRK Embassy in Kuwait Second Secretary, DPRK Embassy in Syria Ministry of Foreign Affairs, second grade researcher (equivalent to deputy director)	Bachelor's degree (DPRK)
D-3	N/A	Korean People's Army General Staff Department OO Bureau Military Officer	Bachelor's degree (DPRK)
D-4	1996	Graduated from Kim Jong Il Political Military University International Espionage Agent of Division 7 of the External Investigation Department, WPK CC International Espionage Agent of Division 4 of Operations Department, WPK CC	Bachelor's degree (DPRK)
F-1	N/A	Diplomat at the German Embassy in Pyongyang	N/A

※ D-1, D-2, D-4 are individuals whose career in North Korea and real or alias names have been publicly disclosed through the media.

The selection process of interviewees as well as conducting and reviewing of in-depth interviews were carried out solely by the co-researcher, Dr. Kwanhyung Lee. Dr. In Su Kwak, on the other hand, focused on the cross-examination of the compiled in-depth interview content for inclusion in this report. This research project included a total of five interviewees, consisting of four North Korean defectors and one foreigner. While three of the defectors were willing to disclose their real names, one refused to do so. Therefore, they are referred to as D-1 to D-4

in this report. The foreign interviewee, F-1, is a diplomat who was stationed at the German Embassy in Pyongyang.

Interviewee D-1 served as a guidance officer in the Organization Department of the Ryanggang Provincial Forestry Management Bureau. Although his final career was as a prosecutor in the Ryanggang Provincial Prosecution Office, NK Watch paid more attention to his organization department experience. Among defectors who have entered South Korea, individuals with experience above the guidance official-level in the organization department are extremely rare.²⁸ D-2 was a senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also has experience in the Party organization. Therefore, he can provide information about both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the party system simultaneously. D-3 and D-4 do not have experience in the party organization, but they have served as a military officer in the General Staff Department (총참모부) and the overseas espionage agent in the External Investigation Department (대외조사부) respectively. They can provide perspectives from their firsthand experiences with the influence of the WPK CC in the military and intelligence agencies. In particular, D-3 personally witnessed significant incidents that occurred in North Korea at the headquarters of the Department of People's Armed Forces.²⁹

The only foreign interviewee, F-1, worked as a diplomat at the German Embassy in Pyongyang. NK Watch interviewed F-1 in order to collect his opinions on the power mechanism in Pyongyang that he directly experienced and felt, despite being an “outsider.” F-1 answered NK Watch's questions sincerely and kindly, providing interesting insights into the power mechanism in Pyongyang. Furthermore, F-1 mentioned that most of the people he had direct contact with during his work in Pyongyang were officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Department of the Workers' Party, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), and the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland under the United Front Department.

Lastly, Dr. Kwak, a co-researcher in this project, has experience working in

28. D-1 told NK Watch, “After entering South Korea in December 2019, I received questions about party affiliation guidance and the Workers' Party mechanism for the first time.”

29. The timing of D-3's escape from North Korea and his service at the General Staff Department are not disclosed. North Korean defectors who served as military officers in the General Staff are a minority. D-3 gave specific and important testimonies. However, it may be possible to identify who he is if some details are revealed. Therefore, the details of D-3's career are omitted.


the Pyongyang Shoe Factory Party Committee (a party organization of the scale of a primary-level party committee) as a secretary (September 1993-March 1994) and as the head of the Organization Division of the Dongdaewon District Party Committee in Pyongyang (April-October 1994). His main occupation in North Korea was in the WPK CC's Liaison Department (연락부) (currently the Cultural Exchange Bureau) and as a member of the clandestine operatives to South Korea. The Liaison Department operated various educational programs for the cultivation and enhancement of espionage operatives. As one of these programs, he worked at the Pyongyang Shoe Factory Party Committee and the Dongdaewon District Party Committee in Pyongyang under a disguised identity (note: even within North Korea, undercover operatives use disguised identities) as a part of the training program, "Practical Cadre Training."³⁰ He was not a full-time party cadre, and his work experience was only for a year. However, considering that individuals who have directly experienced the mechanisms of the party organization in the upper echelons are extremely limited, NK Watch invited Dr. Kwak as a co-researcher. Above all, individuals who can verify and confirm the authenticity of the *suryong's Teachings and Instructions*, and *WPK Policy Implementation Directives* of Kim Jong Un's approved policy documents are rare. In other words, defectors who have directly experienced the workings of the Workers' Party and have handled such documents are an exceptional minority. Dr. Kwak is one of the very few individuals outside North Korea who can verify and confirm the secret documents of the Workers' Party.

30. In the early 1980s, Kim Jong Il presented a policy for nurturing new and younger generation of secret agents and leadership core following the generational change. Accordingly, a four-year educational program was introduced at the Kim Jong Il Political Military Academy, a college for training spies and combatants. In the case of operatives who graduated from this school, they continuously received training to get experience through "Practical Labor Training," which allows them to experience labor as workers in the labor field, "Practical Cadre Training," to experience the life of cadre through placement and acting as regional party cadres and "South Korean Training" where they received training to survive and adjust in the actual South Korean society. Kwanhyung Lee, "A Study on North Korean Spies: Interviews with Former Elite Secret Agents of North Korea," *Korean Journal of Military Art and Science*, 76(1) (2020), pp. 17-18.

II

Power of the Suryong Dictatorship:

the Monolithic Ideological System



North Korea's ideology is not socialism or communism. In North Korea, the "will (thoughts) and teachings of the suryong" are the sole ideology and fundamental driving force of the dictatorial power. North Korea finds the origin of the regime's existence in individuals like Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un. Among them, Kim Jong Un, who is leading the revolution of achieving the unification of Korea that Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il failed to accomplish, is the only person with "ideological authority." Therefore, at present, the will and teachings of Kim Jong Un are the only ideology of North Korea.

In the past, the terms used for the will and teachings of the suryong were "Juche ideology" and "Kimilsungism," but after the passing of Kim Jong Il, they were replaced with "Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism." The will and teachings of the suryong are not metaphorical or symbolic expressions but physical tools that actually move and constrain the entire regime. Consequently, all organizations and people within North Korea, except for the suryong cannot deviate from the boundary of the monolithic ideology (also known as the one-ideology system).

When listing all of North Korean laws, regulations, and norms in order of their significance, the highest ranking would be: 1) The "divine commands" of the suryong's teachings and words, 2) The Ten Principles that institutionalize the will and teachings of the suryong, 3) Rules (Charter) of the Workers' Party of Korea, 4) the Constitution, and 5) General laws including the criminal code. In other words, the "divine commands" of the suryong not only governs policies at the state level but also dominates everyday life as an absolute norm. Subsequently, the Ten Principles holds a subordinate status as the detailed criteria for actualizing the will and teachings of the suryong. While the WPK Charter represents the rules and regulations of the Workers' Party and its members, it practically holds a higher position than the Constitution or general laws since the suryong's dictatorship is carried out by party organizations. Thus, suryong's teachings and words, Ten Principles, and the WPK Charters are non-judicial norms that cannot be found in other countries, but in North Korea, they hold the strongest legal authority.

2.1 Strengthening the Suryong Dictatorship and Establishing Mechanisms

2.1.1 Executions and Purges to Strengthen the Suryong Dictatorship

The main figure who fully equipped the mechanism of the suryong dictatorship based on the Workers' Party was none other than Kim Jong Il. Kim Il Sung strengthened his dictatorial power through alliances, betrayals, and purges of other political forces with the support of the Soviet Union. Kim Jong Il, with the backing of Kim Il Sung, created an efficient and systematic mechanism to maintain his dictatorial power stably and permanently, imprinting it on the entire regime. From this process of imprints and outcomes of this mechanism, it operated as the structural and fundamental causes of crimes against humanity.

Until the 1950s, North Korea's dictatorship was clearly a one-party dictatorship under the WPK, but it was not a personal dictatorship centered around Kim Il Sung. At that time, the WPK was a party based on Marxist-Leninist ideology, and Kim Il Sung, along with various political alliance forces in North Korea, played a role as the representative of the collective leadership system.¹ However, since the armistice before July 27, 1953, all potential rival forces to Kim Il Sung and his political competitors were suppressed or suspiciously perished.

According to Pak Kil Yong, a former vice foreign minister of North Korea, Kim Il Sung shot Cho Man Sik to death, the representative of the Korean Democratic Party, in late September to early October 1950, who introduced him to the citizens of Pyongyang for the first time.² Ho Kai (or Alexei Ivanovic Hegai), deputy premier

1. Kim Il Sung was appointed Prime Minister on September 9, 1948, and Chairman of the WPK CC on June 30, 1949. In addition, during the Korean War that broke out on June 25, 1950, Kim Il Sung served as Marshal of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army.

2. In August 1945, Kim Sung Chu returned to North Korea with the Russians as a captain in the Russian Army. He approached Cho Man Sik, Korean Nationalist and the most respected non-Communist leader in North Korea, telling him privately that he was a fervent nationalist and did not believe in Communist plans for Korea. Cho introduced Kim at a liberation celebration in Pyongyang on October 3, 1945, as Kim Il Sung, describing him as an ardent patriot and nationalist. Cho's reputation assured Kim to receive an enthusiastic reception from the general public, which did not stop to consider that the real KIM Il Sung must have been a much older man. General Staff of Headquarters Far East Command Military Intelligence Section, *History of The North Korean Army* (Security Information) (July 31, 1952), p. 90; Kook Hoo Kim, "Midnight Pyongyang Prison Execution: The Dramatic End of Cho

at the time and also representative of the “Soviet faction,” indirectly intervened in the execution of Cho and was also mysteriously killed on July 2, 1953. At that time, the North Korean leadership treated the incident as a suicide. To remove Park Hon Yong, who was the representative of the South Korean Workers’ Party and vice premier, and also his biggest rival, Kim Il Sung executed and purged those closest to Pak first. According to Kang Sang Ho, who served as the first vice minister of the Internal Affairs and the chief of the General Political Bureau of North Korea from 1953 to 1958, he claimed that about 4,000 members affiliated with the South Korean Workers’ Party who had moved to North Korea from South Korea were purged at that time.³ The punishments included execution, imprisonment, exile, and forced labor on collective farms or in mines, classified by rank. It is noteworthy that the practice of collective punishment or guilt-by-association that punished not only the individuals charged but also their families and closest affiliations, which continues to this day, started from this period.⁴ In other words, North Korea’s crimes against humanity originated from this period—a series of executions and suppression carried out by Kim Il Sung to strengthen his dictatorial power.

In August 1953, Kim Il Sung announced a decision stating that Ri Sung Yop (then secretary of the WPK) and Ri Kang Guk (deputy minister of foreign affairs) were criminals against the party and the state, and that they were also responsible for Ho Kai’s suicide. As stated in this decision, the WPK revealed that it had “exposed and suppressed those who had infiltrated the party and engaged in factional, hostile, and renegade activities, in order to guarantee the purity and unity of the party and promote the solidification of the party based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism.”⁵

Man-Sik Revealed”, *Joongang Ilbo*, July 19, 1991.

3. Sang-ho Kang, “My North Korean Purge: Eliminating the South Korean Workers’ Party (15),” *Joongang Ilbo*, May 24, 1993; Sang-ho Kang, “My North Korean Purge: Eliminating the South Korean Workers’ Party (16),” *Joongang Ilbo*, May 31, 1993; Sang-ho Kang, “My North Korean Purge: Eliminating the South Korean Workers’ Party (18),” *Joongang Ilbo*, June 15, 1993; Sang-ho Kang, “My North Korean Purge: Eliminating the South Korean Workers’ Party (20),” *Joongang Ilbo*, June 28, 1993.
4. North Korea detains those punished as “anti-party, anti-revolutionary factionalists” in political prison camps. When detained, not only the punished individual, but also his or her family and relatives, and the family and relatives of business associates are also detained. This is North Korea’s guilt-by-association system.
5. Gwang Oon Kim, *A Study on the Political History of North Korea I: The Foundation of the Party, Nation, and Military*, (Seoul: Sunin, 2003).

As a result, at a special trial of the Supreme Court of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held on December 15, 1955, Pak Hon Yong was sentenced to death and all his property was confiscated. Kim Il Sung shifted the blame for the failure of the Korean War to Pak Hon Yong and the South Korean Workers' Party faction and transitioned to a dictator. Kim Il Sung's purges continued. From August 1956 to March 1958, Kim Il Sung identified officials affiliated with the Yanan faction, which received support from China, and the Soviet faction, which received support from the Soviet Union, as "factionalists against the party and the revolution." As a result, from December 1958 to December 1960, the "Central Party Concentrated Guidance Campaign" was implemented, leading to their execution or forced resettlement in remote mountainous regions.⁶

When Kim Il Sung entered North Korea from the Soviet Union in September 1945 and first revealed himself to the public, he had no political foundation. At that time, the only individuals who could be considered as Kim Il Sung's close aides were 17 guerrilla soldiers who came with him from the Soviet Union. The reason Kim Il Sung was able to establish his dictatorial power as the suryong was not only due to the absolute support of the Soviet Union but also because he thoroughly eliminated potential rivals and future competitors. Even though the dictatorship centered around Kim Il Sung was established by the late 1960s through the large-scale purges, it continues to be practiced in the same manner to this day.

2.1.2 Constructing the Suryong Dictatorship Mechanism

The mechanism of suryong dictatorship was fully established after Kim Jong Il officially became the successor. While Kim Jong Il fulfilled the basic requirements as the eldest son of Kim Il Sung, he also eliminated numerous competing factions to secure his dictatorial power. From 1967 to 1969, Kim Jong Il purged high-ranking officials who opposed his succession. In 1971, he also purged Kim Song Gap, the Organization Secretary of the Pyongyang City Party Committee, and his associates. Kim Song Gap was the younger brother of Kim Song Ae, Kim Il Sung's second wife. Kim Jong Il perceived family members as the most threatening forces

6. National Unification Board Information Analysis Bureau, *North Korea Overview*, (Seoul: National Unification Board, 1990).

to his dictatorial power and referred to them as “side branches (곁가지).” In 1973, Kim Jong Il expelled Kim Yong Ju, Kim Il Sung’s younger brother and his uncle who was the WPK CC OGD Director and in 1980, he purged Kim Pyong Il, Kim Yong Il, and Kim Kyong Jin, the children of Kim Il Sung and Kim Song Ae.⁷

Kim Jong Il began his career as a guidance official in the Secretariat of the WPK CC in 1964. He later served as the chief guidance official of the Central Guidance Division of the OGD in 1966, the cultural and artistic guidance chief of the PAD in 1968, and the deputy director of the PAD in 1969. In 1970, when Kim Yong Ju, the Director of the OGD at the time (Kim Il Sung’s younger brother), went abroad for a medical treatment, Kim Jong Il took control of the OGD from early 1970 and exercised real power. In September 1973, during the 7th Plenum of the 5th WPK Central Committee, Kim Jong Il was anointed as the successor as the director of the OGD and PAD. In February 1974, during the 8th Plenum of the 5th Central Committee, his succession was officially formalized.⁸

The mechanism of suryong dictatorship can be considered to have been completed after Kim Jong Il’s confirmation as the successor. However, the personal dictatorship and personality cult of the suryong accelerated significantly after the 15th Plenum of the 4th Central Committee of the Workers' Party in May 1967. During this meeting, Kim Il Sung emphasized two points as “urgent tasks.” The first was to remind all party members and workers of “Comrade Kim Il Sung’s revolutionary ideology,” on all party members and workers, and the second was to identify and punish revisionist and anti-revolutionary elements within the

7. However, Kim Jong Il did not execute or assassinate his uncles and half-brothers like Kim Jong Un. However, no news has been released about Kim Pyong Il and Kim Kyong Jin, who appear to be currently in North Korea. Kim Pyong Il began his career in 1977 as an officer in the Department of People's Armed Forces. In 1979, Kim Jong Il dispatched Kim Pyong Il to Yugoslavia as an assistant attaché (military diplomat) at the North Korean embassy and continued to live abroad. Kim Pyong Il served as ambassador to Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, Poland and the Czech Republic. Meanwhile, on November 4, 2019, South Korea's National Intelligence Service reported to the National Assembly's intelligence committee that "it seems that Ambassador Kim Pyong Il will soon be replaced and returned home." Also, Kim Pyong Il's older sister, Kim Kyong Jin's husband, Kim Kwang Sok, the North Korean ambassador to Austria, is also likely to be replaced and return home, so it seems that Kim Kyong Jin returned to North Korea with Kim Pyong Il. It is known that Kim Yong Il died of cirrhosis of the liver in May 2000 while serving as a counselor at the North Korean Representative Office in Berlin.

8. Pyung-gil Shin, *Kim Jong Il and North Korean Espionage*, (Seoul: Institute of North Korean Studies, 1997); Soo-nam Choi, Guem-soon Park, Young Ahn, *70 Years of Chosun Leadership*, (Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 2015).

party.⁹ This specific order by Kim Il Sung is known within North Korea as the “May 25th Teaching” and marked the turning point for the establishment of the suryong dictatorship.¹⁰ Afterward, Kim Jong Il replaced traditional Marxist-Leninist ideology with Kimilsungism (Juche ideology), deepening the cult of personality around Kim Il Sung.

2.2 Ideological Dictatorship

2.2.1 The Suryong’s Ideological Authority

On May 12, 2013, Kim Jong Un mentioned the following to the officials of the Central Committee of the WPK:

“Our Party’s ideology is strictly a monolithic management system. There should be no room for any compromise, even by 1mm, in the principles of the monolithic management system. All issues raised in our Party’s ideology operations must be reported thoroughly to the Party Central Committee and handled accordingly by the decisions of the Central Party.” Remarks by Beloved General Secretary, Comrade Kim Jong Un to the Chief Officials of the Party Central Committee on May 12, 2013, (Juche 102) (Top Secret), pp. 4-5.

The term “Central Party” has been used to refer to Kim Jong Il since the 1970s. In other words, the “Central Party” refers to the suryong, the supreme authority. As evident from Kim Jong Un’s remarks, the suryong is the sole person with the power

9. Soo-nam Choi, Guem-soon Park, Young Ahn, *70 Years of Chosun Leadership*, pp. 86-87.

10. Starting with the “May 25th Teaching,” the existing socialist and communist ideologies, including Marxism-Leninism, were deleted throughout North Korean society and Kim Il Sung filled the vacancy. In the “book organization project” that started in the late 1960s and continued until the mid-1970s, among the books in every home and workplace, books that did not conform to the leader’s idolization and absoluteness were retrieved. Since the mid-1970s, books such as *Capital: Critique of Political Economy and The Communist Manifesto* have all been recalled. In other words, the Cultural Revolution that occurred in China between 1966 and 1976 also occurred in North Korea. Hye-rang Song, *Wisteria House: The Autobiography of Song Hye-rang* (Seoul: Chisiknara, 2000), p. 313; Seong-Il Hyun, *North Korea’s National Strategy and Power Elite: Focusing on Cadre Policy* (Seoul: Sunin, 2007), pp. 114-115.

to establish, revise, and interpret North Korea's monolithic ideology. In other words, suryong is the only person who has the ideological authority.¹¹

Starting from the 1970s, Kim Jong Il established mechanisms to concentrate power on himself under the pretext of building a monolithic ideological system and the system of his own leadership. He also bestowed absoluteness upon his own teachings. The reason Kim Jong Il took control of both the OGD and PAD from 1973 and 1980, respectively, was to establish the monolithic leadership system, a dictatorship mechanism, through the OGD on one axis and create the monolithic ideological system through the PAD on the other.

Kim Jong Il turned "the will and teachings of the suryong" into a sophisticated institution and an absolute norm, rather than a simple political tool. This is embodied in the "Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Party's Monolithic Ideological System," (hereinafter the Ten Principles) publicly announced by Kim Jong Il on April 14, 1974.¹² These Ten Principles continue to function as the driving force behind the current North Korean regime.¹³ Kim Jong Un modified the title and some contents of Kim Jong Il's Ten Principles and announced the "Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Party's Monolithic Leadership System" on June 19, 2013 (Appendix II), which were revised again in September 2021.¹⁴ The "monolithic ideology" (1974) changed to "monolithic leadership" (2013) because the monolithic ideology is presumed to have already been absolutized during Kim Jong Il's reign and the current Ten Principles explicitly specify the absoluteness of Kim Jong Un's will and teachings.

From 1973, Kim Jong Il established a system of ideological education

11. The term "ideological authority" is used for convenience in this report.

12. Kim Jong Il, "Let's further strengthen the monolithic ideological system throughout the entire party and society (speech to officials from the WPK central committee, state, economic institutions, labor organizations, people's armed forces, social security, science, education, culture and arts, and press, April 14, 1974)," *Complete Collection of Kim Jong Il Works*, Vol. 23, (Pyongyang: Workers' Party of Korea Publishing House, 2018), pp. 236-269.

13. The person who first devised the Ten Principles was Kim Yong Ju, younger brother of Kim Il Sung and former head of the OGD. Kim Yong Ju devised the Ten Principles in 1967, but as he was purged by Kim Jong Il, and the only founder of the Ten Principles was recorded in North Korean history as Kim Jong Il.

14. This report cites the Ten Principles as amended on June 19, 2013. Please refer to Appendix II for the provisions of the Ten Principles, and for the Ten Principles amended in September 2021, please refer to the National Intelligence Service website, https://www.nis.go.kr/AF/1_2_1.do (accessed 19 May 2023).

targeting the entire population through the PAD, centered around the monolithic ideological system (the will and teachings of Kim Il Sung) and the monolithic leadership system (concentrating all powers on Kim Jong Il to actualize the monolithic ideology). He also established personnel evaluation, investigation and auditing systems through the OGD to control personnel appointments in the party, government, and military, aiming to more strictly fortify ideological and organizational control over all party members and workers.

According to Shin Pyung-gil (formerly known as Pak Byung Yop), who served as a guidance official in the WPK Central Committee's Liaison Department and the deputy director of the WPK External Investigation Department before entering South Korea in the 1980s, Kim Jong Il completed the monolithic leadership system and concentrated power on himself based on the Ten Principles. Specifically, he seized power in the party from September 1973 to 1974, the military from late 1974 to mid-1975, the cabinet, external (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and Reconnaissance General Bureau (targeting South Korea) from 1975 to mid-1976. As the organization secretary and head of the OGD, Kim Jong Il continuously executed audits and inspections on the party, government, military, and reconnaissance agencies from 1973 to 1976 through the OGD apparatus. Organizational and personnel reforms were carried out based on the results of these inspections. By 1977, personnel powers for all institutions within the regime were in Kim Jong Il's hands.

Since his appointment as a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau of the CC of the WPK, Secretary of the WPK CC, and member of the WPK Central Military Commission at the 6th Congress of the WPK in October 1980, Kim Jong Il exercised actual power as the suryong.¹⁵ From 1980 onwards, almost all reports on national strategies and policies were concentrated on Kim Jong Il. In other words, Kim Il Sung retired early from all aspects of governance, except military command and foreign diplomacy.¹⁶ Kim Jong Il, who had become the Supreme Commander of

15. Pyung-gil Shin, *Kim Jong Il and North Korean Espionage*, pp. 137-139; Chang-Hyun Jung, *The CEO of the DPRK Kim Jong Il*, (Seoul: Joongang Books, 2007), pp. 172-192.

16. For 46 days from May 16, 1984, Kim Il Sung departed from Chongjin, North Hamgyong Province, by special train and toured the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania. At the time, the South Korean government mobilized all intelligence lines to trace Kim Il Sung's whereabouts. As a result, the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported that Kim Il Sung, who had health problems, had declared during his visits to Bulgaria and Romania,

the Korean People's Army (KPA) in December 1991, had gained complete dictatorial power as the de facto leader even before Kim Il Sung's death on July 4, 1994.

2.2.2 Seizing Regime Control Through the Institutionalization of the Ten Principles

Since 1973, North Korea's Ten Principles have been applied not only to the Workers' Party Rules (Charter), the Constitution and various laws, but also to national strategies and policies. In other words, the Ten Principles went beyond an ideological tool and became a system that moved everything. However, there are also contradictory opinions. F-1, a German diplomat in Pyongyang, expressed the following opinion about the Ten Principles.

The leadership principle as embodied in the "Ten Principles for the establishment of the one-ideology system." In its efforts to indoctrinate the North Korean population, the regime attaches more importance to the Ten Principles than to the national constitution or the Workers' Party constitution. It is, however, important to keep in mind that the Ten Principles are an ideological instrument that does not reflect reality and that certainly does not prove that the supreme leader enjoys absolute authority. In fact, most North Koreans know quite well that there is a huge gap between the official propaganda and real life and that North Korean society is not monolithic but composed of different interests and social groups that pull into different directions.¹⁷

If the Ten Principles are indeed "an ideological tool that cannot clearly prove that the supreme leader has absolute authority," as F-1 argues, then, it leaves the

"I will hand over the post of president to Kim Jong Il by next year (1985), and I will retire from active duty and maintain only an honorary position." After that, on July 11, 1984, under the supervision of the National Security Planning Department of Korea, a working-level meeting of directors related to post-Kim Il Sung measures was held. Immediately after the meeting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared reports such as "Measures for Post-Kim Il Sung: Kim Jong Il's Power Succession and South Korea's Countermeasures" (July 1984) and "Preparation for Kim Il Sung's Step Down" (August 1984) and reported them to the President. Woosuk Choi, "Contemporary Historical Data: The Chun Doo-Hwan Administration Holds a Meeting to Prepare for the Early Resignation of Kim Il Sung," *Monthly Chosun*, October 2015.

17. Interview with F-1.

conclusion that the suryong dictatorship is a mirage. However, this report sees the Ten Principles not as an ideological tool, but as an institutionalized norm postulating specific standards for all North Korean people and officials to abide by the will and teachings of the suryong. The Ten Principles may seem abstract, much like religious precepts. However, the Ten Principles are actually a “weapon” (punishment system) capable of annihilating an individual and all of his family and relatives, and also a “framework” that supports and sustains North Korea.¹⁸ This report examines how the Ten Principles are imprinted and utilized by all individuals and power structures, including cadres, party members, and ordinary citizens. This fact can also be confirmed in the COI report.

Paragraph 123. Footnote 66. It is even more expressly entrenched in the reported Ten Principles for the Establishment of the One-Ideology System. Principle 5.3 reportedly stipulates that Kim Il-sung’s instructions must be viewed as a legal and supreme order.¹⁹

131. Once the Central Committee elected Kim Jong-il to membership of the Politburo and endorsed his selection as Kim Il-sung’s heir in 1974, he deepened the ideological basis of the Suryong system. Kim Jong-il announced the “Ten Principles in Establishing Party’s Monolithic Ideological System” which called for “unconditional obedience” and “all our loyalty” to Kim Il-sung.²⁰

166. Children are taught to revere and idolize Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and now Kim Jong-un. Plaques with slogans, posters and drawings expressing gratitude to the Supreme Leader are found in kindergartens irrespective of the children’s ability to fully comprehend these messages. In addition to the usual subjects in schools, such as mathematics, science, art and music, an unusually large portion of the school syllabus is dedicated to the instruction about achievements and teachings of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, including the Ten Principles and the DPRK’s official version of its revolutionary history.²¹

18. Cases of punishment based on the Ten Principles are dealt with in Section 2 of Chapter IV.

19. UN, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, p. 32.

20. UN, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, p. 35.

21. UN, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, p. 46.

176. Children in the DPRK are introduced at an early age to “confession and criticism” sessions. Children gather in groups weekly and take turns standing up and describing their activities for the previous week, as far as possible showing how they were living in accordance with the teachings of the Kim philosophy and the Ten Principles. The Principles are recited during the confession.²²

As pointed out by the COI, the Ten Principles are norms that must be imprinted in the heads of all residents and put into action. Of course, just the text of the Ten Principles, like the F-1 claim, cannot be the basis for proving the absolute authority of the suryong. However, these Ten Principles are reflected in the WPK Rules and the Constitution. In other words, since the suryong himself is the source of the system, these texts, which are inevitably seen as non-judicial in ordinary countries, have been used as absolute norms in North Korea for the past 50 years.

The institutionalization of the Ten Principles in North Korea is directly related to crimes against humanity. In other words, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearances, arbitrary detention, and contemporary forms of slavery occurring in North Korea are all based on the Ten Principles, especially executions of high-ranking officials. Punishment is also based on the Ten Principles. How the Ten Principles are imprinted in the North Korean system are elaborated on from Section 1 of Chapter III to Section 2 of Chapter IV. But first, discussion cannot proceed further without a closer look at how the Ten Principles are reflected in the Workers’ Party Rules (Charter) and the Constitution, which form the basic structure of North Korea, as well as national goals, and interests.

First, as stated in Article 1 of the Ten Principles (Appendix II), the suryong of North Korea is the de facto supreme leader who moves the Workers’ Party, state, and military. And this provision is imprinted in the WPK Rules and the Constitution.

Workers’ Party Rules Preamble (January 2021)

“The Workers’ Party of Korea is the great Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist party. Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism is an encyclopedia of the revolution and the construction which has been systematized in an integral way based on the Juche ideology and is a revolutionary and scientific ideology whose truth and vitality have been verified in the practical struggle to

22. UN, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, p. 49.

realize the independence of the masses.” (omitted)

Workers’ Party Rules Article 47 (January 2021)

“The Korean People’s Army, as the basic force for national defense and the main force of the revolution, is the revolutionary armed force of the Workers’ Party of Korea that defends the socialist country, the Party and the revolution with arms and supports the leadership of the Party at the forefront. The Korean People’s Army conducts all military and political activities under the leadership of the Party.”

North Korean Constitution Preamble (August 29, 2019)

“The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is the socialist motherland of Juche where the ideas and leadership of the great leaders Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il are applied. The great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung was the founder of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the father of socialist Korea. (Omitted) The Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea shall, as the codification of the Juche-oriented ideas of the great leaders Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il on State building and their exploits in it, be called the Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il Constitution.”

North Korean Constitution Article 3 (August 29, 2019)

“The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is guided in its State-building and activities exclusively by the great ideology of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.”

As stated above, the Workers' Party of Korea is the “Kimilsungist-Kimjongilist Party,” and the Constitution is the “Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il Constitution,” which legalizes Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism. In other words, it emphasizes that the Workers' Party, the state, and the military are in fact owned by the suryong.

Second, North Korea's national goal is to turn the entire Korean Peninsula, including South Korea, into Kimilsung-Kimjongilist. In other words, it goes beyond North Korea-led unification, and extends to the complete realization of the suryong dictatorship over the entire Korean Peninsula. The suryong’s goal of ruling the entirety of Korea—regardless of its feasibility—is the justification for the dictatorial power that the suryong himself is putting forward. According to North Korea’s Grand Korean Dictionary, it defines the state as “an institution of power

through which the ruling class realizes political control over society” and “a special power institution that performs dictatorship functions.” In other words, the “state” in North Korea is a tool to realize the purpose of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Therefore, the ultimate and immediate goals of the Workers’ Party are actually the national goals of the North Korean regime.

Workers’ Party Rules Preamble (January 2021)

“The Workers’ Party of Korea considers the Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism of the entire society as the highest principle of the party. The immediate purpose of the Workers’ Party of Korea is to build a prosperous and civilized socialist society in the northern half of the Republic and to realize the independent and democratic development of society on a nationwide scale, and its ultimate goal is to build a communist society in which the people’s ideal is fully realized.”

North Korean Constitution Preamble (August 29, 2019)

“Under the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Korean people will uphold the great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung as the eternal President of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and will carry the revolutionary cause of Juche through to completion by defending and carrying forward their ideas and achievements.”

North Korea revised the Workers’ Party Rules in May 2016, after Kim Jong Un came to power, and revised them once more in January 2021. North Korea’s national goal remains unchanged from the 1950s to the present—to carry out a nationwide revolution. This means that the suryong will continue to proceed with the unification of the Korean Peninsula led by North Korea, uncompleted from the Korean War of 1950. Kim Jong Un is hoping to find justification to rule as a leader to complete this revolutionary task passed down from his predecessors. Two additional explanations about North Korea’s national goals are as follows.

In the North Korean scholarship in South Korea, there is a belief that North Korea abandoned the North Korean-centered unification of the Korean Peninsula in the revised Workers’ Party Rules in May 2021, that is, relinquished its revolution against South Korea. However, North Korea has not abandoned this policy line even to this day. Dr. Jong Seok Lee, a prominent South Korean scholar on North Korea who

served as the 2006 National Security Council Chairman and Unification Minister, told a media outlet that North Korea's revolutionary policy toward South Korea and the discourse on reunification had been diminished. He evaluated that the deletion of the term “Democratic Revolution for National Liberation” in the preamble of the WPK Rules goes beyond a mere change in the text and has the implication of putting an end to the existing domestic debate over North Korea's changing strategy toward South Korea. In addition, he revealed that the goal of North Korea's revolution against South Korea has weakened because the existing immediate goal has been revised to “realization of the independent and democratic development of society on a nationwide scale” from the previous statement that read, “carry out the democratic revolution for national liberation on a national scale.”²³

However, this interpretation suggests that Dr. Lee's view is intentionally misinterpreted or he is unfamiliar with North Korea's revolutionary policy toward the South. The “national scale” that North Korea is referring to refers to the entire Korean Peninsula. In addition, “democratic revolution for national liberation” is a phrase that expresses the nature of the revolution that North Korea is advocating, and “independent and democratic development” is an intermediate goal to be achieved in the course of the revolution. In other words, North Korea's “realization of independent and democratic development of society on a nationwide scale” means that when an “independent democratic government” or “national self-reliant government” is established in South Korea in the course of the South Korean revolution, the suryong takes sovereignty and achieves “national unification.” Regarding of this, at the 5th WPK Congress in November 1970, Kim Il Sung emphasized that “the US imperialist aggressor forces have to be driven out of South Korea and only then, can an independent and democratic government be formed in Korea and reunification be possible.” In addition, if immediate unification is difficult, he proposed implementing a transitional form of federalism.²⁴ The “independent and democratic South Korean government” mentioned by Kim Il Sung refers to the political forces that are sympathetic to Kim

23. Je Hun Lee, “Jong-seok Lee on the Completion of North Korea's Party Rules Revision <Kim Jong Un's Party>...Relationship with Japan?” *Hangyeorae*, June 2, 2021.

24. Kim Il Sung, *Report on the Central Committee's Summary of Affairs from the 5th Congress of the Korean Workers' Party*, (Tokyo: Central Standing Committee of the Federation of Korean Workers in Japan, 1970), pp. 102-103

Il Sung's revolutionary task and those that can transfer power to Kim Il Sung.

Even after the deaths of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, North Korea's national goal, the suryong's revolutionary task, is still in progress. From 1945 to the present, the suryong continuously threatens the security of South Korea through the establishment of underground political parties in the south, political intervention, and splitting civil society through organizational espionage (political espionage).²⁵

As is well known, Kim Il Sung illegally invaded South Korea and committed war crimes with military support from the Soviet Union and China. Nonetheless, Kim Il Sung further defined the Korean War as the "Korean Liberation War," and Kim Jong Il defined it as a "war of justice." It is rather ambiguous to understand the views of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il politically or psychologically as a self-defense mechanism. However, what is clear is that the suryong's desire to "North Koreanize South Korea" has not disappeared. Even if the suryong cannot dominate the Korean peninsula by force, he wants to divide and destroy Korean society

25. According to the information obtained by a South Korean media outlet, on March 15, 2023, the NIS and the Seoul Central District Prosecutors' Office, and National Police Agency arrested and prosecuted four individuals for violating the National Security Act and engaging in criminal organization activities. These individuals were part of the "Jaju Tongil Minjunjeonwi or Self-Reliant People's Liberation Front" (also known as the Changwon Spy Ring) formed in accordance with the orders of the North Korean espionage leadership. Additionally, on April 5, the NIS, Jeju District Prosecutors' Office, and National Police Agency prosecuted three individuals for the violations of the National Security Act and engaging in criminal organization activities in collaboration with the North Korea's Cultural Exchange Bureau (formerly the Central Party Liaison Office) by forming an espionage organization called the "HGH" (also known as the Jeju Spy Ring). Furthermore, on May 10, three officials from the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) and one representative from a civic organization, were arrested and indicted for working under the direction of the North's Cultural Exchange Bureau. Then, on May 23, two underground organization members who were both subordinates of the Self-Reliant People's Liberation Front were subjected to searches and seizures by the NIS and the police. According to a prosecution document obtained by a media outlet in South Korea, they referred to Kim Jong Un as the "Chairman of the Assembly," the cultural exchange bureau as "Headquarters," the KTCU as "Sales Division 1," and the leadership of the Self-Reliant People's Liberation Front as the "Board of Directors," camouflaging themselves as an ordinary corporate entity. Hyeon-su Jeong, "[Exclusive] NIS Designates High-ranking KTCU Officials as Key Contacts with North Korean Operatives." *Kukmin Ilbo*, January 19, 2023; Do-ye Ko, "[Exclusive] KTCU Officials Enter US Military Bases, Film Facilities, and Send Footage to North Korea," *Dong-A Ilbo*, March 29, 2023; Min-joong, Kim, Cheol-woong Kim, and Chang-hoon Lee, "NIS Secures Footage of Contact between North Korea and KTCU Officials, Sending Messages with Hand Fans." *Dong-A Ilbo*, March 31, 2023; Yong-hoon Kwon and Gil-seong Yang, "KTCU Referred to as Sales Division 1 by North Korea...Freight Workers Implement General Strike." *Korea Economic Daily*, May 21, 2023; Seok-jo Noh, "[Exclusive] Raids Conducted on the Gangwon Provincial Branch of the Korean Teachers and Education Workers Union (KTU) called the 'Board of Directors', an Undercover Network of the Self-Reliant People's Liberation Front." *Chosun Ilbo*, May 23, 2023; Seok-jo Noh, "Former Progressive Party Representative Pledges Loyalty to Kim Jong Un, Vowing to be His Loyal Fighter." *Chosun Ilbo*, May 25, 2023.

through unrestricted warfare, a combination of united front work, organizational espionage (political espionage), terrorism, and drug and hacking attacks. And this desire is directly reflected in North Korea's national goals. From the standpoint of the suryong, in fact, the direct and biggest threat is South Korea, not the United States. This is because South Korea is the closest comparison target to North Korea. If the North Korean authorities did not thoroughly block information outside their borders, the North Korean people could become a stronger “enemy” to the suryong than South Korea. Therefore, from the position of the suryong, South Korea is “a subordinate country of US imperialism, an underdeveloped state, and an object of revolution,” and the people of North Korea must be completely and thoroughly controlled.

Third, Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism is reflected in the national interest of North Korea. In other words, the existence of the suryong is infallible, and it is in the national interest to create a personality cult around him accordingly and protect his personal safety with all national power. North Korea connects the absolute source of its regime to the suryong. In other words, if the suryong does not exist, the system cannot exist. Through these reasons, the North Korean authorities state that their system is a socio-political body consisting of a triad of suryong, party, and masses, and that the suryong is the top brain of this single body.²⁶ Accordingly, North Korea has emphasized the claim that the party and the masses can exist only when the suryong exists first, and that the party and the masses exist to serve the suryong entirely.²⁷ Therefore, North Korea must provide absolute protection of the suryong by mobilizing all its capabilities.

Of course, some consider the personality cult of the suryong to be nothing more than a symbolic propaganda tool. But even this is far from the truth. Song Hye Rang, the older sister of Kim Jong Il's first spouse Song Hye Rim, recalled that an acquaintance of hers committed suicide after she was accused of violating Article 3 of the Ten Principles.²⁸ That acquaintance was Kim Yong Jun. He was a prominent Korean art historian and defected to North Korea in 1950 with the KPA. In 1967, he disposed newspapers with portraits of Kim Il Sung as wastepaper

26. Young-ae Cha, *The Great Leader Comrade Kim Jong Il's Theory of Thought (3rd Volume)*, (Pyongyang: Social Science Publishing House, 1996), pp. 66-67.

27. Jang-yop Hwang, *I Saw the Truth of History* (Seoul: Hanul Books, 1999), p. 387.

28. Hye-rang Song, *Wisteria House: The Autobiography of Song Hye-rang*, pp. 299-300.

at the apartment's garbage disposal in Gyeonglim-dong, Jung-gu, Pyongyang.²⁹ Destroying the portrait or photo of the suryong is an anti-party and anti-revolutionary crime, that is, a fatal political crime. Article 3 of the Ten Principles has been working thoroughly since 1967 to the present.³⁰

Appendix II, Article 3 of the Ten Principles emphasizes the absolute authority of the suryong. To emphasize the authority is synonymous with deifying the suryong. Furthermore, Sections 4 and 5 of Article 3 explicitly state that all propaganda materials idolizing the “Great Heroes of the Mount Paektu” must be strictly protected. In other words, North Korea idolizes not only Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un, but also the Kim family. The Article 3 of the Ten Principles is well depicted in Article 13 of North Korea's Detailed Wartime Guidelines in Figure 3.

“Article 13. All departments and units must carefully organize protection and defend the portraits, plaster and bronze statues of the Great Leaders Comrade Kim Il Sung and Comrade Kim Jong Il, and the anti-Japanese female hero Comrade Kim Jong Suk, and the statues of revolutionary families, and art works depicting the three generals of Mt. Paektu by moving them to a safe place, and guard the Comrade Kim Il Sung Revolutionary History Museum, Comrade Kim Il Sung’s Revolutionary History and Thought Research Center, revolutionary battlegrounds and revolutionary historical sites, the on-site teaching board of the three generals of Mt. Paektu, hall of on-site instructions and the basic slogans of the Party.”

29. Although deleted from North Korean history, the first inventor of the Ten Principles was Kim Yong Ju, younger brother of Kim Il Sung and head of the OGD. As mentioned before, it was after the 15th plenary meeting of the 4th Central Committee of the WPK in May 1967 that the personality cult of Kim Il Sung and the dictatorship of the suryong rapidly intensified. The first version of the Ten Principles produced by Kim Yong Ju appeared around May 1967, and from this point on, the Ten Principles operated as absolute norms.

30. Further examples of punishments for damaging portraits and photos of the suryong can be found in the COI report, UN, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, p. 53.

Figure 3 North Korea's Detailed Wartime Guidelines (April 7, 2004)



Source: Documents obtained by Dr. Kwanghyung Lee.

The protection of the suryong's authority and personal safety as well as idolization are well demonstrated in the following Kim Jong Un approved policy documents.

Appendix I-B-9, "Measures for Strengthening Party Organizational Operations to Thwart the Enemy's Outrageous Sanctions, Pressure and Provocations and to Accelerate the Construction of a Powerful Socialist State" (Approved by Kim Jong Un on August 12, 2017, OGD)

(Omitted) We intend to thwart the enemy's tyrannical sanctions, pressure, and provocations, and force a vigorous struggle to accelerate the building of a powerful socialist state with the power of single-hearted unity. We are trying to protect the leadership of the revolution to the death and defend the authority of the party in every possible way.

① *In the party organizations, there is the respected Supreme Leader Comrade, who is the symbol of the mighty power of the great Mt. Paektu country, the great guardian of justice, and the undefeated steel commander. All our energy will be focused on the work to defend the leader of the revolution to the death, keeping the faith that there is only victory and glory ahead of Juche Korea....(omitted)*

- In the party organizations, we are trying to do everything possible to guarantee the personal safety and well-being of the respected Supreme Leader. (Omitted) We are trying to mobilize and concentrate all forces and means to ensure the personal safety of the respected Supreme Leader. We will strictly keep event confidential, seal off important event areas, and thoroughly establish security measures for human and physical objects including control and surveillance, that may pose a threat to escort safety. (omitted)

② *...In order for party organizations to safely and respectfully enshrine portraits, plaster and bronze statues, video works, of great people in Mt. Paekdu, appropriate measures will be made based on the overall understanding of the basement storage room to prevent moisture and dampness. (omitted)*

Appendix I-B-17, “Measures to Strengthen the Standards for Operating the Party Life Criticism Sessions for the Fourth Quarter of Last Year and Strengthen the Party Life Guidance in the First Quarter of This Year for Cadres and Party Members” (Approved by Kim Jong Un on January 10, 2018, OGD)

(Omitted) Party organizations... We would like to ensure that the facilities, supplies, materials and trees and shrubs of good species are given the highest priority in order to make Kumsusan Palace of the Sun a more splendid and sacred place of the eternal sun.

We are planning to take thorough measures to make sure that party organizations understand the actual state of the defense work and the state of enshrinement for the statues and solar portraits of the great leaders and great generals, video art works, revolutionary battlegrounds and revolutionary historical sites, and Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism research institutes. (omitted)

Particularly, we intend to ensure that party organizations work and carry out guarantees for important political events to be held on February 8, including the military parade celebrating the 70th anniversary of which the great leader strengthened and developed the Korean People’s Revolutionary Army into a regular revolutionary armed force.

To thoroughly guarantee the safety of roads and railways, party organizations strictly establish traffic order in the capital and order in the storage, handling, and use of weapons, bullets, explosives, pressurized equipment, and toxic substances, and work to find and eradicate defective and dangerous areas in the roads and railway sections in a timely manner.

We intend to ensure that the party organizations carry out the work responsibly to safely assist the Comrade Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea at any time in their units and to give him joy.

Party organizations will never condone even the slightest element that undermines or challenges the absolute authority of the Chairman of the Workers’ Party of Korea and demolish it at the budding stage. (omitted)

As can be seen from the contents of the document above, the suryong and his family are deified human beings, and all organizations and people in North Korea must provide “personal safety” and “joy” to the suryong.

As such, although North Korea calls itself a “democratic republic,” it is reasonable to view it as a dynastic totalitarianism. After Kim Jong Il’s death, North Korea propagated that there are more than 1,200 titles for Kim Jong Il, including “great man among great men,” “protector of justice,” “protector of human peace,” and “great prophet.” Of course, North Korea’s behavior can also be seen as symbol manipulation from a sociological point of view. However, among the Kim family and close aides, the suryong is clearly recognized as a “king.” Song Hye Rang, aunt of Kim Jong Nam (Kim Jong Il’s first son who was assassinated in February 2017) and older sister of Kim Jong Il’s first wife Song Hye Rim, testified of calling Kim Jong Il a “prince” and Kim Jong Il’s sister Kim Kyong Hui a “princess.”³¹ Japanese chef Kenji Fujimoto, who was Kim Jong Il’s personal chef, also admitted to calling Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong as prince and princess when they were young.³² In other words, these titles are direct expressions, not metaphorical ones.

31. Hye-rang Song, *Wisteria House: The Autobiography of Song Hye-rang*, p. 334, 376, 392.

32. Kenji Fujimoto, translated by Hyun-ho Shin, *Kim Jong Il’s Cook*, (Seoul: Monthly Chosun, 2003), p. 136.

III

Operation of Suryong Dictatorship:

the Monolithic Leadership System



All realms of the North Korean system are organized. Organizations in North Korea are organically combined to form the structure of the system. The reason why the dictatorship can be effectively and systematically executed by the individual leader is that the suryong controls and dominates organizations in all realms of society through the Workers' Party. And this very power is the "organizational authority" (조직권) of the suryong.¹

Organizations in North Korea are divided into Workers' Party, state, military, and special sectors, and there are four labor (workers') organizations classified as external or peripheral organizations of the WPK.² As a state body in North Korea, the cabinet has jurisdiction over central administrative agencies, provincial and county people's committees, and district or *dong* offices, which are the lowest units of administrative districts. In addition, 30 to 40 households of ordinary residents are organized into one people's unit called the *inminban*. *Inminban* functions as an administrative district, but it is also the most basic organization that forms the basis of the suryong dictatorship.

The suryong controls all organizations in North Korea through the Central Committee of the Workers' Party (also known as the Central Party). In particular, the OGD is the most important institution that belongs to the Central Party. This is because the OGD is an institution that has been entrusted with organizational and executive authority by the suryong. The OGD has the function of controlling the central and local organizations of the Workers' Party, as well as the state, military, munitions industry, and special agencies. The reason why the OGD can effectively perform these functions is that party organizations are established in all organizations and sectors.

Through the OGD, the suryong intervenes in the macro domain including national strategies and policies as well as the micro domain including the lives of individual citizens. In this chapter, how the suryong issues orders and how these

1. "조직권" or organizational authority is an actual term used in North Korea.

2. Munitions industry units are organizations such as the Second Economic Committee that produce and export WMD and other weapons, and special units are operational organizations such as the General Bureau of Reconnaissance and the Bureau of Cultural Exchanges. Munitions and special unit organizations receive direct command from the suryong. In addition, labor organizations are classified into the Socialist Patriotic Youth League, the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, the Union of Agricultural Workers of Korea, and the Socialist Women's Union of Korea according to age, gender, and occupation, and ordinary citizens automatically join at least two organizations.

orders are carried out in all sectors of the system will be examined in detail.

3.1 An Organizational Dictatorship

3.1.1 The Suryong's Organizational Authority

Organizational authority is the power that the suryong has to guide all organizations and permanent and non-permanent meetings. The only person who can use the term “guidance” as a personal qualification is the suryong. The term guidance implies the authority to intervene and control organizations and establish and dismantle organizations. In fact, the suryong directly determines the establishment, dismantlement, and modification of all institutions in North Korea through the OGD of the Central Party (WPK CC). The suryong’s organizational power is thoroughly realized to the extent that private and non-political gatherings of individuals are not permitted. In this regard, D-2, a North Korean defector who was a high-ranking diplomat, commented as follows.

“What is written in the Ten Principles is that they do not allow anyone to form sects. Organizations with more than 3 members, whether private or not, they are not allowed because it is made up of anti-partisan elements. If they grow bigger, they can turn into an oppositional organization, so it is strictly forbidden. Not to mention, even a book club is banned. This is also considered anti-party.”³

As D-2 said, the Ten Principles stipulate that North Korea operates only under the leadership of the suryong’s party.⁴ The reason why an individual called the

3. D-2 interview.

4. Appendix II, Article 6 of the Ten Principles stipulates, “The ideological and willful unity and revolutionary solidarity of the Party centered around the Great Leader must be strengthened in every way. The steel-like unity centered around the Great Leader is the lifeblood of the party, the source of its invincible strength, and the key to the victory of the revolution.” In addition, Article 6, Paragraph 5 stipulates, “We must fight resolutely against all anti-Party elements of all kinds, including sectarianism, regionalism, and nepotism, which destroy the unity of the Party, as well other forms of divergence and feigned obedience. Article 24 of Chapter 3 of the Workers’ Party Rules stipulates that “the General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea represents the party and organizes and directs the entire party.”

suryong can effectively exercise dictatorial power is that the North Korean system is a collection of organizations authorized by the suryong. In other words, if a person is born in North Korea, he or she is automatically enrolled into an organization from the moment he or she is born to parents with citizenship and is registered as a citizen. And all individuals carry out the orders of the suryong and are evaluated and controlled through these organizations.

Kim Jong Un holds the positions of General Secretary of the WPK, Chairman of the State Affairs Commission, and Supreme Commander of the KPA, so he has legal and actual powers to control all organizations and meetings (events). And this power directly affects even the micro-level of social realms. Here is an example.

Daemyung Koo, a North Korean defector who arrived in South Korea in 2017, described in detail the process of establishing a trading company in North Korea in his memoir. In early 2014, he heard the following advice directly from Trade Deliberation Officer of the Trade Bureau of the Ministry of Trade about establishing a trading company.

“First of all, if you want to open a trading company, you have to follow the great leader’s teachings and instructions. To do so, you need to get an agreement from the Ministry of Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Agency and the Trade Bank. This is the agreement document. We need to get the seal of the agreement body here. And first and foremost, if you want to start a trading company, you have to have a basis. It would be nice if there was a letter of intent from the Chinese counterpart to invest money or equipment.”⁵

At the beginning of 2014, Koo belonged to an Agricultural Publishing House, and this publishing house is under the guidance of the PAD. He received help from a working-level official of the Ministry of Trade to establish a trading company under the Agricultural Publishing House. He first submitted a plan to establish a trading company to the Ministry of Trade and received approval. Subsequently, he received approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Trade Bank, and the

5. Daemyung Koo was born in Yonan County of South Hwanghae Province in 1969. From 1998 to 2007, he served as a driver for the director of the Overseas Counterintelligence Bureau of the National Security Agency, and from 2014 to 2016, he was the president of a Green Trading Company under the Propaganda and Agitation Department. Daemyung Koo, *Bubble 1*, (Gyeonggi: Myunghwa Publishing House, 2021), pp. 88-94.

Second Bureau of State Security, respectively. After receiving approval from each organization, the establishment plan was submitted to the PAD, and the PAD has to go through obtaining approval of the Rules and Regulations Division of the OGD of the Central Party. After the approval of the Rules Division, Koo was informed by the secretary of the primary party committee of Agricultural Publishing Company, “The Marshal has approved our report document to set up a trading company. The name of the trading company was decided as the Green Trading Company.” Then he heard the news that he had been appointed as the president of the company. In addition, an Agricultural Publishing Company Primary Party Committee cadre guidance official showed Koo a document approved by Kim Jong Un and the document read as follows.

In accordance with the approval of the respected Marshal Kim Jong Un on August 13, 2014, a trading company will be established by the Agricultural Publishing House. The name of the trading company is the “Green Trading Company.”

1 president, 1 bookkeeper, 1 document clerk, 5 assistants.

A production enterprise is established under the “Green Trading Company.”

1 manager, 1 bookkeeper, 200 workers

With the funds earned from the “Green Trading Company,” it aims to raise the standard of living of employees along with guaranteeing materials related to agricultural publishing.

Rules Organization Division of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea.

The second case can be found in Appendix I-B-4, *Report on Measures Related to the Organization of Mass Rallies Supporting the Statement of the Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Approved by Kim Jong Un, PAD on August 8, 2017)*. This document is a report of the PAD, outlining their intention to hold mass rallies in various areas including Pyongyang. According to this document, the PAD reported to Kim Jong Un specific details regarding the date, time, place, name of

the rally, slogans, and images to be displayed at the event, as well as the order of the event. Furthermore, it also mentions a plan to hold similar mass rallies in local areas, resembling the ones to be held in Pyongyang.

On the other hand, the suryong's organizational authority is not limited to the North Korean territory. As mentioned in Section 1 of Chapter II, the suryong is still commanding and directing underground parties within South Korea through intelligence operatives. Establishing underground organizations and clandestine parties in South Korea is also within the suryong's organizational authority. The suryong grants the special status to espionage agents to South Korea, as a representative of the Central Committee of the WPK, or simply a party representative. Hence, one agent can perform the same functions equivalent to one agency such as a county party committee.⁶ These operatives, acting under the suryong's organizational authority, recruit individuals into the party and build an underground party. Currently, underground parties and organizations in South Korea are still under the direct and specific guidance and inspections of these espionage operatives.

The North Korean operative leadership infiltrated South Korea with ten operative groups between 1988 and 1992. These operatives supervised and inspected preexisting underground organizations in South Korea, conducted surveillance, and inspections and created new espionage networks. It is estimated that each of these ten operation teams have created an average of two or more new spy networks, generally consisting of 3-5 members. By the early 1990s, approximately ten out of 20 or so spy networks (with a total of 60-100 members) established in South Korea had been apprehended.⁷ Therefore, it is believed that there are currently ten undisclosed spy networks (with a total of 30-50 members) that have not yet been arrested. If these espionage networks have not been exposed to date, they are likely to be under the direct guidance of North Korean espionage agencies.⁸

6. The forms of underground party established by North Korean operatives in South Korea generally fall into four categories. For detailed information, please refer to Kwanhyung Lee, "A Study on North Korean Spies," page 323.

7. The exact scale of the spy networks established within South Korea is known only to Kim Jong Un and the responsible personnel of the Cultural Exchange Department. Currently, over 20 spy networks have been identified, but the actual number of these networks may be much higher.

8. In Su Kwak, "Outlook on North Korea's Espionage Activities in Response to the Loss of NIS Investigative

3.1.2 Seizing Regime Control through the OGD

Organizational Structure of the WPK

The organizational structure of the Workers' Party can be divided into three main components: the central organization, local organizations, and basic organizations. The central organization and local organizations are organizations that are responsible for implementing Kim Jong Un's orders and policies. The most prominent central organizations include the Organization and Guidance Department (OGD), Propaganda and Agitation Department (PAD), Office 39, Cadres Department, Munitions Industry Department, Military Administration, and Discipline Inspection Department, which all fall under the Central Party. On the other hand, local organizations consist of party committees established in administrative divisions such as provinces, cities, counties, and districts. Core departments that perform autocratic functions, such as the OGD and PAD have counterparts with the same names in local organizations.⁹ This party structure is also replicated within the military. According to Article 48 of Chapter 6 of the revised Rules of the Workers' Party of Korea in January 2021, the KPA Central Military Commission performs the functions of a provincial party committee and operates under the guidance of the central committee. In other words, the General Political Bureau (GPB), which performs the role of the Central Military Commission (CMC), is a subordinate department of the Central Party's OGD. The Ministry of State Security's Political Bureau, Ministry of Social Security's Political Bureau, and Cabinet's Political Bureau perform the same functions as the organization departments in their respective institutions, and the directors and key officials of the political bureaus are all dispatched from the OGD. Therefore, the GPB of the KPA, which fulfills the role of the party organization within the KPA, is a subordinate department of the OGD.

In addition, there are also basic organizations within the Workers' Party responsible for policy implementation and the party life of the members. According

Authority" (2023 Spring Academic Seminar by the Institute for Korea Security and Unification, May 24, 2023, Seoul Global Center), pp. 23-25.

9. At the local level, the committees are referred to as the "Organizational Department" and the "Propaganda Department" rather than the "Organization and Guidance Department" and "Propaganda and Agitation Department." This is because "guidance" and "propaganda" is exclusive power of the suryong.

to Article 42 of Chapter 5 of the Workers' Party Rules, a party cell is formed when there are 5 to 30 party members (in special circumstances 3 to 4 members or over 30 members are allowed). Independent units with 31 to 60 members constitute a sub-primary party committee, and workplaces with more than 31 members have sector party committees. Furthermore, if there are 61 or more members, a primary party committee is formed. The full-time cadres responsible for a primary party committee typically consist of 2 to 5 individuals. For example, the Central Public Prosecutors Office primary party committee consists of approximately six members, including a secretary, an organizational deputy secretary, a propaganda deputy secretary, two primary party committee guidance official, and one primary party committee's cadre guidance official. Similarly, the provincial prosecutors' office primary party committee is composed of a secretary and a deputy secretary as full-time officials.¹⁰ These primary party committees play a central role among the basic organizations within the WPK.

These basic organizations exist not only in the party, cabinet, and military, but also in factories and enterprises, residential areas, North Korean embassies abroad, and even on ships operating overseas. All party members, whether soldiers or Central Party officials, must participate in the party life as a part of the party member, regardless of their rank. The OGD of the Central Party is the key institution in charge of politics among the three surveillance systems: politics, administration, and security. For instance, political officers are dispatched to the KPA corps headquarters, and political deputy directors are dispatched to the brigade headquarters. In addition, there are political guidance officials assigned at each battalion and company level. These political officers are officers dispatched from the GPB in charge of the party life. In other words, if you are a soldier and a party member, regardless of your rank, you must participate in the party through the party cell and primary party committee of the military unit to which you belong to.

Organizational Structure of the OGD

The suryong implements his policies and guidance, including all policies throughout the regime, through the central and local organizations of the Workers'

10. Interview with D-1.

Party, and receives upward reporting through these lines. Then through the OGD and various levels of party organizations dispersed throughout the regime, the suryong guides the party life (execution of suryong’s policies, organizational life, personal life, etc.). In addition, each basic organization reports the public and private lives and trends of party members to higher party organizations on a daily basis. In other words, the position of General Secretary of the WPK held by Kim Jong Un signifies that he is the secretary of secretaries, that is, the highest officer in charge of all party organizations.

The OGD emerged as a key dictatorial power mechanism right after Kim Jong Il was appointed as the official successor in February 1974. The reason why Kim Jong Il held the positions of both the secretary and the director of the OGD from September 1973 until his death in December 2011 was because the function of the OGD was very important. As such, the OGD can be considered the most essential part in understanding the mechanism of the suryong dictatorship. The departments of OGD are explained in detail in Table 3 below.

Table 3 Organizational Structure and Functions of the OGD of the Central Committee of the WPK (as of December 2019)

Department (Korean/English)	Responsible Functions
조직지도부 부장/ Director of OGD	Oversees all departments within the Organization and Guidance Department.
제1부부장/ First Deputy Director	The chief secretary directly in charge of the party committee also serves as the first deputy director.
제1부부장/ First Deputy Director	Oversees all cadre departments.
제1부부장/ First Deputy Director	Oversees all departments responsible for the party life guidance.
제1부부장/ First Deputy Director	Oversees the guidance of the Korean People's Army's Party Committee (General Political Bureau).

<p>직속당위원회/ Direct Party Committee or Headquarters Party Committee</p>	<p>The Direct Party Committee or Headquarters Party Committee is the department in charge of guiding party organizations and the party life of party members within the Central Party (CC of WPK). In the Headquarters Party Committee, there are organizational and propaganda secretaries and guidance officials who exclusively handle party affairs. The chief secretary in charge of the headquarters party committee concurrently serves as the first deputy director of the OGD but reports only to General Secretary Kim Jong Un, not to the Director of the OGD.</p>
<p>10호실/ Office 10</p>	<p>This is an office of the OGD that simultaneously serves the role of the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of Social Security. It monitors, controls, and investigates (Changgwang Security Department) the compliance of the Ten Principles among the staff working in the WPK CC. North Korea's highest-ranking officials are subject to interrogation by the Changgwang Security Department before being executed or purged.</p>
<p>당원등록과/ Party Member Registration Division</p>	<p>It handles the registration and issuance of party membership and registration cards of party members selected from the basic party organizations.</p>
<p>간부등록과/ Cadre Registration Division</p>	<p>It manages and maintains (modify and supplement) personnel-related documents of high-ranking officials.</p>
<p>통보과/ Notification Division</p>	<p>It handles comprehensive tasks of handling general incidents and accidents reported by the subordinate party organizations.</p>
<p>일보과/ Daily Report Division</p>	<p>It performs the daily tasks of compiling the daily reports from the subordinate party organizations.</p>
<p><i>Each Cadre Division is responsible for the selection of high-ranking officials in North Korea.</i></p>	
<p>간부 1과/ Cadre Division 1</p>	<p>Officials inside the Central Party (CC of WPK).</p>
<p>간부 2과/ Cadre Division 2</p>	<p>Party cadres of provincial, municipal, and county party committees (chief secretary, organization secretary, propaganda secretary)</p>
<p>간부 3과/ Cadre Division 3</p>	<p>Party cadres of central organizations such as the Supreme People's Assembly, the Cabinet, the Central Court, and the Central Public Prosecutors Office.</p>
<p>간부 4과/ Cadre Division 4</p>	<p>Secretaries and chief secretary of the party committee in joint and special enterprises and factories</p>

간부 5과/ Cadre Division 5	Personnel and soldiers belonging to the Guard Command (or General Guard Bureau) and Unit 974 (reserve forces for the Supreme Commander)
간부 6과/ Cadre Division 6	Specific selection targets unknown
간부 7과/ Cadre Division 7	Specific selection targets unknown
간부 8과/ Cadre Division 8	Ministers of administrative agencies under the cabinet (e.g. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Labor), and heads of central organizations directly under the party, state, and military (e.g., Directors of the Taesong Guidance Bureau and Kumgang Guidance Bureau under Office 39)
<i>Each Party Life Guidance Department is responsible for overseeing the party life guidance for all party organizations established in all institutions and organizations in North Korea.</i>	
지도 1과/ Guidance Division 1	Responsible for the party life guidance for party committees installed in the central organizations. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supreme People's Assembly, Cabinet Secretariat, administrative agencies under the Cabinet, labor organizations (Party committees or basic organizations established in the Socialist Patriotic Youth League, the General Federation of Trade Unions of Korea, Union of Agricultural Workers of Korea, and the Socialist Women's Union of Korea)
지도 2과/ Guidance Division 2	Responsible for guiding the party life guidance for the party committees established in the provinces. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local Guidance Division and Internal Division of the Organization Department of the party committees of the province or municipality
지도 3과/ Guidance Division 3	Responsible for guiding the party life of local administrative and judicial agencies, and labor organizations under the cabinet installed in the provinces. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organization departments in provincial and city party committees. • People's committees, rural management committees, prosecutors' offices, courts, labor organizations in provinces and cities
지도 4과/ Guidance Division 4	Responsible for the party life guidance for factories and enterprises installed in provinces. The specific responsible agencies are as follows. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Factory Guidance Division of provincial and city party committees' organization department • Union and special factories and enterprises

지도 5과/ Guidance Division 5	Agency in charge of Kim Jong Un's security and hospitality
지도 6과/ Guidance Division 6	Security Agency for Kim Jong Un's Residence
지도 7과/ Guidance Division 7	Ministry of Social Security, Central Court, Central Public Prosecutors Office
지도 8과/ Guidance Division 8	Ministry of State Security
지도 11과/ Guidance Division 11	Organizations in charge of publishing, reporting, and culture and arts
지도 61과/ Guidance Division 61	General Political Bureau of the KPA: Guides the party life of soldiers and staff belonging to the Department of People's Armed Forces (now the Ministry of National Defense).
지도 62과/ Guidance Division 62	Responsible for the selection of soldiers and staff belonging to the Ministry of People's Armed Forces.
지도 63과/ Guidance Division 63	Provides the party life guidance to personnel affiliated with trade organizations under the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces.
지도 64과/ Guidance Division 64	Provides the party life guidance to soldiers and staff belonging to the General Guard (or General Guard Bureau) and Unit 974 (reserve forces for the Supreme Commander)
지도 65과/ Guidance Division 65	Provides the party life guidance to staff of munitions industry organizations such as the Second Economic Committee.
지도 66과/ Guidance Division 66	Provides the party life guidance to personnel affiliated with specialized agencies such as the Reconnaissance General Bureau and the Cultural Exchanges Bureau.
검열 1과/ Audit Division 1	Details unknown
검열 2과/ Audit Division 2	Details unknown
검열 3과/ Audit Division 3	Details unknown

※ Note: Jang Song Thaek was the head of the Central Party's administrative department before he was executed in December 2013, and the guidance for Ministry of Social Security, Central Court, and the Central Public Prosecutors Office was under his jurisdiction. According to NIS, after Jang Song Thaek was executed, functions of the OGD's Guidance Division 7 were transferred to the newly established Central Party Organizational Administration Department in August 2020. Myong-song Kim, "North Korea Revives Organizational Administration Department Abolished after Jang Song Thaek's Execution," *Chosun Ilbo*, August 21, 2020.

OGD Functions (1): Guidance through Dominating Subordinates

In Kim Jong Un's approved policy documents presented in Appendix I-B, the terms dominate and control appear frequently. This is demonstrated in the following document:

Appendix I-B-9, "Measures for Strengthening Party Organizational Operations to Thwart the Enemy's Outrageous Sanctions, Pressure and Provocations and to Accelerate the Construction of a Powerful Socialist State" (Approved by Kim Jong Un on August 12, 2017, OGD)

"③ We intend to strengthen the control reporting operations within the party organizations to promptly dominate and handle all issues raised by officials and the masses regarding ideological trends and movements. We will ensure that all problems that arise are reported faithfully to the Supreme Leader, who is respected, and that they are handled in accordance with the conclusions provided by him. We aim to establish strict rules and order to enforce a disciplined system that ensures timely control and addresses all issues in a timely manner. We will thoroughly prepare for any unexpected situation and ruthlessly crush the actions of disloyal opponents by establishing operation report systems, emergency contact systems, work notification systems, resident report systems, and accommodation registration orders in all sectors and units."

As evident from the document above, from Kim Jong Un's perspective, all organizations, including officials and residents are subjects of domination, guidance, and control. Kim Jong Un realizes these objectives through the OGD. This control is executed through top-down "domination" and "upward reporting."

In North Korea, the mechanism by which the Central Party OGD controls the subordinate party organizations at each level in a top-down manner, is referred to as the "domination and guidance system for subordinate party organizations" or "subordinate domination and guidance system." The OGD dispatches guidance officials belonging to the Party Life Guidance Department specified in Table 3 to the relevant organizations and fields to carry out the domination and guidance in respective subordinate organizations.

The most important things that party organizations at all levels, including the Central Party, grasp through the subordinate domination and guidance are

the status of the execution of Kim Jong Un's instructions and the Party's policies, compliance and violation of the Ten Principles, the party life status of cadres and party members, ideological trends of the masses, and the party's implementation of the mass policy line. Consequently, the North Korean system can be considered to be effectively governed and controlled through the domination and guidance of the Central Party's OGD, meaning that Kim Jong Un governs the entirety of North Korea through this department.

The OGD continually confirms and reconfirms the status of domination of subordinates through cyclical repetition of these processes. For example, in the following Kim Jong Un's approved policy document, the following phrases appear:

Appendix I-B-17, "Measures to Strengthen the Standards for Operating the Party Life Criticism Sessions for the Fourth Quarter of Last Year and Strengthen the Party Life Guidance in the First Quarter of This Year for Cadres and Party Members" (Approved by Kim Jong Un on January 10, 2018, OGD)

"We aim to make sure that party organizations carry out the behests of the Great Leader and the Great General in detail, by examining them on a case-by-case basis and to implement them thoroughly to the end."

"We plan to intensively fight against all kinds of negative phenomena, including disbelieving or misinterpreting the Party's ideas, lines and policies in their own way that goes against the party life organization and guidance and focus on party organizations to fully carry out the words of the Comrade Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea with approval and implement the Party's line and policy at all costs."

As described in the document above, the OGD ensures thorough domination over subordinate organizations to convey and reaffirm the instructions and policies of the suryong and the Workers' Party through the party organizations. The subordinate domination by the OGD can be divided into three stages. These stages can only be executed after prior reporting and approval from Kim Jong Un. The documents in Appendix I-B illustrate the implementation processes of these stages.

In the first stage (operation and announcement), when Kim Jong Un's

instructions or policies are presented first, the OGD, PAD, and other relevant working-level departments establish measures or plans on how to implement them. Once the plan is established, the next step in the process is to receive final approval from Kim Jong Un, which then gets transmitted to the lower party organizations. The second stage (control and guidance) is the process of dispatching higher-level party organization cadres to subordinate units to ensure the proper delivery and implementation of the policies and instructions issued in the first stage. The third stage (reflection session and reannouncement) is a process of interim inspection to evaluate the extent to which Kim Jong Un's instructions and policies have been implemented. If any errors occurred or uncompleted work is identified during the inspection, investigations into the causes are carried out and relevant measures are established to issue revised instructions. Of course, the results of the interim inspection and the direction of reannouncement must also be reported to and approved by Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Un continuously checks the implementation of his policies and guidelines through reports from the OGD.

The subordinate guidance methods of the OGD can be largely divided into 20-day guidance system and 10-day guidance system. First, the 20-day guidance system is implemented at the Central Party (WPK CC) level, which plays the most important role in the subordinate domination. It is called the 20-day leadership system because it takes 20 days to carry out guidance to the subordinate units. It refers to the system where the Central Party provides guidance to provincial, municipal, and KPA party committees, as well as party committees with equivalent functions. The primary duty of the dispatched guidance officials from the OGD of the Central Party is to thoroughly grasp and control the work and trends of officials of affiliated agencies, including chief secretaries, organizational secretaries, propaganda secretaries, and labor organization secretaries belonging to party committees of provinces and municipalities. After the completion of the 20-day guidance, the guidance officials report to the first deputy director of the OGD of the relevant field. Then the first deputy director reports to the director of the OGD, who then reports to the organization secretary of the Central Party, and ultimately to the General Secretary Kim Jong Un. Upon Kim Jong Un's final approval and issuance of policies, the reports are transmitted through this reporting line to the subordinate party organizations.

The 10-day guidance system is implemented by the provincial, municipal, and

county party committees, as well as party committees with equivalent functions, to guide the subordinate party organizations (including county party committees and party organizations with equivalent functions). The Organization Division of Provincial and Municipal Party Committees dispatches responsible officials to guide the county party committees. The basic mission of the dispatched officials is to grasp and guide the affairs and trends of officials within the county party committees, including the chief secretaries in charge, organization secretary, and propaganda secretary, as well as party cadres, people's committee chairperson, the head of the security department, the chief of the prosecutor's office, and those in charge of labor organizations at the county level.¹¹

OGD Functions (2): Bottom-Up Reporting

The internal reporting system of the Workers' Party is one of the important mechanisms through which Kim Jong Un controls and governs the entirety of North Korea through the Workers' Party of Korea. The party's reporting system is based on the individuals reporting or submitting work details directly to their superior organizations. Then, the OGD immediately reports the situation to the suryong through the daily reporting and notification system, providing updates on situations occurring across all areas of the regime.

First, the daily reporting system is a system for submitting work reports every day and it occupies the most important part among the internal reporting systems within the Workers' Party. Kim Jong Un emphasizes the daily reporting system, and he even gives specific instructions to strengthen the reporting system so that a sound of a needle dropping even in remote areas can be heard. The daily reporting system operates by reporting the daily work carried out throughout the day to the respective party cells, primary party committees, county party committees, provincial or municipal party committee organization departments, and the OGD of the Central Party.

The content reported through the daily reporting system mainly consists of instructions from Kim Jong Un, the execution of the Ten Principles, and party policies, as well as positive and negative phenomena that arise during the process of establishing the Kim Jong Un-centered leadership system. In addition to the

11. For more detailed information on domination guidance on subordinate organizations, please refer to In Su Kwak, *A Study of the Party's Guidance of the Korean Worker's Party*, pp. 31-37.

activities of the party organization, the living conditions of officials and party members are also important components of the daily report, and among them, trends of cadres in the higher-level units, as well as the trends of party members and the public, are considered one of the most important contents.

In particular, the organization departments of each level of party committees comprehensively analyze positive and negative phenomena that occur in daily work as well as within subordinate party organizations and party members. They specifically analyze positive and negative phenomena that must be rectified. The analysis results are then reported to higher-level party organizations through the chain of organization department heads, organizational secretaries, and chief secretaries for approval, following the reporting procedure of the daily reporting system. For example, if the head of a provincial prosecutor's office leaves their workplace without prior notification to the primary party committee of the prosecutor's office, the secretary of the primary party committee immediately reports it through the daily reporting system to the higher-level party organization, which is the provincial party committee.¹²

Accordingly, in each level of the party committee's organizational structure, there are permanent general guidance official or daily guidance officials who are solely responsible for receiving work reports from lower-level party organizations daily and consolidating them to report to higher-level party organizations. This reporting system is also established in various departments such as the PAD, labor organizations and civil defense departments.

Next, the notification system is a system in which the organization departments of each level party committee promptly figure out various incidents and accidents that occurred in their jurisdiction and report only the facts to the higher party organization. It would be appropriate to understand it as a situational reporting system. In other words, while the daily report system contains the results of the work performed by party organizations and members, along with their analysis and countermeasures, the notification system reports only the facts of incidents and accidents. The organizational units of each level of the party committee have permanent guidance official who solely oversee notification duties.

The organization department of the city or county party committee compiles

12. Interview with D-1.

and reports incidents and accidents reported by the respective party organization to the organization department of the provincial or municipal party committee, and then it reports to the OGD of the central party. In some cases, there are reports of guidance officials belonging to the organization department of city and county party committees in charge of notification report incidents directly to the higher-level party organization without going through their direct superiors—the chief secretary, organization secretary, or director of the organization department. Such situations often lead to tensions within the organizational units, as some personnel may be wary of the notification guidance officials.¹³

OGD Functions (3): Auditing (검열)

The reason why the authority of auditing was concentrated in the OGD was to consolidate the power to control all organizations within the system based on Kim Jong Il's monolithic ideological system. After his appointment as Secretary of the Central Committee Secretariat and head of the OGD and PAD in September 1973, Kim Jong Il strengthened the auditing power of the OGD. The auditing power of the suryong functions as one of the powers that can control all levels of party organizations, party members, and the entire population. The suryong delegates his auditing power to the OGD to censor, inspect and punish organizations, officials, and party members who fail to implement his directives and policies or engage in misconduct.

The specific functions of auditing within the OGD can be understood as follows. First, in the Workers' Party, there is no regularly scheduled inspections or auditing session. However, with the OGD at the top, guidance for controlling the subordinate party organizations is carried out through regular review and evaluation sessions called *chonghwa*. Depending on the results of the review and evaluation sessions, stern warnings, dismissal, relocation, and expulsion from the party are imposed on party members and cadres. In more serious situations, the case is handed over to the official auditing department of the OGD or to Office 10 of the OGD and punishment is imposed by the Changgwang Security Department

13. The OGD compiles and reports on the trends of party members, officials, and residents using various mechanisms to Kim Jong Un. For examples of "mass trend" reporting by the OGD, please refer to Chapter 4, Section 2.

or the Ministry of State Security.¹⁴ In general, Workers' Party inspections or audits are conducted when there are significant problem or specific issues that occurred in a particular unit or individual party member. Inspections of the OGD are conducted in these three cases: 1) the instructions and policies of the suryong are not executed at all or are distorted, 2) the instructions and decisions of the superior party organization are not implemented, and 3) when offenses occur such as misconduct, abuse of power, corruption, infringement of privacy, and other abnormal activities of officials (including paid party workers) that cannot be solely addressed through criminal punishment.¹⁵

The bodies responsible for the auditing the Workers' Party are the WKP Central Committee's Control Commission (commonly known as the Central Control Commission) and the OGD's Audit Division. The Central Control Commission is the body that decides on the disciplinary measures based on the results of audits, while the OGD's Audit Division is responsible for the relevant practical work of audits. Control commissions are set up by provincial, municipal, and county party committees, and audit divisions are also set up by provincial and municipal party committees. The Control Commission under the provincial and municipal party committee is composed of the chief secretary, the organization secretary, the head of the organization department, the executive director of the organization department, and the head of the audit division of the organization department. In addition, the actual work on the matters decided by this Control Commission is carried out by the organization department's audit division of the provincial and municipal party committee.¹⁶

However, with the revision of the Workers' Party Rules in January 2021, the role of the Central Control Commission was taken over by the Party Central Auditing Commission.¹⁷ It is estimated that the execution and practical work of the decisions

14. A detailed discussion on the types of punishments and specific cases in North Korea is provided in Chapter 4, Section 2.

15. In Su Kwak, *A Study of the Party's Guidance of the Korean Worker's Party*, pp. 39-42; Interview with D-1.

16. Interview with D-1.

17. The revised Article 30 of the Party Charter, enacted in May 2016, states, "The Central Control Commission shall investigate and hold accountable party members who engage in actions that violate the party's monolithic leadership system, violate the party charters, and other violations of party rules. It shall review and handle proposals from the local party committees regarding issues related to party charters and the grievances of party members." Additionally, Article 31, revised in

of the Party Central Auditing Commission will be handled by the newly established Party Regulations Inspection Department in January 2021. In other words, the functions that were previously held by the Central Party's OGD's auditing division seem to have been transferred to the Regulations Inspection Department. This department is expected to be mainly responsible for the audits and punishment of high-ranking party officials at the central and local levels.¹⁸

Existing inspections of the OGD take the form of a thorough fact-finding investigation into the issues raised by guidance officials of the auditing division who usually reside for several months until the investigation and handling of the area or sector is completed. Auditing officials take control of all party, administrative, and judicial institutions in the area or organization subject to audits, and conduct investigations not only on those directly involved in the problem but also on surrounding individuals to gather evidence. Subsequently, the investigation results and measures for punishment are formulated and reported to Kim Jong Un, who generally accepts them.

After such Central Party audits are conducted, severe punishments are invariably imposed. Depending on the severity of the punishment, execution by firing squad for more severe cases or imprisonment in political prisoner camps may be decided. Additionally, punishments such as unpaid forced labor, revolutionary reeducation, and imprisonment in reeducation camps are applied.¹⁹ Furthermore, for individuals who have committed relatively minor offenses, strong criticism is

January 2021, specifies that "The Central Control Commission shall supervise and investigate acts that violate party rules, hinder the realization of the party's monolithic leadership, review issues related to party regulations, handle petitions, and inspect the party's financial management."

18. Kwanyung Lee, *A Study of North Korea's Drug Problems: From the Perspective of State-Led Transnational Organized Crime* (Seoul: Korea University Graduate School, Ph.D. dissertation, 2021), p. 67.

19. Unpaid forced labor is a type of punishment primarily imposed on officials who have committed serious offenses for a period of six months to one year. During this period, the individuals are sent to units that require strenuous physical labor, such as mines or steel mills, while their original positions and families remain unchanged. They are provided with only meals and no wages, as a means of disciplining their physical and mental faculties. Revolutionary reeducation, on the other hand, is a form of punishment mainly imposed on high-ranking officials who have committed offenses. It is generally characterized by longer durations, typically ranging from 3 to 5 years or without a specific time frame. In such cases, the individuals are removed from their original positions (dismissed from their posts) and not only their official vehicles are confiscated, but they are also assigned to work as laborers in the reeducation area or unit. Furthermore, not only the individuals themselves but also their families are relocated to that place. However, they would receive the same compensation as their original positions.

administered through collective criticism sessions (*chonghwa*), various meetings, and gatherings.

3.2 A Policy Dictatorship

3.2.1 The Suryong's Policy Power

Suryong's Intervention in Policy and Legislative Decision-Making Processes

The party leadership of the Workers' Party over all state activities is carried out in such a way that national policies are established and determined in accordance with the Workers' Party's line and policy, and guidance and control are enforced so that the determined policies are thoroughly implemented. This is the essence of the "political guidance" (정책적 지도), the core of party leadership.²⁰ The suryong, through the Workers' Party, not only realizes policy guidance by exercising personnel rights over officials of legislative, judicial, and administrative agencies in the position to formulate and implement various policies, but also to influence the process of policymaking, decision-making, and execution of policy through domination and control.²¹

The suryong is the only person in North Korea who has absolute power over the establishment, decision and execution of national strategies, policies, and laws. In fact, only Kim Jong Un can announce important reports that form the basis of North Korea's national strategy, such as the reports of the Workers' Party Congress, the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party, and the New Year's message that comprehensively outlines North Korea's annual policies. Decisions adopted at the party congress or plenary meetings of the party central committee can be adopted and announced only with Kim Jong Un's approval.

The absolute power over North Korea's policies and legislation is institutionalized in the Article 9 of the Ten Principles. In particular, Article 9, Paragraph 2 of Appendix II stipulates that "We must establish a strong revolutionary order and rules that organize and advance all undertakings and

20. "Policy guidance" is the official term used by the WPK. The reference to "policy power" or "policy authority" is a term used arbitrarily in this report.

21. In Su Kwak, *A Study of the Party's Guidance of the Korean Worker's Party*, p. 72.

handle policy questions solely through the decisions of the Party Command.” This reaffirms Kim Jong Un’s absolute power over policy formulation, decision-making, and execution.

The suryong directly intervenes and controls the decision-making process, even if it is a mere formality. In North Korea, there are various organs and conferences such as the WPK Congress, Central Committee Plenary Meetings, Secretariat, and Political Bureau meetings that discuss and decide on national strategies, policies, or legislation. However, these meetings are merely channels for Kim Jong Un to review and approve documents or conclusions in advance.²² The party refers to these controlled meetings as “organizational activities” or “organizational political activities.” The convening of meetings within North Korea can only take place with the approval of the suryong, and discussions are only possible on topics and formats determined by the suryong. In other words, lower-level organizations and individuals can only provide opinions on how to implement decisions already made by Kim Jong Un and what they can do at their own sub-organizational or individual levels.

The following is an example of the Workers' Party's “organization project,” that is, a plan to hold a meeting and reported to Kim Jong Un. Appendix I-B-9 and Appendix I-B-12 are documents that the OGD reported to Kim Jong Un in advance to conduct a discussion project (meeting) through the party organization as separate agendas. Appendix I-B-12 is a document in which the OGD reports that it will implement the discussion project if Kim Jong Un approves through party organizations. The Appendix I-B-9 below is a document where the OGD reports specific implementation plans after receiving approval from Kim Jong Un for conducting discussion activities. As can be seen from these documents, North Korea reports specific details such as the units for discussion activities, topics, duration, and methods to the suryong, and only after receiving approval can they proceed. In other words, the suryong intervenes in the entire process of

22. State media reports that North Korea is partially implementing a bottom-up decision-making structure by holding various meetings of the Workers' Party, but this is only propaganda and is different from reality. In this regard, D-2 emphasized, “It is just a ‘show’ to show the outside world that party members and the public’s opinions are gathered, discussed and decided at the Politburo, and they are not handled arbitrarily.” He also mentioned that even autonomous discussions between departments for policymaking or execution are impossible. And the SPA is said to be nothing more than a “senior citizen center” with no real power or finances. Interview with D-2.

formulating national strategies and policies.

Appendix I-B-9, “Measures for Strengthening Party Organizational Operations to Thwart the Enemy’s Outrageous Sanctions, Pressure and Provocations and to Accelerate the Construction of a Powerful Socialist Nation” (Approved by Kim Jong Un on August 12, 2017, OGD)

In the wake of the resounding success of our intercontinental ballistic missile test launch of the Hwasong-14, which dealt a heavy blow to the bewildered Americans and their coercive authority, they committed an international crime by manipulating the United Nations Security Council to impose unjust sanctions on our country, under the guise of a “sanctions resolution” (omitted). Subsequently, statements were consecutively issued by the government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the spokesperson of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Korea, the spokesperson of the Korean Asia-Pacific Peace Committee, the spokesperson of the General Staff of the Korean People’s Army, and the spokesperson of the Strategic Forces of the Korean People’s Army.

1. We intend to conduct discussions within the party organization to counter the malicious sanctions and provocations of the enemies and vigorously advance the construction of a socialist power.

1) Discussion project unit

.... Primary party organizations will discuss it at the expanded meetings of executive committees, while party cells will discuss it at the general meeting.

※ Labor organizations are also going to conduct discussion projects.

2) Discussion issues and project period

① Discussion issues

The issue for discussion at the enlarged meeting of the Party Executive Committee (Party Committee) is “On the need to vigorously accelerate the construction of a powerful socialist state under the banner of self-reliance and self-development while thwarting the enemies’ outrageous sanctions, pressure and provocations.” For the discussions at party cell general meetings, the topic will be “Tasks of Party

Members in Strongly Advancing the Construction of a Socialist Power in the Face of the Malicious Sanctions and Provocations of Enemies."

② *Discussion project period*

We would like to proceed with the discussion project immediately.

3) *Discussion project method*


Discussions will be conducted in a manner that supports the revolutionary leadership and complete all the revolutionary tasks entrusted to each individual and each unit and present reports that strongly counter the malicious sanctions and provocations of the enemies and vigorously advance the construction of a socialist power. The project will proceed by discussing the issue, and adopting the statements (implementation plans). (Omitted)

Policy and Legislative Decision-Making Structures

North Korea's policy and legislative decision-making structure follows a vertical hierarchy. It starts with the General Secretary of the Workers' Party Kim Jong Un at the top, then secretaries belonging to the Secretariat of the CC of the WPK, then the director, deputy director, and section chief of the relevant department within the CC of the WPK. This top-down policy-making structure is in accordance with the organizational principles of the Chapter 2, Article 11, Paragraph 2 of the Worker's Party Rules which stipulates that "Party members must obey party organizations, the minority must obey the majority, the subordinate party organizations must obey the higher-level party organizations, and all Party organizations must absolutely obey the Central Committee of the Party." Article 3 further specifies that "all party organizations must unconditionally uphold the party's line and policies, and subordinate party organizations are obligated to implement the decisions of the higher party organizations." In other words, Article 11 of the Workers' Party Rule reaffirms Article 9 of the Ten Principles at the Party level.

The process of formulating and deciding on North Korea's national strategies and policies generally involves three methods, as depicted in Figure 4.

Figure 4 Flowchart of Kim Jong Un's National Strategy and Policy Decision-making Process through the Workers' Party of Korea



- ※ No. 7 of B is given to the Central Party's chief secretary in relevant department, and no. 8 of B is submitted by the secretary of the Central Party
- ※ No. 11 of C is submitted by the heads of agencies of the Cabinet administrative agencies and labor organizations.

The first policy decision-making method is when Kim Jong Un's instructions are directly determined as policies or laws, as shown in A in Figure 4. In other words, if Kim Jong Un presents an idea obtained from data, information, documents, or news, it becomes a law or policy immediately before the relevant department or executives make a policy proposal. In this case, the OGD of the Central Party attaches the date that Kim Jong Un mentioned the policy proposal and forwards it to the subordinate party organizations. The purpose of delivering Kim Jong Un's instructions is to materialize his ideas into a policy or law. The OGD compiles detailed plans drawn up by the party organization, the cabinet, or working-level departments of workers' organizations, and reports them back to Kim Jong Un.²³ The process of distribution and reporting continues until the final approval by Kim Jong Un, for it to be cemented as actual policies or laws. The traces of these repetitive processes are recorded in the *WPK Policy Implementation Directives*.

For example, on January 5, 2013, when Kim Jong Un ordered the officials of the Workers' Party to "remove all remnants of Japanese and South Korean languages circulating among our people," a document titled, "Statement by our Respected Leader, Comrade Kim Jong Un to Chief Officials of the Party Central Committee on January 5, Juche 102 (2013)" was distributed through the subordinate party organizations.²⁴ In some cases, the relevant working-level department of the Central Party prepares a document a form such as "execution plan to thoroughly carry out the teachings and instructions of our Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un on January 5, 2013" and receives approval from Kim Jong Un. Documents approved by Kim Jong Un are immediately turned into policies and delivered to subordinate party organizations. However, if it concerns economic policies, there are a few

23. When the Organizational Guidance Department issues orders from Kim Jong-un to the cabinet administrative agencies or working-level departments of labor organizations, or, conversely, reports to Kim Jong-un, they must go through the party organization. In the case of Cabinet administrative agencies, working organizations must go through the Party committee established in the Cabinet administrative agency.

24. The term "responsible workers of the Party Central Committee" is a concept that refers to officials at the rank of deputy director or higher in the Central Party.

more steps involved. Before it gets sent to Kim Jong Un for his final approval, practical measures need to be formulated first where it goes through consultations with relevant departments of the cabinet, and the policy draft is then reviewed by the corresponding department of the Central Party. Only after these stages would Kim Jong Un give his final approval for it to become a policy.

There are cases in which Kim Jong Un's policies and instructions are "legalized" immediately. North Korea's Constitution and laws are enacted through a legislative process that involves the Presidium of the SPA's legislative department to receive guidance from the judiciary division of the OGD. However, the instructions and policies of the suryong can be directly legislated without going through this legislative process. Appendix II, Article 5 of the Ten Principles states, "regard the party's lines, policies, and instructions as laws and the supreme order," and in fact North Koreans also recognize the suryong's instructions as the law itself.²⁵

A *pogo* or decree is a kind of written public notice that announces punishment for certain words or actions based on the instructions and policies of the suryong. Most people in North Korea have no access to the Constitution, criminal and general laws. In other words, unless you are a law student at Kim Il Sung University or People's Economy College, you will not have the opportunity to learn about the law or read the legal codes. Accordingly, the North Korean authorities issue these public notices about legal guidelines in the form of a *pogo* or decrees to the general public.

Kim Jong Un's approval policy related to the issuance of the decrees can be found in Appendix I-B-18. Upon examining this document, the PAD submitted a "Report on the Problem and Countermeasures of the Use of Nonstandard Language Among People" to Kim Jong Un and received his approval on January 26, 2018.²⁶ The PAD wrote this "Countermeasure Report" after receiving Kim Jong Un's instructions. It is presumed that before drafting this document, there were several

25. In this regard, according to a survey of 73 North Korean defectors on their awareness of the law while living in North Korea (duplicate responses possible), 90.5% of respondents recognized Kim Jong Il's "Teachings and Instructions" as law. Also, 86.5% recognized the proclamation issued by each agency as law. Bongdae Choi, *A Case Study on Legal Awareness of North Korean Refugees* (Ministry of Unification Service Research Project) (Seoul: Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 2011), pp. 10-11.


26. This document contains measures to prohibit North Korean residents from using South Korean-style words and grammar. The contents of this document are reintroduced in Chapter 4, Section 2.

reports submitted to Kim Jong Un until it was ultimately enacted as law. Regarding the prohibition of using the South Korean language, Kim Jong Un’s instructions were eventually legislated as the “Cultural Protection Law of Pyongyang” on January 18, 2023.²⁷ While it may appear that this law was enacted and adopted by the Supreme People’s Assembly, like all other laws, it was actually established as law based on Kim Jong Un’s instructions and decisions.

As another example, Appendix I-B-3, Appendix I-B-1, and Appendix I-B-5 are documents that show the process from multiple reports submitted to Kim Jong Un by the OGD until the final issuance of the decree. The title of this decree is “On the Strict Punishment for Those Violating the Socialist Way of Life.” The OGD revealed that the decree would be announced from August 21 to 23, 2017, considering the preparation time for the printing the decree, and specifying the location of the notices to be distributed to all institutions, enterprises, organizations and district offices nationwide.

This decree can be found in Figure 5. Figure 5 depicts a photo of a decree obtained directly from North Korea by a South Korean monthly magazine.

Figure 5. A Decree “On the Strict Punishment for Those Violating the Socialist Way of Life” (August 21, 2017)



Source: Woo-seok Choi, “The Kim Jong-un and Moon Jae-in Governments Underwent Extensive Ideological Censorship in the Early Stages. Decision to Provide \$8 Million in Aid to North Korea a Month Later,” *Monthly Chosun News Room Exclusive*, May 21, 2018.

27. Recently, a South Korean online media outlet, *DailyNK*, reported on the full text of this law. (Source: *DailyNK*, March 23, 2023, online edition).

The decrees (*pogo*) are Kim Jong Un's directives themselves. Therefore, in North Korea, they have the same effect as a general law or hold powers beyond ordinary laws. Some of the decrees are enacted as general laws through the legislative procedure of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly. A representative case related to this is the "Drug Crime Prevention Act" enacted on July 1, 2021 and the "Law on the Elimination of Reactionary Thought and Culture" enacted on December 4, 2020. This law prohibits the acquisition, distribution, and viewing of dramas, movies, books, and popular music content produced in South Korea. Decrees related to drug crimes and prohibition of South Korean content have been continuously promulgated since 2006. Before December 2020, non-judicial punishment based solely on the suryong's instructions had been carried out, but from after 2020, a law was enacted to enforce official judicial punishments.

The second decision method, as shown in B in Figure 4, illustrates policy proposals formulated by various department of the Central Party and state agencies such as the legislation, judiciary, and administration that go through official policy-making processes and procedures to be determined as national strategies or policies. On the surface, this may seem like a bottom-up approach. However, even in this method, the OGD intervenes in the entire decision-making structure, from review to the final decision with Kim Jong Un's approval.

The process of this method begins with each policy department of the central agencies (cabinet administrative and judicial organs, labor organizations) establishing policy enforcement measures to implement it based on Kim Jong Un's instructions or orders. If there are new ideas, a policy proposal is made and submitted to the Party Guidance Committee of the relevant department. Then, the Party Guidance Committee holds a meeting and submits the revised and supplemented policy proposal to the relevant working-level department of the Central Party after sufficient review and consultation on the submitted policy proposal are made.

When the policy proposal made through discussions by the Party Guidance Committee is reported to the relevant working-level department of the Central Party, this department, under the responsibility of the division chief or deputy director reviews whether the policy proposal conforms to Kim Jong Un's instructions. The alignment with Kim Jong Un's instructions and policies is determined by the editorial department established within each department

of the Central Party. The head of the relevant department of the Central Party submits the reviewed policy proposal to the OGD for final review and submits it to the Secretariat meeting or the Politburo meeting (#7 and 8 of B). If there is no secretary in charge, the policy proposal is submitted directly to the Secretariat or the Political Bureau meeting through the director of the OGD or the organization secretary.

Once the policy proposal is submitted, it undergoes deliberation at the Secretariat or the Political Bureau meeting attended by Kim Jong Un, and only after Kim Jong Un's approval, it becomes a national strategy, policy, or law. In rare cases, the secretariat's organization secretary or propaganda secretary makes an arbitrary decision on behalf of the General Secretary Kim Jong Un but after the decision is made, it must be reported to Kim Jong Un.

The third decision-making method, as shown in Figure 4, is when the policy department of the central agencies, such as cabinet administration, judiciary or labor organizations, undergoes the final review by the OGD and then submits it to the Party Guidance Committee of the respective agency. The head (minister) of the agency then submits the policy to the Political Bureau Standing Committee. If the head of the agency concurrently holds the position of a Political Bureau Standing Committee member or has a higher position, they may directly participate in the Political Bureau Standing Committee meeting to propose policies or laws. After being reported to Kim Jong Un through the Political Bureau Standing Committee, and receiving Kim Jong Un's approval, it is finally enacted into a policy or law.

Reference

Party Guidance Committee

The Party Guidance Committee is not an organization specified in the Workers' Party Rules. The Party Guidance Committee is a non-standing organization composed of ministers and deputy ministers of administrative agencies belonging to the Cabinet, secretaries of the party committees of administrative agencies, managers of each joint enterprise under the Cabinet, and the secretary in charge of the party committees of the joint enterprises. In Su Kwak, *A Study of the Party's Guidance of the Korean Worker's Party*, p. 74.

Kim Jong Un's Secretariat Office

The Secretariat Office is also a department that does not appear in the Workers' Party Rules or publicly disclosed documents in North Korea. The Secretariat Office is a department dedicated to the personal affairs of the Supreme Leader. Also, it is a department that delivers instructions and

documents to subordinate organizations including the OGD on behalf of the suryong and is not a department that controls national strategies and policies. The Secretariat Office of the suryong was also called the secretariat office of the WPK Central Committee and the secretariat office of the OGD during the Kim Jong Il era.

The existence of the Secretariat Office was first known through Hwang Jang Yop. Hwang Jang Yop worked as a “secretary” in the Central Party’s “secretariat office” for about 10 years from 1958. The “Kim Il Sung Secretariat Office” consisted of 4 people, and there was the positions of theoretical secretary, technical secretary, director and deputy director. The primary tasks of the theoretical secretaries were to write the manuscript of Kim Il Sung’s speeches and organize the transcripts of his speeches. They also played a role in writing articles under the name of Kim Il Sung and major documents of the Workers’ Party. In addition, they participated in important political events, such as political bureau meetings and overseas visits, accompanying Kim Il Sung and serving as his aides

Since the early 1970s, Kim Jong Il had a similar office called Office 216, which played a role similar to that of Kim Il Sung’s Secretariat Office. Office 216 was staffed with about five to six individuals who had expertise in writing, but were not necessarily journalists or scholars like the Kim Il Sung’s Secretariat. The Kim Jong Il’s Secretariat Office received and classified all proposals and various materials from the party, government, and military submitted for Kim Jong Il’s approval and passed it on to the relevant departments. In addition to handling documents, the Secretariat Office also handled confidential tasks of Kim Jong Il, such as handling his schedule and protocol activities, personal affairs of his family, unofficial party organization and preparations, material procurement, and secret fund management. Kenji Fujimoto, who was Kim Jong Il’s personal chef, was also a member of the Kim Jong Il Secretariat Office. Fujimoto stated in his book that he became a member of the WPK under the name “Pak Chul” in the early 1990s and received a member certificate from the Secretariat Office in July 1994.

Currently, Kim Jong Un’s Secretariat Office is a secretariat under the direct control of Kim Jong Un under the guise of the OGD. Its main tasks include overseeing reports related to national strategy and policies, compiling Kim Jong Un’s speeches, preparing documents related to Kim Jong Un’s instructions, managing his official and unofficial schedules and protocol, and ensuring the convenience of Kim Jong Un’s family affairs. Additionally, they also handle the management of funds related to the “court economy.” (Sources: Jang Yop Hwang, *I Saw the Truth of History*, pp. 113-166; In Su Kwak, *A Study of the Party’s Guidance of the Korean Worker’s Party*, pp. 25-27; Kenji Fujimoto, translated by Yuhee Han, *Why Is Kim Jong Un the Successor of North Korea?* (Seoul: Max media, 2010), pp. 181-183).

In addition to the three general methods described above, there are also exceptional methods employed in cases that require extreme security measures in diplomacy, espionage, and military policies, operations, and activities. These exceptional methods involve direct connections and decision-making between the suryong and the relevant operational entities. Furthermore, these operational entities consist of a small number of officials who form the approval chain, reporting to the suryong and receiving instructions from him.

Firstly, in the field of foreign diplomacy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports directly to the suryong and receives instructions, unlike other executive agencies within the Cabinet. According to D-2, regular reports from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can take the form of two types: “Daily Reports” and “Weekly Reports.” The responsible department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports to the first vice minister, who obtains approval from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Once the document has been approved, it is sent to the Ministry's Copying and Distribution Division (모사과). The officials in this department then rewrite the document in the format required for reporting to the suryong (Secretariat). The documents that have received approval up to the Minister of Foreign Affairs cannot be modified by the officials in the Copying and Distribution Division. The Copying and Distribution Division sends the documents to the suryong (Kim Jong Un’s Secretariat Office) through a separate electronic communication network directly connected to them. The electronic communication network connecting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Copying and Distribution Division and the suryong (Kim Jong Un’s Secretariat Office) is managed directly by the Electronic Communication Division of the Supreme Guard Command.²⁸

A particularly sensitive issue within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is human rights. The department responsible for addressing international criticism of North Korean human rights issues is Division 3 of the International Organization Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to D-2, this department has been dedicated to human rights issues since 2008, while the Law Research Institute of the Academy of Social Sciences is responsible for developing the political, diplomatic, and legal response logic towards the international community. In December 2014, when the issue of North Korean human rights was officially put on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council, the North Korean authorities took it seriously. As a result, a rotating ambassadorial post dedicated solely to human rights was established in 2015, and Kim Jong Un appointed Ri Hong Sik to this post. Afterwards, a system was established to report the international community’s response to human rights issues to Division 3 of the International Organization Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Human Rights Ambassador, First Vice Minister, and finally to Kim Jong Un. In addition, in the case of overseas

28. Interview with D-2.

embassies, the respective ambassadors are compelled to report only to the first vice minister for sensitive matters such as human rights. North Korean embassies abroad undergo annual evaluations regarding their response to human rights issues in the international community. These evaluations are officially conducted during the “Ambassadors Meeting” held annually in Pyongyang, overseen by the OGD in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²⁹

Next is the espionage and military operations sector. The department currently responsible for espionage and political operations in South Korea is the WPK Central Committee's United Front Department, while the organization-based espionage falls under the jurisdiction of the Cultural Exchange Bureau (formerly the Liaison Department). Organization-based espionage involves undercover agents infiltrating South Korea or commanding and controlling underground organizations within South Korea from overseas. The OGD does not directly intervene in such espionage activities. While the OGD selects operatives and guides their party activities, it cannot intervene in espionage operations themselves. The suryong receives reports and issues instructions regarding espionage activities only through the director of the Cultural Exchange Bureau (or deputy director), the responsible department head, and the chief guidance official (or guidance official). Furthermore, the designated guidance officials cannot share information about the underground organizations (spy networks) they manage with other guidance officials or department heads. In other words, reports are only conveyed to the suryong through authorized approval channels.

Finally, the last sector is the military operations. When engaging in military provocations against South Korea, the suryong directly issues commands to the director of the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB), relevant liaison offices or on-site commanders of military units, and to the deployed combatants or military personnel at the scene, in this respective order. One notable example is the sinking of the South Korean warship ROKS Cheonan in March 2010.³⁰ It is highly likely that

29. Interview with D-2.

30. The sinking of the ROKS Cheonan (PCC-772), a patrol combat corvette warship, occurred on March 26, 2010, near Baengnyeong Island, one of the five islands at the western end of South Korea. The ship was sunk by a North Korean torpedo. This incident resulted in the death of 40 ROK Navy personnel and six went missing. Subsequently, the ROK Navy rebuilt a new frigate using the same name, the Cheonan (FFG-826), which was commissioned on May 19, 2023. The Cheonan frigate is scheduled to conduct operations in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) starting from late 2023.

North Korea used the minimum command chain for the security of the Cheonan attack operation. In this regard, D-3, who had worked at the Department of People's Armed Forces headquarters as a military officer of the General Staff Department, stated that a week before the Cheonan incident, key military officials entered a closed-door meeting at the Operations Room of the Supreme Command. According to D-3's testimony, the officials attending the meeting included the Minister of the People's Armed Forces, the Chief of the KPA General Staff, and the Director of the Operations Department of the General Staff Department (a 4-star general). At this meeting, they allegedly conducted three simulations of launching torpedoes near Baengnyeong Island in South Korean territory and evading detection in preparation for the Cheonan attack.³¹ There is no way to cross-validate D-3's testimony, but at the time, D-3 emphasized that he learned about the contents of the meeting through high-ranking officials who directly participated in the secret meeting.

3.2.2 Seizing Control of the Regime through Micro-Level Interventions

The suryong intervenes even in micro-level social phenomena, including the public and private spheres of officials and residents. Furthermore, all reports and decisions are documented. In North Korea, the documents that are reported to the suryong in advance by the party, government, and military officials. This is commonly referred to as "proposals," and the suryong's decisions, which are delivered back to the relevant departments and officials after the proposals are approved, are referred to as "guidelines." This system was fully established when Kim Jong Il officially became the successor in 1974. Regarding this matter, Pyung-gil Shin provided the following testimony.

"Kim Jong Il meticulously regulated the planning, approval process, methods, and consolidation procedures of subordinate guidance projects. It was stipulated that when designing, planning, and executing any project within central institutions, a proposal must be prepared and submitted to him for approval, and then organized and executed"

31. Interview with D-3.

*accordingly. Guidelines were established for the preparation, submission, procedures, and methods of proposals. Through these measures, he strongly instructed the organization and implementation of subordinate guidance projects in accordance with prescribed procedures and methods.*³²

The “era of proposal-policy,” which began in the 1970s, continues to the present day. The policy of the suryong serves as the master switch that moves every aspect of the North Korean regime. If this master switch does not function, subordinate organizations and officials are unable to perform any tasks. Thae Yong-ho, who served as the deputy ambassador to the United Kingdom and defected to South Korea in 2016, recalled that since the 1980s, North Korea was governed by proposal and policy-based governance, with Kim Jong Il’s proposals and policies prevailing over the party’s policies and the state laws. He also mentioned that without the circulation of approved documents within the institutions, confusion would inevitably arise, making it impossible to hide the absence of the suryong.³³ Hwang Jang Yop, the former secretary of the Workers’ Party who defected to South Korea in 1997, referred to Kim Jong Il’s governance as “proposal politics.”³⁴

Each department and official report to their superiors and, ultimately, to the suryong, even on minute details, because the approval policy of the suryong is essential for executing everyday practical tasks. Regarding this, Hwang Jang Yop mentioned that in 1996, when North Korea’s power production fell short of even one-fifth of the demand, special agencies directly obtained approval from Kim Jong Il by submitting proposals requesting priority power supply to their own agencies. Once approved, these special agencies visited the Ministry of Electric Power Industry and threatened them to ensure power supply. Hwang Jang Yop stated that at that time, there were as many as 190 cases where direct approval was obtained from Kim Jong Il regarding power supply, bypassing the approval process of the prime minister.³⁵

Another reason for reporting is for the survival of each department and

32. Chang-Hyun Jung, *The CEO of DPRK Kim Jong Il*, p. 184.

33. Yong-ho Thae, *Password of the Third Floor Secretary Room* (Seoul: Guiparang, 2018), p. 271, 514.

34. Jang-yop Hwang, *The Truth and Deceit of North Korea* (Seoul: The Zeitgeist, 2006), p. 58.

35. Jang-yop Hwang, *I Saw the Truth of History*, p. 288.

individual officials. In other words, if actions that were not reported in advance are later discovered in the course of the Workers' Party's subsequent control or inspection process, it would be seen as a refusal to comply with the suryong's guidance. Through the cases presented in Table 4, the extent to which Kim Jong Un's policies directly intervene in North Korean people's lives can be observed.

Table 4 Cases of Kim Jong Un's Micro-Level Interventions

Appendix	Date of Kim Jong Un's Approval	Reporting Department	Document Title	Note
I-A-6 (2)	2012.03.07.	WPK CC	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un's Remarks on Establishing a Sound Moral Life Style Throughout Society</i> • <i>Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un's Address to the Chief Officials of the Party Central Committee on March 7, 2012 (Juche 101) (excerpt)</i> 	Criticisms on phone etiquettes of cadres
I-A-7 (1)	2013.04.07.	WPK CC	<i>Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un's Address to the Chief Officials of the Party Central Committee on April 7, 2013 (Juche 102) (Excerpt)</i>	Criticism on the cleanliness of the parks in Pyongyang
I-B-3	2017.07.26.	OGD	<i>Analyzed Materials and Measures to Understand the Service Conditions of Restaurants</i>	People's drinking and karaoke culture (1)
I-B-3	2017.07.26.	PAD	<i>A Proposal on Developing Measures for Propaganda and Agitation Activities Aimed at Establishing a Healthy and Revolutionary Lifestyle in Society.</i>	People's drinking and karaoke culture (2)
I-B-2	2017.07.26.	OGD	<i>Materials and Measures to Address the Acts of Vandalism Among Primary and Junior Middle School Students</i>	Small acts of deviation by adolescents
I-B-5	2017.08.03.	OGD	<i>Report on Measures to Implement the Approved Tasks Given by Respected Supreme Commander Comrade Kim Jong Un on July 26, 2017</i>	People's drinking and karaoke culture (3)

I-B-13	2017.08.31.	OGD	<i>Problems and Opinions on Measures for Issues Raised in the Process of Traffic Safety Project</i>	Temporary change of traffic direction due to road construction
I-B-14	2017.09.06.	OGD	<i>Proposed Materials and Measures</i>	Problems with the use of non-standard language by the general public
I-B-20	2018.01.27.	OGD	<i>Proposed Materials and Measures</i>	Issues for Families with Disabled Family Members
I-B-21	2017.08.31.	OGD	<i>Materials and Measures Addressing Promiscuous Activities Occurring in Marital Relationships</i>	Marriage Problems of Ordinary Citizens

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the documents of Kim Jong Un’s *Teachings and Instructions* are documents of what Kim Jong Un addressed to his close aides and are selectively delivered only to the infiltrated targets. These documents reveal Kim Jong Un’s personal characteristics. Appendix I-A-6 (2) in Table 4 contains Kim Jong Un’s instructions to observe phone etiquette when answering and ending phone calls. Although the exact background is unclear as the document lacks context, it appears that Kim Jong Un had an unpleasant experience when someone he was speaking to ended the call first.³⁶ Furthermore, Appendix I-A-7 (1) includes the content that Kim Jong Un reprimanded the Pyongyang City Party Committee, Pyongyang City People’s Committee, and responsible officials in the area for the inadequate management of parks in Pyongyang in 2012.

There are more cases of Kim Jong Un’s instructions and policies that directly affect the personal lives of individual residents. Appendix I-B-3, Appendix I-B-1, and Appendix I-B-5 in Table 4 are documents related to the same issue. In the issues presented in this document, we can see that the suryong is directly intervening even in micro-level social phenomena, and we can also see the process in which the instructions and remarks of the suryong, which have been

36. This statement may seem exaggerated and it may be hard to believe how personal emotions can actually turn into official directives. In Chapter IV, Section 3, various cases are introduced with supporting evidence to justify this claim.

explained above, are immediately turned into policies and laws. Appendix I-B-3 is based on the results of Kim Jong Un's order on July 14 and 15, 2017, "to conduct a fact-finding investigation related to liquor sales and karaoke services in late-night restaurants." Appendix I-B-1 and Appendix I-B-5 are documents reported to Kim Jong Un after establishing measures formulated by the PAD and the OGD, respectively. According to Appendix I-B-1, the document points out that restaurants in North Korea use karaoke equipment indiscriminately and criticize that restaurant staff are "wearing clothes and hairstyles that is not our style." Although the document does not explicitly mention South Korea, it analyzes such phenomena as being caused by "enemy's ideological and cultural infiltration activities," as North Korea commonly refers to South Korea as the "enemy." As a countermeasure against this, it states that propaganda and agitation activities to instill a sense of "enemy consciousness" and "anti-enemy consciousness" to all residents are implemented, and it is stated that such phenomena will be strictly punished by party, administrative, and legal means when discovered. Appendix I-B-5 is a document prepared by the OGD that announces its plans to ultimately legislate and announce a decree "On Strictly Punishing Those Who Infringe upon the Socialist Lifestyle." This decree is presented in Figure 5. This decree was publicly announced throughout North Korea from August 21 to August 23, 2017, and some excerpts from the proclamation are as follows.

3. Institutions, enterprises and organizations must never engage in karaoke services in restaurants and other service establishments without state approval.

5. All citizens should vigilantly observe and promptly report any illegal karaoke services or activities that promote excessive drinking, which violate the socialist way of life.

6. Anyone who violates this decree will have their equipment and facilities confiscated, face suspension or closure of their business operations, and be strictly punished according to the law.

Meanwhile, the suryong also directly inspects the road traffic construction situation in Pyongyang. Appendix I-B-13 of Table 4 is a document in which the OGD is reporting temporary changes in traffic directions in certain areas of

Pyongyang due to road construction. This document was reported by the Ministry of Social Security to the OGD through the party organization, and then the OGD reported to Kim Jong Un, and subsequently handed it down to the relevant party organizations. The reason why the Ministry of Social Security and OGD even reports the road construction status to Kim Jong Un is because his activities are centered around Pyongyang. Of course, the traffic issue in Pyongyang is an important issue as it is directly related to Kim Jong Un's security. Reporting even such detailed urban traffic situations is important because when Kim Jong Un drives himself or when his bodyguards drive him around the city, if there is traffic congestion, he can inquire about the reasons for the delay to the traffic officials. In other words, to avoid Kim Jong Un's spontaneous punishment orders, it is essential for relevant agencies and officials to provide advance reports to him.³⁷

Appendix I-B-14 and Appendix I-B-20 of Table 4 are directly reported and approved documents of the OGD to Kim Jong Un through the notification chain system. These documents are titled "Proposed Materials and Measures." Such titles are used when reporting various issues occurring in North Korea.

Appendix I-B-14 contains a report on the use of the term "August 3 (or 8.3) People's Consumer Product" (8월3일인민소비품) derogated by ordinary citizens, and emphasizes the need to strengthen party and legal control over such non-socialist phenomena. The term "August 3 People's Consumer Products" refers to light industrial products produced with waste materials from factories and enterprises in order to alleviate the shortage of daily necessities for ordinary citizens. This term was originally used as a slogan during the mass movement after Kim Jong Il's on-the-spot guidance (현지지도) at the Pyongyang Industrial Goods Exhibition in August 1984. However, in this document, specific examples of how this term was derogated have been removed before being delivered. In fact, the term "August 3 (or 8.3) People's Consumer Goods" has long remained only as a campaign name and a subject of ridicule. Among ordinary citizens, the term "8.3 amount" (8.3금액), and "8.3 couple" (8.3부부) have been derogatively used where "8.3 amount" refers to the act of bribing the supervisor to avoid being marked absent to one's designated workplace. Additionally, "8.3 couple" refers to an extramarital relationship.

37. It may be difficult to understand or accept Kim Jong Un's criticism or punishment for minor matters. In Chapter IV, Section 3, various cases are introduced that can reasonably support and justify these claims.

Appendix I-B-2 specifies the contents reported by the OGD that a significant number of students in primary and junior middle schools are vandalizing school textbooks and workbooks. North Korea's compulsory education system consists of one year of kindergarten, five years of primary school, 3 years of junior middle school, and 3 years of senior middle school. The age of admission for the first grade of primary school is 6 years old, and the entrance age for the first grade of junior middle school is 11 years old. In other words, this document shows that even minor deviant behavior of children and adolescents from 6 to 14 years of age are documented and raised as a matter of concern.

Appendix I-B-20, similar to Appendix I-B-14, is also a document handed down to the party organization after the OGD reported to Kim Jong Un concerning a social phenomenon. The direct translation of this document is as follows.

Appendix I-B-20, "Proposed Materials and Measures" (Approved by Kim Jong Un on January 27, 2018, OGD)

Material showing some women beating their handicapped husbands

According to the allegation, the cases of women who abuse their disabled husbands is becoming more prevalent, obscuring the noble morals of society.

...

Opinion on Countermeasures:

The measures established by the Organization and Guidance Department are as follows. In order to prevent the occurrence of situations where families of disabled people are abused, we will devise cultural programs for families of the disabled and provide continuous education. For those individuals who fail to improve despite receiving education, we will engage in struggles within the labor organizations and residents' assemblies, firmly disgrace them, and prevent them from walking with their heads up from shame.


As can be seen from Appendix I-B-20, Kim Jong Un also intervenes in issues occurring within each household. Of course, due to the ellipsis ("..."), we cannot ascertain specific cases. However, what is clear is that, as reported by the OGD, in order to "firmly disgrace women who abuse their disabled husbands and prevent

them from walking with their heads up,” Kim Jong Un's approval is necessary. Lastly, Appendix I-B-21 also involves interventions in the private lives of its citizens. This document mentions an increasing number of common-law marriages, marriages between close relatives, and early marriages with teenage girls.

IV

Completion and Continuation of the Suryong Dictatorship:

Personnel, Mutual Surveillance, and Punishment



The personnel system controlled by the suryong and the Workers' Party, as well as the horizontal surveillance and control occurring among all individuals, are factors that complete the suryong dictatorship. In particular, suryong's direct intervention in punishments is a key element supporting the sustainability of this dictatorship mechanism.

As discussed in Chapter III, North Korea's monolithic ideology and leadership and cult of personality are absolutized and institutionalized, deeply ingrained in the system. In other words, the suryong efficiently and systematically dominates North Korea through his dictatorial mechanism. However, it should be noted that Kim Jong Un is not a deity but a human being. This means that no matter how perfect the mechanism may be, the suryong cannot directly intervene and control every situation and event. If the presence of the suryong weakens even slightly within this mechanism, vulnerabilities may arise in the dictatorial power. Therefore, a mechanism developed in which the suryong constantly intervenes directly, namely, the personnel and punishment of party members and officials. In addition to this, there is a system of horizontal surveillance that take place among party members, officials, and ordinary citizens, even when the suryong does not directly intervene. This system of mutual surveillance has become a crucial element that has been institutionalized by the mechanism over the past 78 years, allowing the suryong dictatorship mechanism to be automatically executed.

North Korea's punishment system is also controlled by the Workers' Party. The suryong intervenes in the punishment system through the Workers' Party and, if necessary, gives direct orders and commands. The suryong's direct involvement in punishments is evidence that he is the ultimate responsible and commanding authority for crimes against humanity. North Korea possesses a judicial system similar to other countries, but the suryong and the Workers' Party also intervene in this judicial system, seriously infringing upon basic human rights. Furthermore, based on loyalty to the suryong, which is measured by the Ten Principles, North Korea carries out cruel punishments. Moreover, the suryong also makes decisions on summary executions and political prison camp detainment based on his own arbitrary and subjective judgments. As such, the suryong holds absolute dictatorial power to control and punish people as he pleases.

4.1 A Personnel Dictatorship

4.1.1 The Suryong's Personnel Authority

Definition and Types of Cadres

The term “personnel authority” (간부권) refers to the power to select, verify, assign, reward and punish officials in all organizations in North Korea.¹ Personnel authority is a power that can be exercised by the party based on the monolithic ideology of the Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism. The leader controls the selection and appointment of cadres in the entire system and directly intervenes in the personnel authority of high-ranking cadres.

According to North Korea’s Grand Korean Dictionary, a cadre is defined as: 1) An official who holds a responsible position in the party, state institutions, social organizations, or similar organizations. They are the backbone of the party who execute the party’s policies and serve as the leading member of the revolution and educators of the masses; and 2) An official who works in a certain organization, institution, or group and has set qualifications determined by the state. The term “cadre” is used in socialist countries such as the Soviet Union and China and is translated as “간부” (幹部, ganbu) in North Korea. The term “cadre” used in socialist countries in the past is sometimes compared to the term “elite” used by other countries. The definition of “elite” varies greatly in various political science studies, but generally refers to individuals who can actually exert influence on political or strategic outcomes in a certain position. Cadres in the Soviet Union and China, as a part of the collective leadership system also played a similar role to that of elites in other countries.

However, even if North Korean cadres hold the highest ranks, they cannot directly and substantially influence the national strategy and policy decisions. As mentioned earlier, only the suryong can exercise that decision-making power. However, the responsibility for failures in strategy and policies falls on the relevant sector’s cadres, not the suryong. This is because the suryong is considered infallible in the North Korean system. Therefore, failures that occur are imputed to the cadres for not accurately following the suryong’s decisions or due to their arbitrary

1. 간부권 or personnel authority is an actual term used in North Korea.

decisions.

Excluding Kim Jong Un and his family, the highest-ranking cadres in North Korea can be classified as the following. In the Workers' Party, there are about four members of the Presidium of Political Bureau of the Central Committee, seven secretaries of the Secretariat, two deputy chairmen and nine members of the Central Military Commission. In state institutions, there is one first vice chairman, one vice chairman and ten members of the State Affairs Commission, one premier and seven deputy premiers in the Cabinet, and in the legislative body, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), there is one chairman and two vice chairmen. In North Korea, all these high-ranking cadres are referred to as "chief officials." Chief officials include directors (ministerial level) and deputy directors (deputy-ministerial level) of specialized departments of the Central Committee that are not specified here, as well as heads of central agencies directly under the party, government, and military.²

Chief officials do not necessarily have a higher status among all cadres. In North Korea, since the suryong governs through the Workers' Party, the party cadres are considered to have the highest stature. For example, although the director of the Taesong Guidance Bureau belongs to the scope of chief officials, since this bureau must receive guidance from Office 39 of the Central Committee, their status cannot be higher than that of working-level official in Office 39. D-2 mentioned that the status of staff members in the Central Committee's OGD is absolute, and no institution can surpass the status of the Workers' Party. Therefore, no other institutions besides the Workers' Party can exercise substantive authority, and accordingly, the SPA and its subordinate institutions are referred to as "nursing homes." Additionally, D-3 claimed that even three or four-star generals in the military must bow to the working-level personnel of the OGD Unit 62, who has the personnel authority of military cadres.

Considering these situations, the cadre with the highest status among the

2. The head of a central organization refers to Office 39 of the WPK CC as an example. Organizations under the name of "Guidance Bureau," such as Taesong Guidance Bureau, Kumgang Guidance Bureau, Taehung Guidance Bureau, and Rakwon Guidance Bureau, under Office 39 belong to the central agency. Each of the guidance bureaus under Office 39 has its own external name. The external name of Taesong Guidance Bureau is Korea Taesong General Trading Corporation. The company is also listed on the United Nations and U.S. Treasury Department sanctions lists. The director of a leading country is higher in rank than a deputy minister (vice minister) and lower than a minister (minister).

chief officials can also be identified as Jo Yong Won, the director of the OGD. As of December 2022, he concurrently holds positions as a member of the Presidium of the Political Bureau, a secretary of the Secretariat, a member of the Central Military Commission, and a member of the State Affairs Commission, directly receiving Kim Jong Un's trust and exercising significant authority. However, Jo Yong Won is just one cadre who is entrusted with Kim Jong Un's powers through delegation. As a member of the Party, he is subject to control by the chief secretary of the Central Committee, and just like in 1997 when Kim Jong Il did so, the chief secretary can be purged at any time. Therefore, in the North Korean system, cadres, regardless of rank, can be selected, dismissed, or executed at any time based on the suryong's will and needs, and can be replaced at any time.

In North Korea, cadres are generally categorized based on their field of work and personnel authority. First, they can be distinguished as party cadres, administrative and economic institution cadres, labor organization cadres, military and security institution cadres, and other specialized field cadres.³ Additionally, in the case of lowest level cadres within the Workers' Party, they are categorized based on their full-time status—paid (full-time) cadres, semi-paid cadres, or unpaid cadres.

Furthermore, they can also be distinguished based on where the final approval (endorsement) of cadre appointments is made. That is, a classification is made depending on whether the final decision on cadre appointments is made by the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the OGD of the Central Committee, or by the provincial, municipal, county party committees. Thus, the highest-level cadres in North Korea are the chief officials belonging to the category of “subject to approval by the Secretariat,” and they are individuals who are appointed after Kim Jong Un's approval.

D-2 revealed that in the case of cadres subject to approval by the Secretariat, the individual cadre resumes are reported to Kim Jong Un individually. Each cadre resume submitted for individual reporting to Kim Jong Un includes a half-body photo of the cadre's front and side. The size of each photo is 50 cm x 70 cm. In the case of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not only the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the first vice minister but also ambassadors and councilors dispatched abroad

3. They are also classified as party workers, administrative workers, security guard workers, and external workers.

are subject to Secretariat's approval, although the resumes of councilors do not include front and side photos.

Criteria for Selecting Cadres

As in all areas of the North Korean system, all personnel standards such as selection, punishment, and rewards of North Korean officials are based on loyalty to the suryong, the only ideology. In this regard, Article 9, Paragraph 7 of the Ten Principles stipulates the following.

Appendix II. The Ten Principles, Article 9, Clause 7

Cadres should be evaluated and selected based on their loyalty and competence to the party, and their placement should be determined by this basic yardstick. We must vigorously fight and thoroughly observe the party principles and establish the order of the cadre affair and should not handle issues related to cadres based on bribery or nepotistic relationships such as relatives, friends, teachers, students, alumni, or regional bonds and must not condone acts of arbitrarily hiring, dismissing, or punishing cadres.

The Ten Principles establish loyalty and competence as the criteria for personnel management, which can only be evaluated or acknowledged by the suryong. In this regard, Kim Jong Il made a speech to high-ranking party, state, and military officials on April 14, 1974, as follows.

"We became cadres not by innate talents, but by the suryong's political trust. Without the suryong's political trust, what honor would we have, or find value in our existence?"⁴

As stated in the introduction to Chapter II, the suryong is the absolute source of the system. Therefore, cadres can exist only when there is a suryong. Kim Jong Il emphasized that officials can be considered complete as officials when they receive trust from him. In this regard, Hwang Jang Yop mentioned that Kim Jong Il once said to chief officials, "If comrades lose trust from the Party (or Kim Jong Il), what

4. Kim Jong Il, "Let's Further Strengthen the Monolithic Ideological System Throughout the Entire Party and Society," pp. 244-245.

will be left? You will just be a piece of meat.”⁵

The extent of an individual's real power in any country or organization—including North Korea—is not determined by superficial ranks or positions, but by the proximity to the “powerholder.” In other words, the closer one is to the person in power, the greater the power one can wield. However, what makes North Korea different is the absolute nature of the suryong’s trust, which can be revoked or changed at any time. For example, the simple act of accompanying the suryong in private or public events, taking photos or having drinks together with the him is in itself evidence of strong trust. However, these seats often become vacant through executions or purges, only to be filled in by other officials.

Therefore, the power of North Korean officials is determined by the suryong’s decisions. In this regard, during Kim Jong Il’s reign, D-3 claimed that the rank of officials within the KPA were directly determined by the suryong, and they were given numbers such as “Number 1,” “Number 2,” and “Number 3” based on their level of trust. Of course, this ranking was limited to the positions of Minister of People’s Armed Forces, Chief of the General Staff, and Director of the General Political Bureau (GPB). Depending on Kim Jong Il’s personal preferences, the Minister of People’s Armed Forces could be Number 1 or Number 3. It is also worth noting that they referred to themselves with such number by identifying themselves as “I’m Number 1” or “I’m Number 2” to the operator to get connected to the minister of the People’s Armed Forces.⁶

Cadres Selection Procedures

In North Korea, the cadre management, including the appointment is carried out through the mechanism of the Workers’ Party. Cadres assigned to the party, government, military, labor organizations, and all other organizations are selected through the official procedures of the Workers' Party. The selection of cadres is conducted on a needs basis, to fill in vacancies or from establishment or expansion of organizations. There is no concept of regular personnel appointments. The process of cadre selection begins when the party committee of the sector that has the personnel authority to appoint personnel for the position, requests

5. Jang-yop Hwang, *I Saw the Truth of History*, p. 284.

6. Interview response from D-3.

recommendations from the party organization to which the candidates belong. The party organization then selects cadre candidates for recommendation primarily based on the evaluation of their documents.⁷ Subsequently, candidates are reselected through a process of preliminary interviews, rewriting of cadre documents, background checks, and physical examinations. If necessary, multiple rounds of interviews and physical examinations may be conducted to select the best candidates. Background checks are conducted to determine the candidates' social origins and backgrounds, primarily by verifying the information in the resident registration records managed by the Resident Registration Division of the relevant local (city or county) people's security office.⁸ In addition, thorough background checks are conducted with the candidates' relatives and acquaintances to obtain their personal endorsements.

The Cadre Division of the Organization Department and the Cadre Department of the party committee responsible for personnel appointments, submit the selection documents to the Secretariat Council, the decision-making body of the party committee. The Cadre Division of the Organization Department is responsible for party cadre selection, while the Cadre Department handles the selection of administrative cadres. The Secretariat Council adopts the submitted documents unanimously to determine cadre appointments. Although the duties of the party cadres and administrative cadres are superficially separate, even administrative cadres must go through the review and approval of the Organization Department.

For example, the final personnel authority for the county party guidance officials are made by the county's own party committee. When appointing county party guidance officials, who is a party cadre, the respective party committee's Cadre Division of the Organization Department prepares all the necessary

7. The cadre documents refer to the three documents prepared by the cadre candidate himself. These documents consist of an autobiography (a self-introduction letter written by hand), a family tree (a record of family and relatives), an cadre resume (a brief record of work experience, education, awards, etc.), and an evaluation statement prepared by the organization to which the candidate belongs.

8. Resident registration records are managed by the Resident Registration Division of the People's Security Office of each city and county in North Korea. This document is characterized by a detailed description of the family history, such as property assets and ideological trends that have been held by ancestors for generations. To access and view the resident registration record stored in the People's Security Office, one must have an official document with the official seal of the chief secretary in charge of the city or county party committee.

documents and obtains approvals from the deputy director, Organization Department chief, and organization secretary of the Cadre Division of the Organization Department, and the final documents are submitted to the Secretariat Council of the county party committee. If the Secretariat Council approves the documents unanimously, the county party chief secretary—commissioned by the county party committee—appoints the new cadre, but no separate appointment certificate is issued. Similarly, when appointing an administrative cadre of the county people's committee, the Cadre Department of the county party committee carries out practical preparations such as selection and document preparation, and then submits them to the Cadre Registration Division of the Organization Department of the county party committee for review, and after obtaining the approvals of the director and organization secretary, the documents are presented to the Secretariat Council of the county party committee for final decision, after which the county party chief secretary makes the final appointment.

Cadre management in North Korea is both an internal and an organizational affair of the Workers' Party. Accordingly, all cadre affairs are handled by the OGD of the WPK Central Committee (or Central Party) and the Organization Department of the party committees at all levels, commissioned with the suryong's personnel authority. In particular, cadre personnel appointments in North Korea follow the *Cadre Management Guidebook*, an internal document of the Workers' Party, which is classified as top-secret and produced by the Central Party's OGD. The *Cadre Management Guidebook* specifies all the procedures and methods related to cadre candidate selection, identification, appointments, dismissals, as well as the principles to be observed for all matters related to cadre affairs. It can be regarded as a comprehensive personnel guideline.

The organizations responsible for cadre personnel in the Workers' Party are the Cadre Division in the Central Party's OGD and in each party committee's Cadre Division of the Organization Department, as well as Cadre Department in the Central Party and in each party committee at all levels. In the Cadre Division of the Central Party's OGD and in each party committee's Organization Department, they are responsible for personnel of the party cadres while the Cadre Department in the Central Party and in each party committee at all levels are responsible for cadre personnel in the legislative, judicial, administrative, and economic sectors. In the case of the Ministry of State Security and Ministry of People's Security,,

personnel appointments for the political cadres are under the jurisdiction of the respective institutions' Cadre Division of the Organization Department of the Political Bureau, while the administrative cadres are handled by the Cadre Department of the Political Bureau. However, in the case of high-ranking officials, the final personnel authority is exercised by the Cadre Division of the OGD and Cadre Department of the Central Party. As for personnel appointments for labor organization officials, the final decision is made by the party's Labor Organization Department, and even in this case, it is processed with the consensus from the OGD and the Cadre Department. Similarly, in the case of North Korean military officials, political military cadre appointments are handled by the Cadre Division of the Organization Department of the General Political Bureau (GPB), while the appointment of military commanders and other officials is handled by the Cadre Department of the GPB.

The important point here is that the OGD of the Central Party and the Organization Department of each party committee exercise the final approval power for personnel appointments regardless of the sector. This is because before submitting the personnel appointment agenda to the Secretariat Council and the Secretariat Bureau of the Central Party, the agreement of the respective party committee's Organization Department must be obtained, before getting approval from the organization secretary. Although the final approval for cadre appointments and dismissals is ultimately determined by the Central Party's Secretariat Bureau and the Secretariat Council of each respective party committee, the organization secretary responsible for cadre personnel plays a decisive role in the process.

Ultimately, it is Kim Jong Un who has the final personnel authority for the chief officials of the party, government, and military, the so-called "candidates in need of Secretariat's approval." In this way, Kim Jong Un exercises personnel dictatorship through the OGD of the Central Party and the Organization Department of each party committee at all levels."

Selection of Party Members

As discussed in Chapter III, all areas of the North Korean regime are organized, and all organizations are subject to the control of the suryong through the Workers' Party. All officials and people of North Korea must engage in organizational life,

which subjects them to monitoring and supervision by the organization. From the perspective of the suryong, control through organizations makes dictatorship more efficient and systematic. The individuals who are validated through monitoring and surveillance within the organization become party members and cadres.

In North Korea, the terms “party member” and “non-party member” are commonly used. A party member refers to someone who has joined the party organization, while a non-party member is literally someone who is not a party member. Control over individual party members is carried out through party cells and primary party committees, while control over non-party members is conducted through the labor organizations to which they belong. Guidance on party life for party members begins from the moment when non-party members or ordinary citizens are preparing to join the party. This is called “Party Life Guidance upon Entering the Party.”

The suryong is the only person with the authority to decide on the admission of ordinary citizens as party members.⁹ In other words, if the suryong gives the word, all the procedures can be skipped for admission into the party. The ostensible process for joining the Workers’ Party is specified in the WPK Rules (Party Charter). According to these regulations, when a person wishing to join submits an application for admission to the affiliated party organization, the organization is then required to conduct the necessary deliberation procedures and admit the individual to the party. However, reality is far from this. In actuality, the primary party committees and party cells first select individuals who are loyal to Kim Jong Un, demonstrate exemplary performance in their duties, have good conduct, and come from favorable backgrounds. They are then asked to write an application for admission. In other words, individuals with competence and potential for leadership are first identified and absorbed into the party as party members.

9. According to Article 3 of Chapter 1 of the Workers’ Party Rules, the final decision to join the Party can only be made through the resolution of the secretariat council at or above the military party committee level.

Reference

D-4 emphasized that the reason why bottom-up revolution that occurred in many countries undergoing regime transitions did not occur in North Korea is because all individuals who could become potential leaders have been absorbed by the suryong and the Workers' Party. In other words, rebellions or riots centered around ordinary citizens occur through the formation, expansion, and strengthening of networks with a leader as the focal point. However, North Korea is a system in which such possibilities are eliminated from the onset. As mentioned earlier, only the leader can create all organizations and networks, and individuals who can become leaders are selected as party members and officials. Otherwise, they are either imprisoned in political prison camps or executed.

Ultimately, the process of joining the Workers' Party does not start with the autonomous will and application of individuals, but rather the party organization intervenes from the early stage of selecting prospective members. Individuals selected as prospective members by the party organization are expected to be cautious with their words and behavior, strive to be exemplary in all areas, and show diligence in studying ideology. In particular, the Ten Principles and the Workers' Party Rules must be memorized completely and accurately. Additionally, they must also study the basic principles of Juche ideology, Kim Jong Un's instructions and policies presented in their respective fields of work, and the policies of the Workers' Party. Moreover, they must have a clear sense of self-discipline and plan on how to remain loyal to Kim Jong Un and the Workers' Party after joining. Once such preparations are completed, the review process for admission into the Workers' Party begins.

The process of joining the Workers' Party starts with the recommendation and evaluation process within the labor organization to which the individual belongs. If the prospective member is affiliated with a labor organization, they receive a recommendation from the lowest level of their organization, the primary organization, and then undergo evaluation by the committee of the primary youth league of the institution or enterprise, followed by a final review by the county youth league committee. The review generally involves confirming whether the individual has memorized the Ten Principles and the Party Rules and their speech about their commitment and determination after joining the party. In fact, since the decision to join lies within the party organization, the recommendation

and evaluation process conducted by the labor organization after the party organization selects prospective members is mostly a formality.

Once the recommendation and screening process within the labor organization is completed, the official admission process within the party organization begins. The first place within the party organization to conduct the admission review is the party cell and the primary committee to which the prospective member belongs. The party cell holds a cell general meeting and proceeds with the admission review. Once this process is completed, the admission documents are forwarded to the primary party committee for registration and then to the Party Member Registration Division of the Organization Department of the county party committee.

In the Party Member Registration Division of the Organization Department of the county party committee, a thorough screening of the prospective member, including their loyalty, daily life, task performance, and especially their family background and criminal records is conducted by the officials in the Party Life Guidance Division in the Organization Department. After passing the verification and evaluation by the Party Life Guidance Department and the Party Member Registration Division, the admission documents are submitted to the Secretariat Council of the county party committee.

The final evaluation of the prospective member takes place at the Secretariat council meeting, The chief secretary presides over the meeting and the organization secretary, propaganda secretary, labor organization secretary, and any other relevant secretaries are in attendance with the prospective member. The final evaluation is conducted in a question-and-answer format, similar to the previous stages, focusing on the Ten Principles, the Party Charter, and policies.

Once the final evaluation is completed in the Secretariat Council meeting, the prospective member is asked to leave the room, and the secretaries present at the meeting unanimously determine the decision. The result is then notified to the prospective member. The date of the final decision made at the Secretariat Council meeting becomes the party admission date as a candidate member.

Unless it is a special admission like the “Hwason Party Admission,” where a prospective candidate is admitted as a full member without going through the verification period, newly admitted member cannot immediately become a full member. Therefore, people joining the Workers’ Party must undergo a verification

period as a candidate member for two years.

During the verification period as a candidate member, individuals are required to participate in party meetings and party life *chonghwa* or criticism sessions organized by the party cell and the primary party committee to which they belong, as well as fulfill their obligations as party members and adhere to the party guidance and control. However, they do not have the voting rights when electing the executive body or making decisions on important matters during the party meetings.

Of course, if a candidate member fails to fulfill their obligations as a party member during the verification period or engages in actions that are politically problematic, they will be expelled from the party before the process of becoming a full member. Unmarried women are expelled if they get married and relocate to follow their husbands or quit their jobs during the two-year candidacy period.

After completing the two-year candidacy period, a qualification assessment as a full member is conducted within the party organization. The results are first reported to the party cell and the primary party committee, and then results are reported to the Party Member Registration Division in the Organization Department of the county party committee. Subsequently, a Secretariat Council meeting is convened in the county party committee for the final evaluation to approve the candidate as a full member. During this process, the candidate is again required to memorize the Ten Principles, the Party Rules, and party policies, and asked to make a resolution on how to remain loyal to Kim Jong Un and the Workers' Party. When the Secretariat Council determines the final admission, that date becomes the member's party admission date, which is recorded in the party membership registration record and party membership card.

As such, the party organization provides direct guidance from the selection to the entire screening and evaluation process until they become a full party member. From the moment of admission, the party organization exercises control of party members to ensure their faithful fulfillment of their duties and obligations.

4.1.2 The Suryong's Control over Party Members and Cadres

Control over the Party Life

From July 2 to 6, 2022, in Pyongyang, the “Special Training Session for Party Life Guidance Officials in the Organization Department of Party Committees at All Levels” was held for the first time in the history of the Workers' Party. This training session was attended by Kim Jong Un, Organization Secretary of the Central Committee, Jo Yong Won, Propaganda Secretary Ri Il Hwan, Director of the KPA GPB, Jong Kyong Thaek, Deputy Director of the OGD, and officials from the Organization Department of various levels of the party. Kim Jong Un emphasized, “Party life guidance is fundamental in party activities, and the system of guiding the party life of party cadres and members through the Organization Department of the party committees at all levels is the basic guiding principle and directive line of the Party Central Committee to move the entire party and strengthen the Party's leadership and combat capabilities.”¹⁰ From the scale of this training session and the emphasis placed by Kim Jong Un, it can be inferred that he is directly involved in the party life guidance.

In North Korea, except for the General Secretary Kim Jong Un, all party members are subject to the guidance and control of their respective party organizations, regardless of whether they hold positions such as secretary of the Central Committee, member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, construction worker, or miner. Of course, even non-party members in North Korea are required to be members of labor organizations and undergo organizational life and face control through these organizations. In other words, ordinary citizens are monitored by the party committees composed of party members and officials, and each party committee is supervised by their superior party organization, and all party organizations are under the control of the Central Party's OGD.

Therefore, Kim Jong Un exercises control over North Korea through the political guidance of the Workers' Party, which is conducted with party cadres and members. The political guidance of the Workers' Party is Kim Jong Un's most

10. Headquarters Political News Team, “Special Lecture for Officials of the Party Life Guidance Division of the Organization Department of the Party Committees at Each Level of the Workers' Party of Korea: General Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea and Dear Comrade Kim Jong Un Provided Guidance at the Workshop,” *Rodong Sinmun*, July 7, 2022, p. 1.

important means of governance. The party organization directly responsible for guiding and controlling party members' party life in North Korea is the base-level organization called the "party cell." Therefore, wherever there are party members in North Korea, whether it be on remote islands or aboard foreign vessels, party cells are there to seize and control the party life of party members.

Party life requires that party members to think and act in accordance with all provisions stipulated in Kim Jong Un's instructions and the Party Charter, including the Ten Principles, perform tasks given by the Party organization, report the results, and attend meetings, study sessions, and lectures held by Party organizations at all levels. This entire process constitutes the party life, which is divided into organizational life and ideological life.

Firstly, organizational life for party members includes participating in party meetings, adhering to the Ten Principles, following the directives and provisions of Kim Jong Un, the party charter, and the decisions and instructions of the party organization, receiving and executing assigned tasks, and reporting the results. It also includes carrying out decisions made at cell general meetings or primary party meetings, participating in the party life criticism sessions (*chonghwa*) and various party meetings, reporting promptly to the party organization on issues arising in one's surroundings, and acting according to the decisions of the party organization. In the case of cadres, faithfully fulfilling the duties assigned to them in their positions in the party organization is considered equivalent performing well in party life. For example, the Prime Minister, in addition to fulfilling his duties, he would be considered to have well maintained his party life well by actively participating in party meetings and lectures. The department responsible for controlling the party organizational life of party members is the Party Life Guidance Division of the city or county party committee's Organization Department, and its superior departments are the Organization Department of the provincial or municipal party committee and the Central Party's OGD. Therefore, the Organization Department is also referred to as the "Party Life Guidance Department."

The control of the party life is exercised by the Central Party's OGD is well reflected in Kim Jong Un's approved policy documents. The following is stated at the beginning of this one document:

Appendix I-B-17, “Measures to Strengthen the Standards for Operating the Party Life Criticism Sessions for the Fourth Quarter of Last Year and Strengthen the Party Life Guidance in the first quarter of this year for cadres and party members” (approved by Kim Jong Un on January 10, 2018, OGD)

Focusing on the historic speech delivered by Comrade Chairman of the Workers' Party at the 5th Cell Chairpersons' Conference of the Workers' Party and the combat tasks presented in the New Year's address at the beginning of 2018, we aim to further strengthen the organizations and guidance of the party life for cadres and party members in the first quarter of this year.

As can be seen from the above document, the OGD generally controls organizational life through the party life criticism session (*chonghwa*), to deliver and enforce Kim Jong Un's instructions and policies to party cadres and members belonging to the entire party organization. As such, the party life criticism sessions are an obligation that must be carried out by all party members, whether they are working overseas, living on a fishing vessel, or located in remote areas. According to D-2, diplomats belonging to the North Korean Mission to the United Nations handwrite the contents of their party life criticisms and submit them to Pyongyang due to concerns about eavesdropping by U.S. intelligence agencies. In other words, North Korean party members are required to engage in party organizational life under any circumstances.

Secondly, party ideological life is a concept that encompasses all processes and qualities necessary for a party member to possess ideologically mentally and physically. An important aspect of party ideological life is actively participating in the delivery of Kim Jong Un's instructions, learning about the greatness of the Kim family, and participating in various ideological education and lectures. It also includes actively participating in cultural activities such as visits, field trips, and movie screenings organized by the party organization for the ideological cultivation of party members. The department responsible for guiding and controlling party members' ideological life is the Propaganda Department within the district and provincial party committees, and the Central Party's PAD being the highest guiding institution.

The control of party ideological life carried out by the PAD can also be seen in

the following Kim Jong Un approved policy document.

Appendix I-B-6, “Proposal Regarding the Standardization and Measures for the Officials’ Learning Criticism Session for the First Half of 2017” (Approved by Kim Jong Un on August 10, 2017, PAD)

Opinion on Countermeasures:

Party organizations, including those at the provincial, city, and county levels, are requested to report on the materials regarding the learning review session, and those who receive failing evaluation should not be sent on business trips for one quarter but should be assigned to party members and workers’ study groups to boost motivation.

(End of the excerpt)

As can be seen from this document, the PAD reports to Kim Jong Un on the results of the “learning criticism session” every quarter, which is one control method for party ideological life. In this document, the PAD reports to Kim Jong Un that employees who have received a failing evaluation in the learning criticism session will not be sent on overseas business trips during the first quarter. The criteria for the failing evaluation are based on the memorization of study materials, including Kim Jong Un’s teachings and writings, as well as personality cult related content on the Kim family.

Control over Party Cadres

Controlling party cadres and members is equivalent to controlling all areas of the system, including officials and ordinary citizens in the regime. As previously mentioned, in order to be appointed as a cadre, one must first become a member of the Workers’ Party regardless of the field. This applies not only to officials in various administrative and economic institutions but also to officials in labor organizations. Even in the case of the Korean Social Democratic Party, which is not the Workers’ Party, all officials are party members.¹¹

11. The Social Democratic Party of Korea is North Korea’s formal first opposition party and a bloc party. In other words, it is an external organization of the WPK in name only to dilute the totalitarian image centered on the WPK. Kim Yong Dae, chairman of the Central Committee of the Korean Social

The reason why it is mandatory to appoint party members as officials in North Korea is because the regime defines officials as “the backbone of the party, a commanding member of the revolution who organizes and executes party policies, and the educators of the masses.” Therefore, all officials in North Korea are party members before they become cadres, and they engage in party activities like ordinary party members. Although the responsibilities of cadres, who are in charge of the fixed tasks assigned by the suryong and the Workers' Party, are more important than the tasks assigned to ordinary party members, their basic party life is not significantly different from that of ordinary members.

However, the system for controlling and guiding the party life of party members and party cadres is bound to be different as the cadres are responsible for controlling not only the party members but also the party organization to which administrative and economic cadres belong to. Kim Jong Un strictly enforces the control and guidance of party cadres and their party life through a separate mechanism. These mechanisms are the direct party committee (or party headquarter committee) and institutional party organization. The direct party committee is responsible for guiding the party life of party members and workers in the WPK Central Committee or the Central Party. The institutional party committee are in charge of the party life guidance of officials and members of provincial, municipal, and county party committees. The institutional party committee in the Central Party and the institutional party committee in local party organizations have tremendous influence within the party and above the party organization. The detailed discussion on the control mechanism for party cadres in direct party committees and the institutional party committees is as follows.

First, the organization that controls the party life of all party cadres and members within the Central Party is the direct party committee (also referred to as the direct party). The name of this party organization means “directly under Kim Jong Un.” The direct party committee is also called the headquarters party committee because it is located in the WPK Central Committee headquarters or the main office of the Workers' Party.

Democratic Party and chairman of the National Reconciliation Council from 1998 to 2019, is not a member of the Korean Social Democratic Party. Kim is a key member of the WPK who established the theory of operations against South Korea while serving as the head of the South Korea Research Institute under the United Front Department of the WPK CC.

Under the direct order and control of Kim Jong Un, the direct party committee controls and guides the party life of Central Party cadres through departmental party committees in the central party headquarters and various working-level departments. In other words, the direct party committees are under the direct control of Kim Jong Un, who controls the departmental party committees established in each working-level department of the Central Party, and these departmental party committees control the party cells organized under each department or division in each relevant department. For example, party cadres belonging to the Cadre Division 1 of OGD or Refinement Division of PAD are controlled by party cells organized in the respective departments, and party cells are under the guidance of the party committees of the OGD and PAD. Finally, the party committees of the OGD and PAD are guided by the headquarters party committee.

The Central Party cadres hold positions such as secretary, director, deputy director, division chief, deputy division chief, chief guidance official, guidance official, and assistant guidance official. Accordingly, they give instructions and reports related to their work according to this hierarchy of positions and ranks. However, party life is controlled by the party cell of the department, which is the basic organization of the Workers' Party. Generally, party cell secretaries concurrently hold the position of division chiefs or deputy division chiefs in each department. For example, a Standing Committee member of the Political Bureau or the WPK Central Committee member, a secretary responsible for organizational guidance in the Secretariat, director of the OGD, a deputy director of the Munitions Industry Department, and an assistant guidance official in Office 39 are all members of the party cell of their respective departments, regardless of their official positions and ranks. In other words, all central party officials must be subject to the control of the party cell secretary as party members.

Moreover, the party cells organized in each department or division are subject to the control of the party committee of the department. Generally, secretary of each party committee holds a concurrent position as the department's deputy director (vice-minister level), and the deputy secretary concurrently holds a position of a division chief in the department. In addition, the party committees organized in each department are subject to the control of the direct party committee, which is a superior party organization.

Within the direct party committee, there are full-time party cadres, including the chief secretary, organization secretary, and propaganda secretary, who specialize in guiding the party life of central party cadres. Above all, the chief secretary of the direct party committee holds a position of immense influence within the party. Although the position is the deputy director of the OGD, they directly meet and receive direct instructions from Kim Jong Un. For instance, Jo Yong Won concurrently holds positions such as the member of Presidium of the Politburo, secretary of the Secretariat responsible for organizational guidance, member of the WPK CC Military Commission, member of the State Affairs Commission, and deputy director of the OGD. However, his party life is controlled and guided by the chief secretary of the direct party committee. Similarly, the organization secretary and propaganda secretary of the direct party committee are senior cadres holding concurrent positions in the WPK CC departments or divisions as deputy directors or division chiefs, wielding significant influence.

As previously mentioned, the authority of the direct party committee is formidable because the chief secretary of the direct party committee is in a position to receive direct instructions from Kim Jong Un and report to him regularly.¹² Additionally, the position of chief secretary of the direct party committee is an entrusted position by Kim Jong Un. Furthermore, the chief secretary of the direct party committee is responsible for the party life of all central party cadres, including Presidium member of the Political Bureau and secretaries, and directly evaluates their performance and attitude in the party life, which also has a fundamental influence on the personnel decisions of central party cadres.

As such, the suryong exercises strict control over the party life of central party cadres through the direct party committee, party committees, and party cells in each department or division.

Second, the control mechanism of the institutional party committees will be examined. The organizations that guide and control the party life of cadres of local party organizations, including provincial, municipal, district party committees are primary party committees, established within the party committees at each level. The primary party committees, which are basic organizations, are established

12. Until the 8th Party Congress in January 2021, the chief secretary of the direct party committee was Jong Sang Hak. It is not known who was appointed as the chief secretary of the direct party committee after January 2021. Kwanhyung Lee, *A Study of North Korea's Drug Problems*, p. 66.

not only in the party but also in the military, state-owned enterprises, factories, and labor organizations. In order to distinguish them from general primary party committees, North Korea designates the primary party committees within the party committees at each level as “institutional party committees” (also referred to as the “institutional party”). This term indicates that they are installed within the party organization.¹³

The guidance and control of the party life of officials in provincial and municipal party committees are carried out by the institutional party committees established within the provincial and municipal party committees. The institutional party committees established in provincial and municipal party committees consist of party secretaries, deputy secretaries, and a few full-time guidance officials, and internally, they are referred to as the “Internal Affairs Division” of the provincial and municipal party committees’ organization department.

The secretary of the institutional party committee in the province or municipality concurrently holds the position of organization secretary of the provincial or municipal party committee. The deputy secretary of the institutional party committee concurrently holds the position of deputy director of the Internal Affairs Division of the Organization Department (also known as internal deputy director), and all the guidance officials are also guidance officials of the Organization Department. The organization secretary focuses more on the duty as the organization secretary of the provincial or municipal party committee rather than the duty as the secretary of the institutional party committee (or primary party committee). Consequently, the deputy secretary of the institutional party committee (deputy director of the Organization Department’s Internal Affairs Division of the provincial or municipal party committee) assumes most of the responsibilities of the institutional party committee while being under the command of the secretary of the institutional party committee (organization secretary of the provincial or municipal party committee).

Officials in provincial and municipal party committees, like central party officials, are subject to the control of party cells in each department, such as the party cell of the Cadre Division of the Organization Department and the party cell of the Training Division of the Cadre Department. These party cells are under the

13. The Workers’ Party Rules do not use the term “institutional party committee,” but instead use the term “primary party committee” (초급당위원회) uniformly.

control of the sectoral party committees and the institutional party committees within each department. The chief secretary of the provincial or municipal party committee is generally affiliated with a party cell in the Party Life Guidance Division of the Organization Department or the Cadre Division of the Organization Department. The chief secretary must receive the party guidance of the party cell secretary (the deputy director or division chief of the Organization Department of the provincial or municipal party committee) and the guidance of the institutional party committee secretary (organization secretary of the provincial or municipal party committee) within their respective party cells. Through this mechanism, Kim Jong Un is able to control the strong influence of the chief secretaries of the provincial and municipal party committees, who exercise significant power at the local level.

In this way, the institutional party committees established throughout North Korea perform the function of guiding and controlling the party life and ideological life of all officials affiliated with the departmental and sectoral party cells within the party organization, including each department and sector within the local party committees. Therefore, the power of the cadres in the institutional party committees is also significant. The institutional party committees deployed in local party organizations, like the headquarters party committees, evaluate the work performance and the party life of cadres below the deputy director level of the provincial or municipal party committees, which then gets reflected on their personnel decisions. For the suryong's dictatorial power to exert influence throughout the local regions, the role of the chief secretaries of the institutional party committees in the province or municipality is crucial. As important as their roles, they are the highest-ranking cadres in the local region among ordinary party members.¹⁴ However, they are also subject to control by the institutional party committees as ordinary party members.

From the provincial and metropolitan party committees, the cadres above the ranks of department heads, including the chief secretaries, are subject to approval by the WPK CC Secretariat. These cadres are subject to control not only by the institutional party committee but also by the Provincial Guidance Division of the

14. An example of the significance of their position, Kim Jong Un reportedly gave a Mercedes Benz sedan S600 as an official car to the chief secretaries of the provincial and municipal party committees in 2012. Interview response from D-3.

OGD. They are strictly controlled by the chief guidance officials and corresponding guidance officials of the OGD who are in charge of the respective regions. The assessment results of the cadres are reflected in their evaluation reports prepared by the guidance officials. However, the basic information related to the preparation of the evaluation reports by the OGD guidance officials is obtained from the institutional party committees, which implies that even the chief officials are subject to Secretariat approval and have no choice but to lower their stance in front of the institutional party committees.

The body that governs party cadres belonging to the county party committee is also the institutional party committee organized within each county party committee. Just like in the provincial and metropolitan committees, the organization secretary also serves as the secretary of the institutional party committee within the county party committee. Additionally, the deputy director of the internal affairs division of the county party committee's organization department serves as the deputy secretary of the institutional party committee, and a small number of guidance officials of the organization department also serve as full-time guidance officials of the institutional party committee. The cadres in the institutional party committees are subordinate to the internal affairs division of organization department in the county party committee.

The cadres within the county party committee are also engaged in party activities as members of the party cells established within each department and subsidiary units. For example, the chief secretary of the county party committee is a member of the internal affairs division of organization department's party cell, while the organization secretary of the county party committee is a member of the party life guidance division of the organization department's party cell. The institutional party committees are in control of these party cells. As a result, the influence of the cadres within the internal affairs division of organization department of the county committee is significant because the institutional party committee secretary (organization secretary of the county party committee) evaluates the party activities of the cadres within the county party committee. All officials above the rank of department heads in the city and county party committees are subject to dual control by both the institutional party committees and the organization department of the provincial and metropolitan party committees.

The guidance and control of party activities for cadres of the primary party committees installed in each institution, state-owned enterprises, and other similar organizations are carried out through the party cells established within these committees. In this case as well, the party cell secretary also serves as the deputy secretary of organization of the primary party committee.¹⁵ The party life of the party cells established within each institution and state-owned enterprise are controlled by its superior party organization, the county party committee's organization department.

In this way, Kim Jong Un has established a mechanism for the party life guidance and enforce strict control over not only the cadres in the Central Party, but also the local cadres, including the provincial, metropolitan, and county party committee officials, as well as the officials of the primary party committees.

4.2 Mutual Surveillance and Punishment

4.2.1 Institutionalized Mutual Surveillance

As discussed in the previous division, the selection of party cadres and members, as well as the guidance of the party life are mechanisms in which the suryong directly intervenes to efficiently control the regime. These mechanisms go beyond vertical control and create a situation where party members and officials are vertically loyal to the suryong and horizontally compete with each other. Accordingly, the North Korean authorities promote their system as an organization of unity and solidarity between the party and the people under the exclusive guidance of the suryong. This means that the unity among the suryong, party, and the people, are vertical rather than horizontal. In other words, it is a mechanism of vertical control. This mechanism enhances the efficiency of dictatorship, but it also

15. In North Korea, state-owned enterprises are classified into grades ranging from Grade 1 to Grade 7 based on the size of their workforce. The primary party committee of the largest Grade 1 enterprise consists of a secretary, two deputy secretaries responsible for organization and propaganda, and a few other cadre members. However, the primary party committees of smaller Grade 2 and lower enterprises have only one secretary, one deputy secretary, and one cadre member each. In enterprises or organizations where there is only one deputy secretary, this deputy secretary also holds the position of the party cell secretary.

implies the possibility for the formation of a counterforce against the suryong's dictatorial power if members of the organization unite horizontally. D-2 statement below further explains this.

"Isn't that what the party life criticism sessions are all about? Not allowing people to come together, creating mutual distrust. It's not about unification between ranks, it is all distrust. You don't trust me and I don't trust you. We criticize each other and divided into who is good and bad. The more you know, the clearer it becomes. It's a well-established system. No one can recreate it even if they try."¹⁶

As D-2 mentioned, the mechanisms of the Workers' Party, including the control of the party life, also serve as a means of mutual checks and supervision among party members and officials to prevent them from opposing the suryong. This mechanism has permeated the system and dominated people's daily lives over a long period of time to become a natural culture. In other words, even without the enforcement of the Workers' Party, there is an inherent inertia among party members and officials that makes it impossible for them to trust each other.

The mechanism of the suryong dictatorship does not end with the control of the party organization alone. Besides the party organizations, Party members and cadres are subject to control and supervision from a three tiered system. North Korea refers to this mechanism as the "three-line surveillance." According to Pyeong-gil Shin, the three-line surveillance mechanism was established after Kim Jong Il officially became the successor. This system is a surveillance by the party organization system (in the case of the military, the General Political Bureau), the administrative organization system (in the case of the military, the General Staff Department), and the state security ministry system (in the case of the military, the Guard Command).¹⁷ In other words, while the Workers' Party mechanism provides basic control and supervision, the affiliated administrative system and the state security system add complexity and establish a robust mutual surveillance mechanism. For example, party committees at the provincial and municipal levels and officials at the provincial and municipal levels are subject to surveillance by

16. Interview with D-2.

17. Chang-Hyun Jung, *The CEO of the DPRK Kim Jong Il*, p. 183.

the institutional party committees and their own departments located within the provincial and municipal party committees, as well as the surveillance of the security bureau (under the state security ministry). Officials affiliated with the Central Committee are subject to surveillance by the direct party committee, the department they belong to (such as the OGD, the Economic Department, the Justice Department, etc.), and the surveillance of Office 10 of the OGD, which investigates violations of the Ten Principles. Office 10 specializes in investigating counterparty and counterrevolutionary activities, and direct surveillance and punishment are the responsibility of the Changgwang Security Department. In other words, the Changgwang Security Department plays a role as state security ministry and social security ministry under the Central Committee.¹⁸

This system is not limited to surveillance alone. In the case of military units that possess military power, the three-line surveillance mechanism also operates in general operations and training. According to D-3, all military units report any situation occurring within the units through the three-line system. Additionally, important matters within the units, such as live-fire training exercises or unit movements, are reported by the responsible personnel of the three-line system within the units to the higher organizations of each system, and decisions are made after mutual agreement. For example, in the case of a battalion-level unit, the battalion political guidance official reports to the division political officer, who then reports to the General Political Bureau; the battalion commander reports to the division commander, who then reports to the General Staff Department; and the battalion security guiding official reports to the division security department head, who then reports to the Military Security Bureau.¹⁹ Additionally, when planning shooting exercises in the vicinity of Pyongyang, it is necessary to report to Kim Jong Un.²⁰

18. Testimonies about the Office 10 also appear in the COI report, but the specific role of the Office 10 and its superior departments are not specified. UN, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, p. 66.

19. Interview response from D-3.

20. A media outlet in South Korea reported that they obtained a training document distributed by the Korean People's Army Publishing House in North Korea in June 2013. The document is titled "On Becoming Genuine Commander who Reverently Supports the Supreme Commander Comrade with Revolutionary Beliefs and Conscience in Any Difficult Situation," and it was intended for military officers of the regimental level or higher, junior and senior officers. According to the document, in January 2013, a unit conducted various firing exercises, including the use of 82mm mortar illumination rounds, as part of their preparations for night-time infantry attack tactics near

Such mutual surveillance mechanisms are intricately built into the daily lives of ordinary people in North Korea. This system of mutual surveillance is well depicted in the following document.

Appendix I-B-9, “Measures for Strengthening Party Organizational Operations to Thwart the Enemy’s Outrageous Sanctions, Pressure and Provocations and to Accelerate the Construction of a Powerful Socialist Nation” (Approved by Kim Jong Un on August 12, 2017, OGD)

We aim to establish a controlled reporting system. By strengthening reporting activities within the party organizations, we will promptly grasp the ideological trends and movements of officials and the masses, address all raised issues by reporting them faithfully to the Supreme Leader without omission, and strictly follow his determined conclusions. We will thoroughly prepare for any unjust circumstances and actively manage them by establishing well-organized reporting systems, emergency contact systems, work attendance notification systems, resident reporting systems, and accommodation registration systems in all sectors and units. We will mercilessly crush the maneuvers of hostile elements.

As indicated in the aforementioned OGD report, North Korean society has established emergency contact systems, work attendance notification systems, resident reporting systems, and accommodation registration systems. In North Korea, apart from full-time housewives, retirees, and the elderly, all residents must be affiliated with designated workplaces or organizations. Individual residences are tied to the people's units, which are the bottom-line administrative units. Civil society is monitored by the security departments under the Ministry of Social Security (police stations at the county level), neighborhood posts (police posts at the district level), regional security departments under the Ministry of State Security and the surveillance of each workplace and people's unit.²¹ Chief

Pyongyang. Kim Jong Un criticized the fact that the shooting training was conducted for two days without his approval saying, “our military is lawless and untouchable place.” Kim Jong-woo, “(Exclusive) Internal Information from the North Korean Military Revealed in a 2013 High-ranking Officer Education Document,” *Monthly Chosun*, April 2014 issue.

21. *Inminban* are composed of 30-40 households. The *Inminban* monitoring team consists of a total of 5 people, one leader and 4 members from the 4 households in the same *Inminban*.

cadres, including those in the Central Committee and families of chief officials in Pyongyang, are under constant surveillance and eavesdropping by the direct party committees.

As such, ordinary residents in North Korea are monitored through various surveillance systems, and the Central Committee, as well as the provincial, municipal, and county party committees, regularly compile and report “trends of the masses” to the OGD.²² Furthermore, the OGD uses a broader range of mechanisms, including daily reporting systems and notification systems, to regularly and irregularly report trends of the masses to Kim Jong Un, as described in the following documents.

Appendix I-B-7, “Report on Trends and Measures Raised among the Masses in July” (Approved by Kim Jong Un on August 10, 2017, OGD)

□ *Negative Trends*

...(omitted)

Recently, there has been a noticeable trend among some young workers showing aversion to joining the people's army.

□ *Opinion on Countermeasures:*

We will intensify educational activities in party and labor organizations, as well as educational institutions, to deeply instill in young people the understanding that defending the country is the greatest patriotism and a sacred duty. We will vigorously start a struggle against those who avoid joining the people's army. (omitted)

Appendix I-B-10, “Report on Trends and Measures Raised among the Masses Regarding Recent Situations and Rumors” (approved by Kim Jong Un on August

22. In Appendix I-B-8, there is a phrase that reads, “The Party Safety Committee, which is to receive reports on crowd trends and formulate countermeasures, which is conducted monthly by Party committees at each level, will review the business situation for eliminating religious and superstitious behavior together.” Details of Appendix I-B-8 will be covered again in Chapter IV, Section 2.

15, 2017, OGD)

Representative trends are as follows:

□ *Positive trends:*

- We have nothing to fear as long as our respected leader is with us, and there is a strong belief that we will definitely win.

... (Omitted)

- We should seize this excellent opportunity and demonstrate the might of the Korean people by giving nuclear bombs to those American bastards.

... (Omitted)

□ *Negative trends:*

- There is a trend that suggests that people believe that there will be no survivors if a war breaks out.

... (Omitted)

- There is a trend that people seem to believe that one will have to go through another Arduous March

(Omitted)

- There is a trend that some residents are raising the price of rice and condensed milk, blinded with greed as the domestic situation is becoming more tense.

... (Omitted)

□ *Opinion on Countermeasures:*

... (Omitted)

- We are trying to make timely measures by taking complete control of all the trends and rumors raised by the masses... and in party organizations, and to find out and punish all those who spread rumors that upset the public.

The mutual surveillance system in North Korea described above aims to silence individual thinking and judgment, amplify distrust among individuals, and force only vertical loyalty to the suryong. Above all, mutual surveillance and constraints also serve as effective means for the suryong to carry out direct punishments.

4.2.2 The Suryong's Direct Intervention in Punishment

Punishment Standards and Types

In the North Korean regime, the criteria for judicial punishment are loyalty to the suryong, which is based on the Ten Principles. Loyalty to the suryong is the sole ideology and absolute norm in North Korea, and it is applied to the punishment system. This standard also applies to rewards and reductions in punishment. In North Korea, the punishment inflicted on those who violate this standard is considered legal, and not a crime against humanity. Furthermore, acts of transnational organized crime, espionage, and terrorism committed by North Korean authorities outside the country are also considered legal. North Korea refers to these unconventional standards as “sovereignty” and “self-reliance” in the international community.

The punishment system in North Korea appeared to have seemingly relaxed after Kim Jong Un was officially designated as the successor on January 8, 2009. According to a report released by NK Watch in 2020, it was observed that torture and beatings in some of North Korea's detention facilities have decreased since the late 2010s.²³ Additionally, the system of guilt-by-association has also decreased since 2013.²⁴ These measures by the North Korean authorities can be seen as efforts to cultivate a favorable public opinion towards Kim Jong Un internally and partially address international criticism externally, conscientious of international criticisms. However, these phenomena do not represent fundamental and structural changes. Instead, it seems that the North Korean authorities, conscious of the international community, are engaging in even more covert forms of crimes against humanity.²⁵

23. Although the timing and location of these phenomena were limited to Ryanggang and North Hamgyong provinces for the period 2010-2019, the slowdown in the decline in torture and beatings was evident. Kwanhyung Lee et al., *Effects of International Advocacy toward Human Rights of North Korea*, pp. 75-83.

24. According to the dialogue commentary issued by the WPK CC in May 2013, it is mentioned that "the Party considers the remorse of the 1% who honestly confessed and admitted their crimes, more significant than the 99% of the crimes they committed. The Party has forgiven and pardoned all their offenses." In other words, the Central Party announced that despite the need for firm punishment, Kim Jong Un reduced or granted amnesty to those who confessed their crimes by suryong's love and trust for his people. For the original text, see Appendix I-C.

25. The guilt-by-association system, in which all family members and relatives of the prisoners are detained in political prison camps, has not entirely disappeared. In addition, the reasons for detention in political prison camps have expanded more than in the past. This means that there may be a

North Korea possesses a judicial system similar to other countries. However, the problem lies in the intervention of the Workers' Party mechanism in this judicial system. Accordingly, North Korean punishments are divided into party-based, administrative, and judicial punishments, as specified in Appendix I-B-1, Appendix I-B-8, and Appendix I-B-9. Administrative and judicial punishments are based on criminal law and other laws, while party-based punishments are based on internal regulations of the Workers' Party.

First, administrative punishment is a concept similar to “administrative disposition” utilized by other countries or organizations. According to Article 15 of North Korea's Administrative Punishment Law, punishments include warnings, severe warnings, unpaid labor, reeducation labor, and fines.²⁶ Judicial punishment, on the other hand, consists of penalties based on criminal law and criminal procedure law. Specifically, there are reform through labor sentence (6 months to 1 year of forced labor, detention in disciplinary labor center), limited-term of reform through labor sentence (1 to 15 years of forced labor, detention in correctional labor camp), life-term of reform through labor (15 years or more, detention in correctional labor camp), and the death penalty.

The institutions responsible for judicial punishment include the MSS, Central Public Prosecutors' Office, Central Court, and the Ministry of Social Security. In the military, there are the Military Security Bureau (formerly the Military Security Command), Military Prosecutors' Office, and the Military Court. The Military Prosecutors' Office and the Military Court are under the command of the Central Prosecutors' Office and the Central Court, respectively (according to the interview response in D-1). Criminal cases that occur in general society in North Korea are categorized as State Security Department cases, Prosecutors' Office cases, and Security Department cases. Prosecutors' Office cases and Security Department cases refer to cases that violate the general laws of the criminal law and civil law, while State Security Department cases handle crimes that are considered anti-state and anti-national crimes under the criminal law.

higher number of individual political prisoners being held in these camps than before. Also, just as private executions have increased more than public executions, it is more likely torture and beatings are carried out in more covert ways.

26. Please note that there are two types of dismissal: medical dismissal and general dismissal. In the case of dismissal, reinstatement is possible. However, forced resignation is an irreversible decision. Interview with D-1.

The Suryong's Intervention in Judicial Punishment through the WPK

The judiciary institutions in North Korea mentioned above have subordinate agencies throughout the country, and crimes against humanity known to the international community are carried out by these institutions. Moreover, the suryong intervenes in judicial punishment through the Workers' Party, demonstrating that the suryong's political guidance directly influences the judicial system. The main mechanism for this is the Party Security Committee. The Party Security Committee is an organization not specified in the regulations of the Workers' Party or the Criminal Procedure Law. The committee not only carries out tracking the movements of the masses and the suryong's orders regarding judicial and public security matters, but it also directly interferes in the judicial proceedings of the judiciary institutions. North Korea's criminal proceedings consist of investigation, preliminary investigation, indictment, and trial. The preliminary investigation is a system introduced in North Korea based on the criminal procedure law of the former Soviet Union and does not exist in most other countries. North Korea's Prosecutors' Office, the Security Department, and the State Security Department all have preliminary investigation authority, and the Party Security Committee intervenes in the judicial process at this stage.

According to D-1 who served as a prosecutor at the Ryanggang Provincial Prosecutor's Office, the Party Security Committee is stipulated to hold a meeting within 48 hours after the decision to initiate the preliminary investigation. The reason for the committee's involvement in judicial proceedings is to carry out the Workers' Party's class line and the mass line.²⁷ Furthermore, the criteria used by the committee for judicial decisions are the degree of illegality, threat, criminality, and reformability of the alleged crimes. While D-1 could not provide a definitive answer regarding the judicial proceedings of the MSS, he mentioned that it is possible for the Party Security Committee to be involved in decisions on sentencing detention in political prison camps. This implies that the Party Security

27. Article 2 of North Korea's Criminal Procedure Law states the principle of class line are implemented as follows: "The state rigorously identifies and suppresses a small number of principal offenders while incorporating a majority of accomplices in the struggle against anti-state and anti-national crimes. In the struggle against common crimes, the state focuses on social reform and combines it with legal sanctions." Additionally, Article 3 stipulates the principle of mass line integration as follows: "The state actively relies on the strength and wisdom of the masses in handling criminal cases, prioritizing and strictly safeguarding the interests of the people."

Committee is presumed to be involved in judicial decisions regarding political crimes in accordance with Article 2 of the Criminal Procedure Law on the principle of reconciling the class line.

Additionally, D-1 mentioned that reducing the level of punishment based on the mass line is also within the authority of the Party Security Committee. According to D-1, the committee checks whether the alleged individual has any relatives within their immediate family and up to the sixth cousin who work for the WPK CC, the Second Economic Commission (munitions), the Guard Command, the 974th Army Unit (Supreme Commander's Reserve), or operational agencies. If such individuals are found among the family and relatives of the suspect, the Party Security Committee instructs the judicial institutions to mitigate the punishment. In particular, if there are fighter pilots, submarine crew members, intelligence operatives, or strategic rocket forces among the suspect's family and relatives, the punishment for the suspect is handled as leniently as possible. In addition, when a provincial prosecutor's office is in charge of a case at the provincial level, the members of the Party Security Committee, the chief secretary of the provincial party committee, the director of the provincial prosecutor's office, the deputy director of the case, the head of the preliminary investigation agency, or the preliminary investigator (prosecutor), participate in cases where the provincial prosecutor's office handles the investigation at the provincial level.²⁸

If the Party Safety Committee is the punishment mechanism for ordinary citizens, the party punishment mechanism applies to party members and officials. Party punishment essentially means political punishment. This punishment includes temporary suspension of the suryong's political trust or complete deprivation of political life. According to Article 7 of the WPK Rules, a party member who rejects the suryong's monolithic leadership or fails to follow the Party's line may face penalties such as warn-ings, severe warnings, severe warnings, suspension of rights, demotion to candidate member and in serious cases, they may be expelled from the Party.²⁹ Expulsion from the party means the

28. Interview with D-1.

29. Although not explicitly stated in Article 7 of the WPK Rules, there is a provision for suspension. Suspension is a penalty where a member's qualification is revoked, and they are eligible to rejoin the party within six months. However, once expelled, rejoining the party is not possible. Interview with D-1.

end of an individual's political life. Before a Party member receives execution or a sentenced for imprisonment in a political prison camp, one must first undergo expulsion.

In Kim Jong Un's policy document, the following phrase often appears:

Appendix I-B-9, "Measures for Strengthening Party Organizational Operations to Thwart the Enemy's Outrageous Sanctions, Pressure and Provocations and to Accelerate the Construction of a Powerful Socialist State" (Approved by Kim Jong Un on August 12, 2017, OGD)

"We intend to thoroughly identify and utterly destroy hostile elements to the end, who are spreading rumors to undermine the authority and dignity of the revolutionary leadership, engage in disputes against the Party and the state policies, and attempt to undermine our single-hearted unity."

The content of the above document implies that if one damages the authority and dignity of the suryong, they may face execution or be sent to a political prison camp. In other words, expulsion from the party, imprisonment in a political prison camp, and executions not based on criminal law are measures based on the Ten Principles. The decision for imprisonment in a political prison camp is typically made through trials held by the provincial or municipal Security Bureau under the Ministry of State Security (MSS). These trials are attended by dispatched prosecutors from the MSS, secretaries of the provincial or municipal party committee affiliated with the Security Bureau, the head of the preliminary investigation agency, and preliminary investigation examiners. In some cases, detainees are directly imprisoned by the security units without trial. According to D-1, the MSS has the "Security Operations Regulation (보위사업규정)," and the provincial or municipal Security Bureau have the "Security Operations Standards (보위사업규범)." Additionally, the core departments within each institution are said to have their own "bylaws on security operations (보위사업세칙)."³⁰ The detailed contents of these regulations have not been publicly disclosed yet, but it appears that the MSS is handling anti-party and anti-revolutionary incidents in accordance

30. Interview with D-1.

with these regulations.

The criteria used by North Korean authorities to distinguish anti-party and anti-revolutionary elements are as follows: i) Criticizing the suryong and the party in words or actions; ii) Words or actions directly or indirectly linked to the enemy state South Korea (such as defecting to South Korea, consuming South Korean contents, or contact with South Koreans); iii) Contact with Christianity; and iv) Any words or actions that could potentially damage the authority of the suryong. In practice, these categories are very broad and ambiguous. Essentially, anyone in North Korea, excluding the suryong, can be subject to these criteria. Examples of North Korea designating individuals as anti-party and anti-revolutionary elements based on these categories are as follows:

First, it relates to religious freedom. Article 68 of the revised North Korean Constitution, enacted on August 29, 2019, provides the following provision regarding the religious freedom of ordinary citizens:

Article 68 of the North Korean Constitution:

“Citizens have freedom of religious beliefs. This right is granted by approving the construction of religious buildings and the holding of religious ceremonies. No one may use religion as a pretext for drawing in foreign forces or for harming the State and social order.”

However, as if ridiculing this constitutional provision, Appendix I-B-8 states that the OGD will control the religious activities of party members, party cadres, labor organization cadres, and ordinary citizens through party organizations. This document was reported to Kim Jong Un by the OGD and approved on August 10, 2017, and is titled “Measures for Intensifying Organizational and Political Activities of the Party Organizations to Counteract Religious and Superstitious Acts in the Entire Society.” The following is an excerpt from this document:

Appendix I-B-8, “Measures for Intensifying Organizational and Political Activities of the Party Organizations to Counteract Religious and Superstitious Acts in the Entire Society” (Approved by Kim Jong Un on August 10, 2017, OGD)

1. We intend to strengthen organizational guidance projects aimed at eradicating religion

and superstition at their roots.

① *We aim to reinforce control and supervision over religion and superstition within the party and labor organizations.*

- Within the party organizations, we will establish a thorough reporting system and a mass reporting system to promptly identify and develop measures against those engaged in religious and superstitious acts by strengthening surveillance and control to completely restrict them.

We will especially strengthen surveillance and control over key individuals, including those with a history of engaging in religious and superstitious acts, individuals with connections to South Korea and overseas, those with criminal history in illegal border crossings, and family members and relatives of those who have been legally sanctioned for past religious activities. We will particularly monitor and control by concentrating on those who can easily fall prey to evil influence.

- Within the party organizations, we will pay special attention to overseas business travelers, individual travelers, independent workers who work alone, and those who frequently engage in unauthorized leaves and absences, to ensure strict control and supervision to prevent their involvement in religious and superstitious acts.

(Omitted)

4. We aim to strengthen organizational guidance projects to intensify the struggle against religious and superstitious acts at a societal level.

① *...within the party organizations, we aim to incorporate issues related to intensifying the struggle against religion and superstition into work and operational plans and implement them rigorously.*

② *At the Party Security Committee where we receive trends of the masses on a monthly basis and formulate countermeasures by party committees at all levels, we will develop plans and conduct criticism sessions to eradicate religious and superstitious acts.*

This document demonstrates that Kim Jong Un's approved policies hold higher status than the Constitution. However, it also serves as evidence that strict control and supervision, particularly within the party and labor organizations, are being implemented regarding religion and superstition, with a specific focus on religion. In North Korea, more attention is given to controlling "religion" than "superstition." Here, "superstition" refers to traditional shamanistic beliefs that have been passed

down since prehistoric times on the Korean Peninsula, while “religion” refers to Christianity. Below are more policy documents related to Kim Jong Un’s approved policies regarding religion.

Appendix I-B-15, "Presented Materials and Countermeasures" (Approved by Kim Jong Un on October 5, 2017, OGD)

"In recent months, the enemy has been extensively infiltrating our regions with Bibles and from July until now, the security agencies have confiscated over XX copies....

(omitted)

In relation to this, emergency measures have been established at all levels of security agencies to ensure the complete retrieval and disposal of subversive propaganda materials disseminating religion and superstition, without leaving any trace, and to promptly retrieve and handle all prohibited materials, including the Bible, according to established procedures. It is recommended that the party organizations and labor organizations, including city and county parties, raise awareness among employees, residents, and students about the absurdity, reactionary nature, and harmfulness of religion and superstition, and strictly establish measures for the retrieval and handling of discovered enemy propaganda materials."

The document above is a report by the OGD on the concentrated crackdown by the MSS on growing phenomenon related to Christianity within North Korea from July to September 2017. Although the exact number is not specified, it mentions the confiscation of dozens of Bibles.

According to Appendix I-B-16, “Proposals for Measures for Thoroughly Overcoming Anti-Socialist Phenomena through Propaganda and Agitation Activities” (Approved by Kim Jong Un on October 18, 2017, Propaganda and Agitation Department), the North Korean authorities consider superstition as anti-socialist phenomena. However, superstition is not classified as a political crime that goes against loyalty to the suryong. Therefore, the social security ministry is in charge of control and punishment. However, being in contact with Christianity is classified as anti-socialist phenomena, a serious political crime, and it is handled by the MSS. According to defectors who have experienced forced repatriation, common interrogation questions posed by State Security Department’s preliminary

investigation agents to arrested defectors include those related to their contact with Christianity, South Koreans, and Kore-an cultural content.³¹

The reason the North Korean authorities view contact with Christianity as a betrayal of loyalty to the suryong is that Christianity is the only religion recognized in North Korea. In the North Korean system, the suryong is the living deity, and faith is solely directed towards Kim Jong Un. In other words, the Ten Principles in North Korea, rather than the Ten Commandments of the Bible, are seen as the only way to find salvation in one's life.

The second case pertains to everything related to South Korea. In the past, the focus was mainly on defection to the "enemy state" South Korea from the suryong's perspective. However, the scope has now expanded to encompass "everything" related to South Korea. Kim Jong Un mentioned the following on January 3, 2013:

Appendix I-A-1 (2), "Remarks Made by Comrade Kim Jong Un to the Central Committee Organizational Guidance Department Deputy Directors on January 3, 2013 (Juche 102)" (Excerpt)

...We must firmly establish the party's monolithic leadership system throughout the entire party and society as the lifeline.

(omitted)

Currently, various unhealthy phenomena are appearing in society... We must pay deep attention to establishing a sound business and living atmosphere in society, and completely eliminate any unhealthy ideological elements or living conditions that undermine the socialist system. We must not neglect even the smallest occurrences and thoroughly crush them at the budding stage.

Kim Jong Un issued specific instructions to the deputy directors of the OGD stating, "We must completely eliminate any unhealthy ideological elements or living conditions and thoroughly crush them at the budding stage." Here,

31. From 2013 to the present, NK Watch has investigated North Korea's crimes against humanity, prepared petitions, and submitted them to the United Nations. About 1,200 petitions have been submitted so far, and more than 75% of the testimonies in these petitions are North Korean defectors who have experienced forced repatriation.

unhealthy ideological elements and living conditions refer to the Hallyu (Korean Wave) phenomenon. The instruction to “thoroughly crush them at the budding stage” can be seen as equivalent to ordering severe punishment. Additionally, as evidenced by the following Kim Jong Un-approved policy documents, the blocking of Hallyu-related phenomena within North Korea is the responsibility of the PAD.

Appendix I-B-18, "Report on the Problems and Countermeasures Regarding the Use of Non-standard Language in People's Speech" (Approved by Kim Jong Un on January 26, 2018, Propaganda and Agitation Department)

Currently, non-standard expressions using phrases such as "지말입니다" (literal translation: "it should not be done") and "<...마요>" (literal translation: "do not do it") are prevalent among the people and the People's Army and ordinary citizens. For example, "<...돌아가도 되겠지말입니다>" (literal translation: "it's okay to go back") and "<...제대 군인이지말입니다>" (literal translation: "I am a discharged soldier"). Moreover, there is an alarming trend of using non-standard expressions and non-cultural dialects, such as "<...병원에 가라마요. 식사하라마요.>" (literal translation: "don't go to the hospital, don't have a meal"), with "마요 (mayo)" endings. These phenomena have serious negative consequences on obstructing the superiority of our language, and hindering our efforts on refining language usage to be noble and civilized.

Opinion on Countermeasures:

- We should adopt various forms and methods with perseverance to control and educate by holding commentary dialogues to promote refined and clear language usage in the party and labor organizations to eradicate the phenomenon of people using non-standard expressions like jimalipmida (지말입니다) and mayo(마요). (Omitted)

Appendix I-B-19, "Report on the Material and Countermeasures Regarding the Illegal Sale of Toy Mobile Phones and Watches that Play South Korean Songs and American Flag Kites" (Approved by Kim Jong Un on January 26, 2018, Central 109 Joint Command)

According to the report, toys resembling mobile phones and (smart and mp3) watches contain eight picture buttons on the screen which, when pressed, play 17 foreign songs,

including the South Korean song “Gangnam Style” and Chinese songs reflecting love between a man and a woman. The flags are in the shape of a triangle, and has a picture of a monkey wearing a hat with an image of an American flag.

Opinion on Countermeasures:

- Regarding individuals involved in smuggling and illegal sales of such unusual items, we consider it an act of importing bourgeois reactionary culture into our society and will strictly punish them.

Appendix I-B-21, "Report on the Material and Countermeasures Regarding Circulation of Audio Lecture on South Korean and Foreign Film Situations" (Approved by Kim Jong Un, Central 109 Joint Command, February 2, 2018)

The problem of lecture records and music on South Korean and foreign films being circulated among some residents and young students has been raised and addressed.

Opinion on Countermeasures:

- Plan on deleting audio files of lecture on South Korean and foreign films by the Party and labor organizations.

In the Appendix I-B-18 above refers to the trend of South Korean-style speech, Appendix I -B-19 pertains to the distribution of smartwatches with South Korean songs, and Appendix I-B-21 contains information about the distributing South Korean movies. Notably, there is a department that appears for the first time that is not in the Workers’ Party Rules or North Korean propaganda media. It is called the Central 109 Combined Command. According to D-1, the Central 109 Combined Command is a permanent organization established on October 9, 2003, under the directive of Kim Jong Il.³² Based on Appendix I-B-11, "Proposal Related to the Measures and Strategies for Censorship of Enemy State (South Korean) and Foreign Propaganda Materials in Office 79 of the Publishing Censorship Bureau in the First Half of 2017" (approved by Kim Jong Un on August 16, 2017, PAD), the superior department of the Central 109 Combined Command appears to be Office 79 of the

32. Interview with D-1.

Publishing Censorship Bureau in the WPK CC's PAD.³³

However, the COI report does not specify the exact name of the organization that monitors South Korean movies and dramas.³⁴ Furthermore, South Korean media outlet has reported about this organization as "109 *Sangmu*" instead of the Central 109 Combined Command.³⁵ "109 *Sangmu*" is a term used at the provincial, municipality, and county unit levels. Enforcement organizations on non-socialist-related violations established under the direction of the suryong usually make their names by combining the date of approval of the suryong with the words "*Sangmu*" or "*Gruppa*."

According to D-1, "*Sangmu*" refers to a permanent organization, while "*Gruppa*" refers to a temporary organization. Therefore, the central organization of 109 *Sangmu* is the Central 109 Combined Command. The provincial-level *Sangmu* official is the deputy director of the provincial party committee's Propaganda Department. The 109 *Sangmu* consists of two representatives each from the prosecutor's office, the State Security Bureau, the People's Security Bureau, the party committee's Legislative Department, the Youth League, the Trade Union, and the People's Committee. Since the 109 *Sangmu* is an organization created under the jurisdiction of the suryong, party organizations are established within as all members are required to be take part in party activities. Therefore, members of the 109 *Sangmu*, including the deputy director of the Propaganda Department, must transfer their party membership to the *Sangmu* Party Committee from their previous organization. Members of the 109 *Sangmu* must report their activities within the 109 *Sangmu* to their original organizations once every seven days.³⁶ Thus, the same three-line monitoring system applies within the 109 *Sangmu*.

However, according to D-1, the 109 *Sangmu* was disbanded in November 2020, and in its place, "727 *Sangmu*" was established. The 727 *Sangmu* is presumed to be responsible for monitoring and control based on the "Anti-Reactionary Ideology and Culture Law" (enacted on August 19, 2022), replacing the former 109 *Sangmu*.³⁷

33. Or Central 109 Combined Command could also an external name of Office 79.

34. UN, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, p. 59.

35. Gwang Sung Jung, "(Exclusive) North Korean Ideological Media Censorship Organization '109 Sangmu' Documents," *Monthly Chosun*, November 2018.

36. Interview with D-1.

37. Currently, North Korea is demonstrating a shift in its approach, where criteria that were previously

The 727 *Sangmu* is also under the command of the PAD of the Central Party, but it is uncertain whether the official name of the central organization is “Central 727 Combined Command.” However, due to the mechanism of suryong dictatorship where the Workers’ Party controls all state strategy and policy guidance, it is likely that it is under the command of the PAD’s censorship bureau.

The third cases involve defaming the authority and prestige of the suryong. This category is not only broad but also ambiguous. For instance, it is a common norm in North Korea to execute escapees without exception to prevent the disclosure of political prison camps to the outside world³⁸, or to compel suicide when a spy is arrested in South Korea or abroad, in order to protect the dignity of North Korea and avoid humiliation in the international community.³⁹ Additionally, it is considered an act of defaming the authority of the suryong when a North Korean woman defects and becomes pregnant through marriage with a Chinese man. Above all, damaging the portraits of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il displayed in each household and institution, or defacing the photographs of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il published on the front page of the *Rodong Sinmun*, are considered equivalent as acts of directly undermining the authority of the suryong.

Furthermore, Kim Jong Un himself emphasized the importance of this

considered non-legal are now being officially regulated through formal laws.

38. According to NK Watch's executive director, MyeongMyeong Chul An, who served as a member of the security forces under the SDD in the “total control zone” of North Hamgyong Province and Pyongyang from 1987 to 1994, as part of ideological education, he was required to memorize the teachings of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. In an interview with the South Korean media, he mentioned excerpts related to the authority of the suryong from the teachings of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. The following excerpt is from Kim Jong Il's teachings and instructions: “(Those who escape from political prison camps) must be captured and killed without exception. Escapes are the most important issue related to the external authority and dignity of the suryong, so those who escape must be killed without mercy. In order not to cause concern to the suryong, the comrades must thoroughly control and monitor them so that no one escapes.” Yong-sam Kim, “The Inside Story of Executing Pregnant Women and Conducting Biological Experiments,” *Monthly Chosun*, March 1995, p. 175.

39. Kim Hyon Hui (Hyun-hee, or Hyon-hui), who was a covert agent belonging to the Central Party's External Investigation Department, was involved in the bombing of Korean Air Flight 858 on November 29, 1987, resulting in the death of all 115 passengers on board. According to her memoir, the director of the External Investigation Department in Pyongyang gave Kim Hyon Hui the following instructions: “Through the trust and consideration of our great leader Comrade Kim Il Sung, and our beloved leader Comrade Kim Jong Il, we have been assigned a very important mission. During the performance of this crucial mission, if our true identities are exposed, we must protect the authority and dignity of our beloved leader through death.” Kim Hyon-hui, “I Want to be a Woman Now (Part 1)” (Seoul: Korea Won, 1991), p. 216 (in Korean). The English translation of this book is titled *The Tears of My Soul*.

matter and directly ordered punishment on those alleged crimes. Kim Jong Un's instructions on April 15, 2013 reads as follows.

Appendix I-A-2, "Statement by Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un to Rim Hyong Mo, Secretary Clerk of Secretariat of the Central Committee on April 15, 2013 (Juche 102)"⁴⁰

...

Recently, there have been many incidents regarding the video works and political slogans of our Great Leaders. Such incidents have been occurring consecutively in various units, including Musan County in North Hamgyong Province, in conjunction with the celebration of the Day of the Sun. We must address these incidents with vigilance and establish strong measures to ensure that such incidents do not happen again. The responsible party organizations should not just touch upon the issue with the individuals responsible but should firmly address these issues politically.

...(omitted)

Among the instructions given by Kim Jong Un, the phrase "firmly address these issues politically" means that incidents of damages to video works and political slogans related to the Kim family should be treated as "political crimes." There are various propaganda materials glorifying the Kim family, including photographs, portraits, murals, statues, and even handwritten texts. All North Korean publications always start with the teachings and words of Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un, prominently displayed and emphasized. This is because publication materials cannot deviate from the teachings and words of the suryong. Any deviation from these norms is considered a political crime. In addition, on April 23, 2013, Kim Jong Un issued instructions to preserve Kim Jong Il's handwritten letters as they appear on karaoke machine screens.

Appendix I-A-3 (2), "Statement by Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un to the First Deputy Director Choi Hwi of the Central Committee's Propaganda and Agitation

40. Lim Hyung Mo is not a publicly known figure. His position, "secretary clerk," refers to the clerk of a secretary of the WPK CC's Secretariat, which is equivalent to a secretary in the general sense. The term "secretary" used in North Korea is different from the rest of the world and it refers to an official position within the party organization. It is presumed that Lim Hyung Mo serves as a secretary or clerk in Kim Jong Un's secretariat.

Department on April 23, 2013 (Juche 102)"

In the video song medley of "Our 7.27," there was an error in the song number 388, "Happy New Year." In the first verse of the song, "Promising days and months of happiness" was displayed on the screen along with the handwritten letter that General Kim Jong Il sent to our people on January 1, 1995, which read, "In order to make our country and homeland stronger, let us unite with one heart and one will." This content was repeated once again.

The handwritten letter of the General must be strictly preserved in its original form, and when displaying it in promotional materials, it must be faithfully reproduced. It was a grave mistake to tamper with the General's handwritten letter in the video song medley. Who would dare to alter the General's handwriting?

Through this incident, we must firmly awaken our comrades to prevent the recurrence of not faithfully preserving the General's handwriting as is without any alterations.

(omitted)

As indicated above, Kim Jong Un personally intervenes in the lyrics that appear on karaoke machine screens, indicating the extent of his involvement in all aspects of the regime. He even instructs to ensure that if Kim Jong Il's teachings appear in karaoke lyric screens, they should be displayed exactly as is, including the font style. His criticism was that the lyric screen did not display his father's handwriting in its original form and the Karaoke was reprimanded for "a serious mistake." Although it is unclear from this discourse whether there were separate instructions regarding punishment for the karaoke screen producers, even if there are no explicit instructions from Kim Jong Un regarding punishment, it is reasonable to assume that the karaoke screen producers were undoubtedly punished.

As mentioned in the previous discussion on extrajudicial punishments, those who become "counter-revolutionaries" by being deprived of their political lives by the power of the suryong can be subject to political persecution. As explained in Section 1 of Chapter IV, those detained in political prison camps are not considered a threat and not subject to the MPS. In other words, they are not registered citizens. The reason is simple. Once they lose their trust from the suryong and become counter-revolutionaries, they clearly cannot receive treatment as "humans." From the perspective of the North Korean authorities, they are not considered human,

and therefore, “human rights” do not apply to them. Consequently, their detention, torture, and even killings are not regarded as crimes against humanity.

Cases of the Suryong’s Direct Interventions in Punishments

COI stated explicitly that “the intentional killings of individual inmates in the DPRK’s political prison camps, through summary executions, beatings, infanticide, deliberate starvation and other illegal means, all amount to the crime of murder.”⁴¹ Moreover, the suryong bears responsibility for this crime of murder. The core of the Kim dynasty’s monarchy is directly intervening in executions (killings) according to their own needs.

The reason why the suryong directly intervenes in the mechanism of punishment is because it is the most effective means of dictatorship. By executing individual officials or specific regions and targets, the suryong can demonstrate his absolute power. The suryong also delegates investigations and punishments by utilizing the mutual supervision and surveillance functions among specific officials or institutions. Consequently, if public opinion worsens due to large-scale executions, the suryong can stage it as the fault of the judicial institutions or specific officials, rather than his own. Thus, the suryong can disguise himself as the righteous judge and compassionate leader by eliminating both the judicial institutions and specific officials who received and carried out his orders. Above all, by removing the perpetrators of crimes against humanity, the suryong can completely eliminate evidence of his involvement.

On the other hand, the suryong’s direct involvement in punishment can be seen from a political perspective, but there are also cases where it is politically unrelated. In the totalitarian regime, these cases are arbitrary executions based on the suryong’s personal decisions and the suryong’s arbitrary and subjective decisions can also be staged as a form of political governance. In the following section, we will examine four major cases of executions directly intervened in by the suryong.

41. UN, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, p. 326.

Reference

Execution Methods in North Korea

In North Korea, death penalty under the criminal law involves “depriving one of one’s physical life.” As mentioned earlier, to receive treatments as a “human” in North Korea means receiving a “political life” (or political trust) from the suryong. In other words, death penalty is a measure taken after depriving someone of their political life. There are officially two methods of execution in North Korea: “propaganda executions” and “internal executions.”⁴²

Propaganda executions are more commonly known as public executions. On the other hand, internal executions are private executions carried out by the judicial institutions themselves. Private executions have mainly targeted political prisoners in political prison camps, but since the late 2000s, they have also been conducted on ordinary civilians. Private executions are becoming more common due to growing international concerns about public executions.

In general, public executions in North Korea involve three executioners each firing three shots, totaling nine rounds, at the person being executed. However, there is currently no precise information about the methods used in private executions. According to some defectors, hand axes are sometimes used in these executions.

1. Case 1: Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un’s Direct Intervention in Large-scale Executions to Transfer Political Responsibilities and Strengthen Dictatorial Power

1) Kim Jong Il Period: Large-Scale Executions during the Arduous March in the 1990s

After the death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994, Kim Jong Il planned to shift the blame for North Korea’s severe famine, economic difficulties, and social system collapse onto senior officials of the Workers’ Party while simultaneously plotting to eliminate Kim Il Sung’s close aides. This plan was devised before December 1996. In December 1996, during the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the founding of Kim Il Sung University, Kim Jong Il mentioned in his speech that the intensified economic crisis was caused by the fault of the Workers’ Party officials, stating, “It is time to calculate who is at fault.” He also emphasized the need to

42. Interview with D-1.

learn from the military's ways to overcome the crisis of the Arduous March. In other words, Kim Jong Il intentionally shifted his responsibility to the Workers' Party officials and empowered the military.⁴³ A year later, in January 1998, the joint New Year editorial in North Korea emphasized the message that society should learn from the military, ushering in the forefront of the Songun (military-first) politics.⁴⁴

Kim Jong Il's executions were not limited to a few officials. Kim Jong Il wanted to consolidate his dictatorial power more firmly by eliminating all of Kim Il Sung's closest aides.⁴⁵ In August 1997, Kim Jong Il planned the spy ring incident. At that time, Kim Jong Il instructed Chae Mun Dok, the Political Bureau director of MPS,

43. Here is an excerpt from Kim Jong Il's speech: "At a time when the situation is as complicated as now, I cannot solve all the problems that have arisen like the economic business. If I were to take charge of not only the important sectors such as the party and the military but also economic affairs, it could have irreversible consequences for the revolution and construction. During his lifetime, the suryong told me that I should not interfere in economic affairs, and he told me several times that if I meddled in economic affairs, it would prevent me from carrying out party and military operations. In today's complex situation, strengthening the military is more important than anything else, so I frequently provide on-site guidance to the People's Army units. Economic affairs should be handled by party members and administrative-economic officials. In order not to mix up military and social work and to encourage provincial party officials to put more effort into economic work, I do not take them with me when I give field guidance to military units. Even when I went to Hill 351, I did not take the Kangwon Provincial Party chief secretary with me. Party organizations and Party officials at all levels should concentrate all their energies on solving the food problem. The food problem should not be left only to administrative and economic officials, but all party officials should step up and solve it. The ability and responsibility of today's party officials should be shown in how they solve the food problem. Now is the time to count who is at fault. There is no need for a party official who does not use his brain and work on his feet, or who does not solve problems." *Monthly Chosun*, "[Breaking News] Kim Jong Il's December 1996 Speech Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Founding of Kim Il Sung University: 'We Are Now in a State of Anarchy Because of Food,'" *Monthly Chosun*, April 1997, pp. 309-310.

44. It is true that the status and power of the KPA at the time was higher than in the past, but it could not exceed the status of the WPK. In other words, just because Kim Jong Il emphasized the military-first policy, the North Korean military cannot escape the control of the Workers' Party. That is, the reason why the military power seemed relatively strong on the surface was the result of the suryong's intention.

45. As mentioned in Section 2 of Chapter II, Kim Jong Il exercised real power after 1980. However, after the death of Kim Il Sung in July 1994, from Kim Jong Il's point of view, the officials who were close to Kim Il Sung were the objects to be eliminated to achieve complete dictatorship. Meanwhile, according to a declassified document from South Korea's Foreign Ministry, in August 1984, South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan told diplomatic and intelligence agencies, "I believe that Kim Jong Il is the de facto ruler and Kim Il Sung is the formal ruler. Think of the anti-Kim Jong Il forces as followers of Kim Il Sung." Woosuk Choi, "[Contemporary Historical Data] Chun Doo-Hwan Administration Holds a Meeting to Prepare for the Early Resignation of Kim Il Sung," *Monthly Chosun*, October 2015.

and Ri Chol, a guidance official of Central Party's OGD responsible for MPS, "to intensify the scrutiny of residents' registration documents to uncover hidden spies since the Korean War." Subsequently, the MPS formed a "Special Team for Resident Inspections" consisting of 8,000 members. The spy ring incident planned by Kim Jong Il resulted in the execution of over 5,000 people by the early 2000s, and around 20,000 family members and relatives of those executed were imprisoned in political prison camps. WPK CC Agriculture Secretary So Kwan Hui, Pyongyang City Party Committee Chief Secretary So Yun Sok, Kaesong City Party Committee Chief Secretary Kim Ki Son, and Central Prosecutor's Office Primary Party Committee Secretary Pi Chang Rin were executed under false charges of being spies and anti-party, anti-revolutionary elements. Mun Song Sul, the Chief Secretary of the Direct Party Committee, committed suicide. With Mun's suicide, the spy ring incident came to an end.

However, this incident was just one of Kim Jong Il's typical dictatorial tactics. In other words, it involved using the pretext of anti-party and anti-revolutionary activities as justifications to carry out large-scale executions and intimidation, and subsequently remove those responsible for such extrajudicial punishments through the "killing the dog after hunting" tactic. At that time, Kim Jong Il ordered Jang Song Thaek, the First Deputy Director of the OGD, to investigate the responsible individuals of the "Special Team for Resident Inspections," who had caused controversy with the spy ring incident. As a result of this investigation, Political Bureau director of MPS Chae Mun Dok was imprisoned in a political prison camp. Additionally, 15 individuals, including Ri Chol, OGD guidance official and Hwang Yun Mo, the chief of staff of MPS, and investigation chiefs of Social Security Department of the Ryongsong District of Pyongyang, were executed. In April 2000, Kim Jong Il ordered that the name of the Ministry of Social Security to be changed to the Ministry of People's Security. Currently, North Korea claim that the incident was an individual act of delinquency and an ultraleftism to achieve the political purposes and ambitions of Chae Mun Dok and Ri Chol.

2) Transition Period from Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un: Public Executions of the Central Party's Financial Planning Department Director Pak Nam Ki and Deputy Director Kim Tae Yong in March 2010

In March 2010, Director Pak Nam Ki and Deputy Director Kim Tae Yong of the Central Party's Financial Planning Department, were executed, taking responsibility for the failure in formulating plans for currency reform. North Korea's economic situation began deteriorating in the 1970s. After going through the period of the Arduous March in the 1990s, North Korea's currency rapidly depreciated starting in the early 2000s. Eventually, North Korean currency lost its purchasing power domestically and led to an acceleration of transactions using Chinese yuan or US dollars within North Korea. Consequently, in order to extract foreign currencies accumulated by the nouveau riche and ordinary residents, the North Korean authorities implemented the "currency reform" on November 30, 2009.⁴⁶

As mentioned before, such currency reform was certainly planned and decided based on the suryong's instructions. In other words, the Financial Planning Department (now renamed the Ministry of Economy) was merely the department in charge of practical matters, and the ultimate decision-making authority was the suryong. According to D-3, the North Korean authorities conducted lectures on currency reform for two months after its implementation, targeting all residents, including the party, government, and military. These lectures emphasized that "this currency revolution is not just a simple currency reform, but a great revolution. It is a great revolution prepared and implemented under the excellent leadership of the young general (Kim Jong Un), the only successor of the great General Kim Jong Il."⁴⁷ In other words, after appointing Kim Jong Un as the official successor on January 8, 2009, Kim Jong Il aimed to build economic achievements for Kim Jong Un through the currency reform. However, this currency reform failed miserably within two months, resulting in acceleration of hyperinflation in North Korea.

D-3 reflected that if Kim Jong Un had not failed in currency reform, the

46. Kim Jong Nam, the first son of Kim Jong Il and half-brother of Kim Jong Un, evaluated North Korea's currency reform as following in an e-mail interview with Yoji Komi, editor of Tokyo Shimbun, "People's trust in the North Korean leadership has collapsed due to the aftermath of the currency reform." "An aging leader, an inexperienced successor, a collapsed economy... The political situation surrounding North Korea has no choice but to be seen as dangerous." "North Korea executed Pak Nam Ki, head of the WPK financial planning department, but the people know very well that currency reform is not something a single official can do." For reference, Kim Jong Nam was assassinated at Kuala Lumpur Airport in Malaysia on February 13, 2017, by a North Korean spy agency. Keuk-In Bae, "[Exclusive] Kim Jong Nam 'Jong Un, What's Wrong with that Kid's Face?'" *Dong-A Ilbo*, February 9, 2012.

47. Interview response from D-3.

Cheonan sinking incident in March 2010 and the Yeonpyeong Island shelling incident in November 2010 might not have occurred.⁴⁸ In other words, Kim Jong Un failed to gain positive responses from the residents due to the failure of the currency reform. Consequently, Kim Jong Un carried out a terrorist attack against South Korea to demonstrate his military leadership qualities, and he shifted the blame for the failure of currency reform onto the officials.⁴⁹

3) Kim Jong Un Period: Execution of Jang Song Thaek in December 2013

According to North Korean newspaper *Rodong Sinmun*, Kim Jong Un chaired a Politburo expanded meeting in Pyongyang on December 8, 2013. The agenda of the meeting was reported to be “issues related to the anti-party and counterrevolutionary factional acts of Jang Song Thaek” (*Rodong Sinmun*, December 9, 2013: 1). *Rodong Sinmun* also reported that a special military tribunal of the MSS was reported to have taken place regarding Jang Song Thaek (*Rodong Sinmun*, December 13, 2013: 2). The article reported that the verdict was reached to execute Jang Song Thaek in accordance with Article 60 of the DPRK Criminal Code, along with a photo of his arrest.⁵⁰

It appears that Kim Jong Un had made the decision to remove Jang Song

48. The Yeonpyeong Island shelling incident occurred on November 23, 2010, around 2:30 PM when North Korea fired artillery towards Daeyeonpyeong Island in Yeoncheon-myeon, Ongjin-gun, Incheon, South Korea, without any prior declaration. Immediately after being targeted, the South Korean Marine Corps retaliated by firing back towards North Korean territory. On November 27, 2010, Kim Jong Nam sent an email to Yoji Komi, an editorial board member of Tokyo Shimbun, with the following content: "The Yeonpyeong Island incident is a provocation by the North Korean military to showcase their position, rationale for existence, and legitimacy in possessing nuclear weapons. My father is old, the successor is young, and my uncle (Jang Song Thaek) lacks any military experience, so there seems to be virtually no one who can control the North Korean military." Keuk-In Bae, "[Exclusive] Kim Jong-nam, 'What's with that childish expression, Kim Jong-un?'" *Dong-a Ilbo*, February 9, 2012. Keuk-In Bae, "[Exclusive] Kim Jong Nam, 'Jong Un, What's Wrong with that Kid's Face?'" *Dong-A Ilbo*, February 9, 2012.

49. D-3's interview response.

50. In 2013, Article 60 of the North Korean Penal Code pertained to the crime of plotting to overthrow the state. This provision stated, "Those who participate in subversion, riots, demonstrations, or attacks against the state or engage in conspiracies shall be subject to a minimum of five years of labor reform. In cases where the gravity is particularly severe, they shall be subject to punishment by life-term labor reform, execution, and confiscation of property." It should be noted that under the amended penal code as of May 17, 2022, the crime of conspiracy to overthrow the state falls under Article 61.

Thaek since early 2012. Starting in 2012, Kim Jong Un began investigations and punishments of individuals around Jang Song Thaek. During this period, Jang was under investigation by the OGD (Office 10), which is responsible for directly carrying out Kim Jong Un's orders, and the State Security Department (SSD). After the results of the investigation on Jang were partially derived, he was expelled from the party and removed from his positions through the direct party committee and handed over to the Changgwang Security Department, as he is the highest-ranking official in the Workers' Party.

At the time of Jang's execution, he held high positions in the party, government, and military. Within the Workers' Party, he held positions such as Administration Department Secretary of the Central Committee, member of the Political Bureau, member of the Central Military Commission, member of the Central Committee. In the government, he served as vice chairman of the State Affairs Commission and although he was not a military official, he held the rank of a General in the KPA. At the time, Jang Song Thaek was the only "chief official" or figure in North Korea who could counter the suryong's dictatorial power. This was made possible because he was the husband of Kim Kyong Hui, the younger sister of Kim Jong Il and the aunt of Kim Jong Un. During the period of the national crisis caused by Kim Jong Il's deteriorating health in 2008, Jang Song Thaek, along with Kim Kyong Hui, played a role in managing the "emergency management system" along with the First Deputy Director of OGD Ri Jae Kang, Chief of the KPA General Staff Ri Yong Ho, and the Senior Deputy Minister of the State Security Department U Tong Chuk. During this period, Jang Song Thaek also simultaneously carried out the project of designating Kim Jong Un as the successor through this emergency management system.

The truth or background behind Jang Song Thaek's execution is still a mystery.⁵¹ The possible background for Kim Jong Un's execution of his uncle could be similar to the spy incident (August 1997) planned by Kim Jong Il to eliminate Kim Il Sung's close aides and shift the responsibility for economic failure. It is also possible that there were power struggles within the OGD and the GPB and a scheme created

51. In May 2019, during a closed-door meeting attended by supporters, one participant mentioned to a US media outlet that "President Trump vividly and in detail recounted the story of Kim Jong Un executing his uncle Jang Song Thaek and displaying his head for others to see." However, there is still no way to confirm whether Kim Jong Un actually did as he allegedly told President Trump or if it was an exaggeration. John Hudson and Josh Dawsey, "Trump and Kim battled subordinates ahead of spike in tensions," *Washington Post*, May 9, 2019.

by high-ranking officials of these organizations or due to escalating privileges and influence that Jang and his affiliated groups had gained. Furthermore, as claimed by the North Korean authorities, Jang may have contemplated a coup with the assistance of Chinese political figures.⁵² However, under the mechanism of suryong dictatorship, Jang Song Thaek, as one of the officials under surveillance and control, would not have had the opportunity to execute a coup. Even if Jang Song Thaek harbored resentment towards Kim Jong Un, the most realistic option available to him personally would have been to wait quietly.

Ostensible justification for Jang Song Thaek's execution is, as reported by the *Rodong Sinmun*, the crime of conspiring to overthrow the state under Article 60 of the Criminal Law. However, as repeatedly mentioned in this report, the norms that govern the North Korean regime are not the Constitution or criminal law but rather loyalty (monolithic ideology) to the suryong and the suryong's dictatorship mechanism (monolithic leadership). Therefore, it is correct to view the justification for Jang Song Thaek's execution as a violation of these norms. Even if Jang Song Thaek and his subordinates did not violate these norms, this had to be true from Kim Jong Un's perspective. This is because the Ten Principles are an absolute norm that all individuals, including Kim Jong Un's family and relatives, must abide by, with the exception of Kim Jong Un himself. In other words, this was the only legitimate justification for executing his uncle. Whether the allegations in the verdict were true or not, the coup attempt violated all the provisions of the Ten Principles.

On the other hand, the pattern of Jang Song Thaek's execution is similar to

52. In August 2012, Jang Song Thaek led a delegation of over 50 economic representatives on a visit to China. The purpose of the visit was to promote the development of economic special zones in North Korea and request an urgent aid package of 1 billion dollars. According to an article written by Michael Lee, who had served in US military intelligence and the CIA for over 40 years, during his visit to Beijing in August 2012, Jang Song Thaek reportedly had a secret meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao. During this meeting, Jang Song Thaek spoke negatively about Kim Jong Un. When asked by Hu Jintao if there was an alternative to Kim Jong Un, Jang Song Thaek allegedly mentioned Kim Jong Nam as a possibility. However, it is said that the contents of this secret meeting were leaked to North Korean intelligence by Zhou Yongkang, a Standing Committee member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Zhou Yongkang's act was later discovered, leading to his conviction and imprisonment on charges of leaking classified information. It is worth noting that Zhou was expelled from the CCP in December 2014 on charges of bribery and leaking state secrets and subsequently received a prison sentence. This was the first judicial punishment of an incumbent Standing Committee member since 1989.. Seong-dong Kim, "The Assassination of Kim Jong-nam from the Perspective of Michael Lee, a former CIA Operative," *Monthly Chosun*, April 2017.

the abovementioned incidents in Chapter 2, Kim Il Sung's purge of Pak Hon Yong orchestrated in 1953 and Kim Jong Il's large-scale spy incident scheme in 1997. At that time, Kim Il Sung deliberately planned the purge to eliminate his opponents and strengthen his dictatorial power. He first arrested and executed Ri Sung Yop and Ri Kang Kuk, who were subordinates of Pak Hon Yong, the premier of North Korea and the head of the South Korean Workers' Party with many supporters. Similarly, Kim Jong Un also arrested and executed Jang's closest subordinates, First Deputy Director Ri Ryong Ha and Deputy Director Jang Su Kil of the Central Party Administration Department.

Furthermore, Jang Song Thaek's verdict contains the statement: "Jang Song Thaek is the mastermind who instigated and manipulated the massive economic chaos by inciting Pak Nam Ki, an archenemy of the people, to embezzle billions of our currency in 2009, thereby unsettling public sentiment." Jang Song Thaek was designated as the mastermind behind the execution of Pak Nam Ki, the Director of the Planning and Finance Department, in March 2010, holding him responsible for the failure of the currency reform. Similar to how Kim Il Sung eliminated Park Hon Yong through blaming him for the failure of the Korean War, Kim Jong Un can be seen as shifting the blame for the currency reform failure and economic crisis onto Jang Song Thaek.

Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter 2, Kim Il Sung executed and purged not only Pak Hon Yong but all individuals associated with him in order to establish a dictatorship system. The structural and widespread crimes against humanity that began with the Pak Hon Yong incident in 1953 were repeated in the spy incident in 1997 and Jang Song Thaek incident in 2013. In December 2013, immediately after the execution of Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong Un applied the guilt-by-association principle, targeting Jang Song Thaek's family, relatives, and all individuals associated with his group, and imposed collective punishment.⁵³ In other words,

53. On February 4, 2014, a South Korean media outlet quoted a government official stating that North Korea was carrying out a purge operation targeting Jang Song Thaek's relatives and subordinates. The North Korean authorities classified Jang's remaining loyalists into four categories and executed them or imprisoned them in political prison camps. The South Korean government official told the media outlet, "North Korea is applying a guilt-by-association system for treason against the state and conducting investigations on over 10,000 individuals in order to eliminate any potential threats." On the other hand, according to the memoir of Daemyung Koo, who was in North Korea at the time, in December 2013, the North Korean authorities instructed all cadres and officials to fill out investigation questionnaires. The questions on these questionnaires included name, gender,

even after 60 years, the suryong continues to commit crimes against humanity using the same methods.

2. Case 2: Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un's Killings by Brutal Execution Methods

As previously mentioned, the usual execution method in North Korea involves three executioners and nine bullets. However, from August 2007, during the late period of Kim Jong Il's rule, 90 rounds of firing were carried out instead of nine. According to D-3, during the later period of Kim Jong Il's rule, there were many executions of officials and ordinary citizens, labeling them as counter-revolutionaries and national traitors. Even though they had established their suryong dictatorship, Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong Un portrayed external crises caused by themselves as internal crises and managed the regime accordingly.⁵⁴

1) Kim Jong Il Period: First Execution that Fired 90 Shots in Yonsa County of North Hamgyong Province and Wonsan City of Kangwon Province in August 2007

In August 2007, a public execution incident occurred in Yonsa County of North Hamgyong Province. The offender sentenced for execution was the head of the Yonsa County branch of a trading company based in Pyongyang. The execution method at the time was a public shooting where three executors each fired 30 rounds, totaling 90 rounds of fire. The body of the executed was unrecognizable. At the time, not only the residents of Yonsa County but also numerous high-ranking officials from Pyongyang and other regions attended this public execution.

workplace, position, and specific questions like "What kind of relationship did you have with Jang Song Thaek? Have you ever met Jang Song Thaek? Have you received gifts from Jang Song Thaek? Do you know any close relatives or friends of Jang Song Thaek? Yong-soo Jeong, "North Korea Investigating 10,000 People to Find Remaining Influence of Song Thaek Jang...Results by June," *JoongAng Ilbo*, February 4, 2014; Daemyung Koo, *Bubble 1*, pp. 76-77.

54. The cases presented below are incidents in which D-3 directly witnessed or had a direct relationship with the victims. D-3 provided very specific details about the situations. However, the specific events and individuals that could identify who D-3 is in North Korea are kept confidential.

Kim Jong Il personally directly ordered the Central Party, local party, central government agencies in the cabinet, and the MPAF (Ministry of People's Armed Forces) officials to participate in this public execution. As a result, dozens of buses, known as "100-person bus," capable of carrying 100 people each, were mobilized from Pyongyang.⁵⁵

The next day after the public execution, these buses moved to Wonsan City in Kangwon Province. In other words, there was another public execution in Wonsan City on the following day after Yonsa County. The offender sentenced for public execution in Wonsan City was also a high-ranking official in charge of earning foreign currency. The official's crimes included drug use, viewing illegal videos, and illegal timber exports. The official was also shot with 90 rounds of fire. D-3 found it difficult to understand the part regarding the illegal timber exports among the official's crimes. The executed official's task was to export timber from North Korea to China. North Korea has limited forest areas available for logging, so the official harvested timber in the Mount Baekdu (Paektu in North Korea) region for export. North Korea considers Mount Baekdu as a revolutionary site of Kim Il Sung. Therefore, the North Korean authorities viewed the illegal logging and export of timber from this sacred area as an anti-party and anti-revolutionary crimes. However, despite the official's numerous illegal logging activities in the Mt. Baekdu region, the North Korean authorities did not raise any issues until the execution. In other words, it is not a problem in North Korea unless suryong considers it a problem.⁵⁶

2) Kim Jong Un Period: Execution of MPAF Deputy Director Kim Chol by Firing 90 Shots in Late December 2011

In late December 2011, Kim Chol, Deputy Director of the MPAF (Ministry of People's Armed Forces, responsible for earning foreign currency), was executed. According to D-3, Kim Chol was a high-ranking official who served as the commander of the 10th Corps and the Deputy Chief of the General Staff. It is said that Kim Chol drank alcohol at a temple called Sokwangsa in Kosan County, Kangwon Province,

55. Interview response from D-3.

56. Interview response from D-3.

during the mourning period that began after the death of Kim Jong Il on December 17, 2011 (The headquarters of the 10th Corps is located near Sokwangsa). Upon learning of this fact, Kim Jong Un ordered the immediate execution of Kim Chol. As a result, Kim Chol disappeared without a trace after being shot 90 times by three executioners. D-3 states that the brutal executions of Kim Jong Un, which were not found during Kim Jong Il's rule, occurred frequently following Kim Jong Il's death.⁵⁷ Furthermore, the incident was also confirmed in learning materials distributed by KPA Publishing House in June 2013. According to the document, it explicitly states, "Last January (2012), the Party set off a serious alarm to deal with the problem that among the chief officials of our People's Army, including that scoundrel Kim Chol, who behaved incoherently with disparate dreams in supporting the respected Comrade Supreme Commander."⁵⁸

3. Case 3: Arbitrary Summary Executions

Kim Jong Un has employed brutal summary executions by packaging his highly personal issues as public matters. Kim Kuk-song, who defected in late December 2013 and entered South Korea in January 2014, was a senior colonel in the 5th Bureau of the Reconnaissance General Bureau. In an interview with BBC in October 2021, he publicly revealed his existence to the international community for the first time.⁵⁹ Afterward, he shared anecdotes related to Kim Jong Un in an interview with a South Korean media outlet in December 2021.

"When Kim Jong Il died and the funeral was over, the first words out of Kim Jong Un in front of the core members were, 'I will do as I please from now on.' It wasn't like following

57. For reference, Kim Jong Il declared a mourning period lasting three years after the death of Kim Il Sung on July 8, 1994. At that time, the North Korean authorities held Kim Il Sung's funeral for ten days. Approximately one month after the funeral, between August and September 1994, Kim Jong Il investigated the whereabouts of senior officials during the period of Kim Il Sung's funeral through the OGD. Those officials who had engaged in unauthorized activities or misdeed during the funeral period faced dismissal, demotion, and revolutionization measures, but there were no executions reported.

58. Jeong-woo Kim, "[Exclusive] Internal Information on the North Korean Army Revealed in 2013 Senior Officer Training Documents," *Monthly Chosun*, April 2014.

59. Laura Bicker, "Drugs, arms, and terror: A high-profile defector on Kim's North Korea," *BBC News*, 11 October, 2021.

the Supreme Commander Kim Jong Il's way of thinking... It meant that he would do as he pleased from now on. It was scary. He doesn't know the scent of people. He grew up that way since he was a fetus... He even says things like 'Hey, Yong Chol' to Kim Yong Chol, the head of the United Front Department, not calling him by his title as the General Director Comrade. He didn't clap his hands facing straight like Kim Jong Il did; he clapped left and right. (In front of Kim Jong Un) When officials kneel in front of him, you can tell. So, he just went ahead and (executed) Jang Song Thaek. When you see Kim Jong Un, you can say he has quick political thinking and judgment. You may call him a beast, but he makes North Korean officials tremble in an instant, shaking in fear."⁶⁰

Kim Kuk-song claims that he heard this directly from Kim Yong Chol, who he was close to. Kim Yong Chol held concurrent positions as directors of United Front Department and RGB. He said that Kim Jong Un became a “dictator who did as he pleased” from the moment Kim Jong Il died. These examples are ordinary facts, as seen in many cases mentioned in this report.

1) Nine Members of the Unhasu Orchestra Summarily Executed in the First Half of 2012 (To Which Kim Jong Un's Wife, Ri Sol Ju Once Belonged)

On September 20, 2013, a Japanese media outlet quoted a high-ranking defector stating that nine members of the Unhasu Orchestra and the Wangjaesan Light Music Band had been executed. According to the report, the MPS, which functions as the police, wiretapped conversations among the nine artists, where they mentioned that they had “produced pornographic videos in which they appeared and Ri Sol Ju also played around like them before.” The arrest of these individuals reportedly took place on August 17, 2013, and they were executed three days later on August 20 at the Kang Kon Military Academy near the Pyongyang Sunan Airport (*Asahi Shimbun*, September 20, 2013).⁶¹ Three days after the Japanese media report, a British media outlet also reported a similar incident, suggesting that such

60. Joo-hyung Cho, “[Exclusive] Kim Jong Un Calls the Director of Reconnaissance who is 40 Years Older, ‘Hey, Young-Chul’...the Secret to Governance is ‘Blood,’” *PenN*, December 17, 2021.

61. Makino, Yoshihiro, “Kim Jong Un's Wife Scandal, Breaking up, Public Executions,” *Asahi Shimbun*, September 20, 2013.

an event had indeed occurred.⁶² Three months later, a South Korean media outlet reported on December 11, 2013 that Jang Song Thaek, a former senior official of the Central Committee's Administrative Department (husband of Kim Kyong-hui, Kim Jong Il's brother-in-law, and Kim Jong Un's uncle), had been purged because of an inappropriate relationship with Ri Sol Ju in the past.⁶³

Regarding this incident, D-3 provided testimony that differed from the media reports. D-3 confirmed that the nine members of the Unhasu Orchestra (founded on May 30, 2009) were executed, and the reason for their execution was that they had seen a photo of Ri Sol Ju and her ex-boyfriend. D-3 recalled that they were executed in the first half of 2012.⁶⁴ Furthermore, D-3 stated that the reports of their execution due to pornography filming or their association with Jang Song Thaek were entirely false. According to D-3, the Unhasu Orchestra consisted of graduates of the Kumsong School's specialized department (high school class of the arts school for gifted students) and members of the Wangjaesan Light Music Band (founded on July 22, 1983). Nine members of the Unhasu Orchestra looked at a photo of Ri Sol Ju and her ex-boyfriend taken in front of the Mangyongdae Schoolchildren's Palace (located in Palgol-dong of Mangyongdae District, Pyongyang). This photo was taken with Ri Sol Ju and her boyfriend at the time, with his hand on her shoulders. Ri Sol Ju and her ex-boyfriend knew each other since their school days at the Kumsong School, but D-3 could not remember exactly what her ex-boyfriend studied, but appears that he did not pursue a career in the arts after graduation. Among the executed members of the Unhasu Orchestra, about two to three attended the Kumsong School with Ri Sol Ju, and many stories related to Ri Sol Ju circulated around them. The MSS, which discovered this fact, reportedly issued several indirect warnings to them through the Unhasu Orchestra.⁶⁵

D-3 confirmed that the Kang Kon Military Academy was the place of execution. Kim Jong Un instructed only a small number of individuals to attend the execution.

62. Tania Branigan and Justin McCurry, "North Korea criticises 'reptile media' for saying Kim Jong Un ordered executions," *Guardian*, 23 Sep 2013.

63. Myeong-il Kim, "[Exclusive] The Unsaid Real Reason for Song Thaek Jang's Downfall," *Sunday Sisa*, December 11, 2013.

64. Ri Sol Ju first appeared in the public through a news report on Korean Central Television (KCTV) on July 25, 2012.

65. Interview response from D-3.

The front row of spectators consisted of members of the Moranbong Band, formed immediately after the disbandment of the Unhasu Orchestra on July 6, 2012, followed by a few high-ranking officials from the party, government, and military. After executing the nine individuals, an order was given to walk around the corpses, starting from the front row, one by one.^{66 67}

If D-3's testimony is true, Kim Jong Un is a criminal who brutally murdered everyone who knew about his personal life or those close to him.

2) The Division 38 Chief (KPA Rank, Major General) of the GPB Summarily Executed in April 2014

Kim Jong Un ordered the summary execution of the chief of Division 38 of the GPB because he failed to answer Kim's phone call. According to D-3, the Division 38 of the GPB is responsible for managing the staff members and personnel stationed in various military guesthouses under the jurisdiction of the MPAF. Each military guesthouse is comprised of team of women specializing in cooking, hospitality staff (waitresses), singers, and dancers. Each guesthouse is organized into one squad, with smaller guesthouses have around 6-7 women and larger ones have 11-12 women assigned to each unit. The personnel directly involved in protecting and entertaining Kim Jong Un are selected from the Cadre Division 5 of the OGD and are assigned to the 974 military unit, also called the "Supreme Commander Reserve." Those who were not assigned to the 974 military unit are assigned to the Division 38 of the GPB.⁶⁸

According to D-3, in 2014, Kim Jong Un frequently drank at the "Bipa Guesthouse," located near the MPAF headquarters in Sosong District in Pyongyang. In April 2014, Kim Jong Un visited the Bipa Guesthouse as usual and consumed a

66. South Korea's NIS stated at a plenary meeting of the National Assembly Intelligence Committee on April 29, 2015 that 17 high-ranking North Korean officials were executed in 2012. Meanwhile, among the officials who were executed or subjected to internal investigation in 2012, although not confirmed, it seems that Pang Chang Su, head of the investigation bureau of the Supreme Prosecutor's Office, and Ri Yong Kuk, division chief of the central party's administration, were included. These are all officials working under Jang Song Thaek. Eunji Kim, "National Intelligence Service 'Coercive Politics of Kim Jong Un, Executions to Set Examples of those with Differing Views,'" VOA, April 30, 2015.

67. Interview response from D-3.

68. Interview response from D-3.

significant amount of alcohol. Whenever Kim Jong Un visits, a “special event” is organized under the supervision of the chief of the Division 38. After Kim Jong Un leaves and the event ends, chief of the division holds an after party with the staff members of the guesthouse for encouragement and support. This practice has been a tradition since the Kim Il Sung period. However, it is reported that after the drinking session ended and Kim Jong Un returned, he called the chief during the late hours of the night. The chief, who had fallen asleep after the party, missed the phone call. The next day at 10 a.m., Kim Jong Un reportedly executed the chief.⁶⁹ Please note that according to a report by the ROK National Intelligence Service to the National Assembly's Intelligence Committee on May 31, 2023, Kim Jong Un is said to suffer from alcohol and nicotine addiction as well as insomnia. AI analysis has also estimated his weight to be around 140 kg.⁷⁰

3) Continuing Summary Executions by Kim Jong Un to This Day

On April 29, 2015, South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS), announced that 15 senior officials in North Korea had been executed from January to April 2015. At the time, Lee Byung-ho, the head of NIS, who reported on North Korea's trends to the National Assembly, stated, “If Kim Jong Un gives impromptu orders and they don't follow them, he frequently demotes them in the military and even executes them.” He also revealed that Kim Yong Chol, the director of the RGB, had been demoted from the rank of four-star general to lieutenant general (two-star), and recently promoted back to colonel general (three-star), experiencing four rank changes in three years.⁷¹

Furthermore, on May 13, 2015, the NIS announced in a confidential briefing to the National Assembly's Intelligence Committee that Hyon Yong Chol, the director of the MPAF had been executed on charges of disrespect. The NIS stated that Hyon had been executed by anti-aircraft gunfire in front of hundreds of people on April 30, 2015 for charges that include falling asleep during a military event

69. Interview response from D-3.

70. Hwan-yong Kim, “National Intelligence Service, ‘North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un has Considerable Sleep Disorder...Food Shortages Causing Surge in Starvation,’ VOA, May 31, 2023.

71. Tae-jung Park, Yu-dae Kim, Young0shin Kim, “National Intelligence Chief, ‘Kim Jong Un Executes 15 as an Example of Challenges to his Authority,’” *News 1*, April 29, 2015.

and contradicting Kim Jong Un's orders or talking back to him. Additionally, a NIS official mentioned to the media that Hyon's execution was carried out rapidly without the usual decision-making process by the Party's Political Bureau or a trial, unlike the execution of Jang Song Thaek in the past.⁷² The decision by Kim Jong Un to order the execution of Hyon Yong Chol during a meeting does not appear to be a normal judgment. However, as stated in Appendix I-A-8, Kim Jong Un mentions people who doze off during meetings in the following document.

Appendix I-A-8, "Remarks by Comrade Kim Jong Un to the Party and State Officials on April 1, 2013 (Juche 102)"

The act of closing one's eyes during a meeting where participants are present can also be seen as a sign of dissatisfaction with the meeting. It is an ideological problem for members attending the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Party to be dozing off, where important issues in the advancement of our revolution is being discussed and decided...

Those who doze off or play around during meetings where Party's strategic lines are discussed and decided can only be seen as an ideologically ill person.

Humans are not animals and should make expressions to express if something is bitter or sweet. Officials participating in the meeting should empathize with the issues being discussed... (omitted)

In other words, Kim Jong Un perceives those who doze off during meetings as dissatisfied individuals, ideologically ill, or even as animals. This radical evaluation by Kim Jong Un seems to have led to the execution of Hyon Yong Chol.

On another note, according to the Institute for National Security Strategy, a think tank under South Korea's NIS, one month after Hyon Yong Chol's execution in 2015, on May 13, Vice-Premier Choe Yong Gon was also executed. The reason for Choe's execution was reported to be the failure of Kim Jong Un's reforestation policy. Additionally, in July 2016, Vice-Premier Kim Yong Jin was executed. The reasons for his execution were his improper posture during the SPA meeting

72. Jung-ahn Kim, "NIS, 'Yeong-chul Hyun, North Korean Minister of the People's Armed Forces, Executed without Trial,'" *Dong-A Ilbo*, July 11, 2016.

in June 2016 and the failure of Kim Jong Un's education policy.⁷³ Moreover, on November 27, 2020, the NIS announced that due to the phenomenon of currency depreciation in North Korea, a currency trader in Pyongyang was executed at the end of October 2020.⁷⁴

4. Case 4: Purges of MSS Officials Who are the Main Perpetrators of Crimes Against Humanity in North Korea

The MSS has extensively eliminated individuals who violated the Ten Principles and belonged to anti-party and anti-revolutionary factions. However, they, too, became “victims” after being utilized as the suryong’s “hunting dogs.” Since the establishment of the State Political Security Department on February 15, 1973, until now, its officials have been replaced seven times, and the department's name has changed three times. It appears that there have been no natural deaths among the officials during the process of replacement.⁷⁵

The first director of the State Political Security Department (SPSD), established in 1973, was Kim Pyong Ha. Under the orders of Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, Kim Pyung Ha created and operated around 12 (or more) political prison camps throughout North Korea, imprisoning approximately 120,000 to 150,000 political prisoners until the early 1980s. However, Kim Pyung Ha was purged for deviating from the mass line and charged for separating the party from the people. The ostensible reason why Kim Jong Il labeled Kim Pyung Ha as an “anti-party and anti-revolutionary factionalist” was due to worsening public opinion from detaining too many people in the political prison camps. However, the fundamental reason was that Kim Pyung Ha’s influence at the time posed a potential threat to Kim Jong Il’s dictatorial power. In 1981, Kim Jong Il conducted a major inspection within the

73. Institute for National Security Strategy, *White Paper on Kim Jong Un's Five Years in Power*, (Seoul: National Security Strategy Institute, 2016), p. 24.

74. Sung-gyu Maeng, “[Comprehensive] National Intelligence Service, ‘Kim Jong Un Executes Currency Traders Due to Exchange Rate Collapse...also Executes Officials Violating Quarantine Regulations,’” *Maeil Business Newspaper*, November 27, 2020.

75. The State Security Bureau of the KPA also went through a similar process of change. The Military Security Bureau is also an institution that directly carries out the orders of large-scale purges and executions for the suryong. At the same time, it is also a tool used when removing the person in charge of the MSS and key officials. Due to space constraints, the case of the Military Security Bureau cases is not dealt with in this report.

OGD especially targeting the State Political Security Department. It was confirmed that Kim Pyung Ha was purged in July 1982 when he was expelled from the SPA. Through the inspection, the organizational leadership revealed all of Kim Pyung Ha's personal misconduct. Kim Pyung Ha eventually committed suicide between 1982 and 1983.

In 1982, Kim Jong Il renamed the SPSD as the State Security Department (SSD) and appointed Ri Jin Su as Kim Pyong Ha's replacement. After serving as the director of the Ministry of Social Security and the head of the Central Prosecutor's Office, Ri Jin Su was appointed as the director of the SSD in 1983. However, on August 24, 1987, the *Korean Central News Agency* reported that Ri Jin Su had died from heart failure. The cause of Ri Jin Su's death still remains a mystery. After Ri Jin Su's death, Kim Jong Il governed the SSD headed by Kim Yong Ryong, who served as the first deputy director from 1988. Kim Yong Ryong was primarily responsible for overseas reconnaissance operations (overseas espionage), including drug trafficking in China, kidnapping and terrorism against South Koreans, and the arrest of North Korean defectors. With special trust from Kim Jong Il, he was promoted to the rank of colonel general in April 1992 and to general in April 1997. Furthermore, in 1993, Kim Jong Il renamed the SSD (국가보위부) as the State Security Department (국가안전보위부). However, Kim Yong Ryong also underwent an OGD inspection from December 1997 to March 1998 and also eventually became an "anti-party and anti-revolutionary factionalist." After being stripped of his political life by the suryong, Kim Yong Ryong took his own life in April 1998.⁷⁶ The officials belonging to the State Security Department's overseas reconnaissance section, who were also under inspection, were eliminated by the State Security Command.⁷⁷

After Kim Yong Ryong's death, Kim Jong Il appointed Jang Song Thaek as the deputy director of the SSD from 1999 to 2005, working as a proxy leader. After Jang Song Thaek, U Tong Sok was appointed as the deputy director of the SSD and later became the senior deputy director in the late 2000s. As mentioned before, U Tong Sok was active as part of the emergency management system after Kim Jong

76. This is what Yoon Dae-il, who worked as a counter-detective and guidance officer (major) at the SSD in Musan County, North Hamgyeong Province from September 1983, defected to South Korea in August 1998, and disclosed it to the South Korean media. Yoon Dae-il, "Enforcing Evil: Excerpts from Yoon Dae-il, the first North Korean defector from North Korea's Social Security Department," *Monthly Chosun*, October 2002.

77. Dae Myung Koo, *Bubble 1*, pp. 144-145.


Il's health deteriorated in 2008, but he was dismissed or purged in 2012.⁷⁸ In April 2012, Kim Won Hong was appointed as the director. If Kim Jong Il governed the SSD through the deputy director during his reign, Kim Jong Un began reappointing the director of the SSD. In 2016, Kim Jong Un renamed SSD as the Ministry of State Security (MSS). However, Kim Won Hong could not avoid being purged. South Korea's Ministry of Unification announced in January 2017 that Kim Won Hong had undergone an OGD inspection.⁷⁹

Kim Won Hong was known as the person who directly carried out the investigation and execution of Jang Song Thaek under Kim Jong Un's orders. However, it has not been confirmed whether Kim Won Hong was executed.⁸⁰ Jong Kyong Thaek was named as his replacement. Jong Kyong Thaek served as the minister of the MSS from 2017 and was appointed as the director of the GPB of the KPA in June 2022. Since June 2022, Ri Chang Dae has been appointed as the minister of the MSS and still holds this position today. Additionally, Jong Kyong Thaek continues his public activities as the director of the GPB.

78. It is also known that Ri Yong Ho, chief of staff, was executed in July 2012. According to the learning document distributed by the KPA Publishing House in June 2013, Ri Yong Ho is specified as "a person who did not share the party's ideology and will, but acted inconsequentially, resulting in legal and party measures. Jeong-woo Kim, "[Exclusive] Internal Information on the North Korean Army Revealed in 2013 Senior Officer Training Documents," *Monthly Chosun*, April 2014.

79. Hwan-yong Kim, "ROK Ministry of Unification, 'North Korea dismissed State Security Minister Kim Won Hong in the Middle of Last Month,'" *VOA*, February 3, 2017.

80. Hee-yoon Do, "[Secret Story] Song Thaek Jang's Execution Operation R.G.J: Ministry of State Security 'Song Thaek Jang Incident Document'...Conducted by Wong-hong Kim," *Monthly Chosun*, January 2023.



This report discussed the fundamental causes and structure of crimes against humanity in North Korea through the mechanism of the suryong dictatorship. Specifically, it focused on demonstrating why Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un, collectively known as the suryong, are the ultimate responsible figures for crimes against humanity.

The conclusion of this report is simple and clear. North Korea operates under a dictatorship system where all power is concentrated in the hands of the suryong, and the ultimate responsibility for the crimes against humanity resulting from this dictatorship lies with the suryong. The mechanism of the suryong dictatorship is highly complex and sophisticated, characterized by intense oppression and violence and there are no historical precedents. While members of the international community were aware of North Korea's dictatorship, the specifics and detailed operations of the suryong dictatorship mechanisms were incomprehensible to many.

This study does not cover all aspects of North Korea's suryong dictatorship mechanism. However, based on the content of this report alone, it is not difficult to deduce that the suryong bears the responsibility and accountability of crimes against humanity that have occurred from 1948 to the present. The implications of this study are as straightforward as the conclusion. NK Watch aims to provide the following recommendations to the international community, South Korea, and North Korea's suryong, officials, and people of North Korea.

5.1. Recommendations to the International Community

First, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un are not only the key perpetrators but also the ultimate responsible figures for North Korea's systematic and widespread crimes against humanity. It is contradictory to demand Kim Jong Un, who currently holds all the power as the actual leader of North Korea, to resolve crimes against humanity. It is akin to asking a criminal to act as a judge.

The international community and South Korea should focus on judicial accountability and non-judicial accountability for crimes against humanity, directed to Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un. Through the Korean War, terrorism, and provocations, they have killed, injured, and abducted countless

people from South Korea and the international community. Furthermore, in order to maintain their family's permanent power, they have committed a myriad of crimes, including unlawful killings, extrajudicial executions, arbitrary deprivation of life, enforced disappearances, and forced labor against their own citizens.

However, some argue that there is insufficient evidence of direct involvement in crimes by Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un, or that they are not ultimately responsible due to North Korea's socialist collective leadership system. To make such arguments, stronger counterarguments should be presented than this report. (Our research team particularly welcomes open rebuttals from the WPK Political Bureau, Secretariat, Organization and Guidance Department, and Social Science Academy.)

Moreover, even if the international community wanted to hold the former minister of MSS or MPS accountable as direct perpetrators of human rights abuses, most of them have been executed or have committed suicide at the hands of the suryong. In other words, they can also disappear at any time as “anti-party counter-revolutionary factionalists” (반당반혁명 종파분자) through the mechanism of suryong dictatorship. In the end, the Kim family is the only one remaining, guarding the throne to the end.

Second, the international community and South Korea should formulate their North Korea strategies under the premise of acknowledging the inalterability of the suryong dictatorship mechanism. In other words, to completely eliminate not only North Korea's crimes against humanity, but also transnational organized crime and nuclear weapons threats, it is crucial to recognize that this is only possible when Kim Jong Un dictatorship ends. If the international community and South Korea fail to hold Kim Jong Un's accountable and passively let the succession of the fourth generation to take place, these threats will continue to haunt our future generation.

So far, the international community has pursued various strategies such as sanctions, engagement, internal transformation, and deterrence, but North Korea has remained unchanged. Over the past 78 years, Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un have diligently reinforced the mechanism of suryong dictatorship while destroying human rights and civilization. Currently, Kim Jong Un is the suryong who holds all decision-making power, but without the assistance of the Supreme Operations Command Division (최고작전지휘처), the Secretariat (서기실), the

Organization and Guidance Department (조직지도부), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (외교부), he cannot understand the diplomatic language and actions of the international community. Kim Jong Un only uses unrefined expressions and actions rather than diplomatic ones toward the international community.

Therefore, both the international community and South Korea need to deliver direct and straightforward messages to North Korea, rather than diplomatic language. Furthermore, these messages should always target the regime's suryong dictatorship. Of course, there is a possibility where “inalterability of the suryong dictatorship mechanism” may falter or breakdown. The international community should keep mind of such possibility and prepare an exit strategy in case the suryong peacefully relinquishes power.

Thirdly, there is a need to improve the methods and content of information inflow into North Korea. The regime has consistently emphasized to party officials that “people come first” (사람과의 사업이 먼저다). For the sake of changing Kim Jong Un’s attitude, the focus of international community should be on all “people” (사람) of North Korea— excluding the Kim family. The information to be conveyed to them should include the message that “the suryong and you are not a community of shared destiny, but separate entities, and even if the forced bond that the suryong created is destroyed, you will suffer no harm.”

The regime has constantly indoctrinated officials and brainwashed people with the idea that “if I die, there will be no party, no country, and no you.” However, what would happen if North Korean people took the red pill and became aware that the “wonderland” they are living in is actually a “deep rabbit hole” from which they can escape? From the suryong’s perspective, the most threatening enemy is not the United States but the people (사람) of North Korea themselves.

Finally, there is a recommendation regarding China. China must immediately cease the arrest, detention, and torture of people seeking freedom, human rights, and dignity. Moreover, unconditional forced repatriation of defectors is in itself crimes against humanity. North Korea is not a vassal state of China, and China does not need to emulate North Korea's suryong dictatorship.

5.2. Recommendations for North Korea

First, this is a recommendation to Kim Jong Un. It is hoped that he will acknowledge the crimes committed by his predecessors and himself, such as murder, torture, abuse, and enforced disappearances, and offer apologies to the victims. Furthermore, he should be willing to face the appropriate punishment. The time has come for him to return the power and dignity that his predecessors have taken away to the 25 million people of North Korea.

Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Will even this universal proposition be distorted and argued as “Western standards,” “double standards,” or “schemes to undermine supreme dignity”? The term “supreme dignity” (최고존엄) is applicable only within North Korea. Furthermore, the word “dignity” cannot be modified by words like “supreme” or “lowest” because all humans are inherently dignified.

Second, this is a recommendation for the North Korean authorities currently engaged in crimes against humanity, such as the Central Party’s Organization and Guidance Department, Ministry of Social Security, KPA Ministry Security Bureau, and the Ministry of People’s Security. It is well understood that adhering to the monolithic leadership and ideology is the only realistic way for survival in North Korea and there are subsequent consequences that follow when you betray the suryong and the party. Due to such fears, you may have made the decision to step onboard the same boat as Kim Jong Un.

However, the international community does not see you and Kim Jong Un or the Workers' Party as one entity. The term “socio-political organism” is nothing more than a “fraud” exclusive to North Korea. Humans are individual entities with inherent dignity from birth. If you have committed criminal acts, you should face the corresponding legal consequences. In countries that respect freedom and human rights, there are no extrajudicial executions or collective punishment that holds families responsible at political prison camps.

Taking the rap for Kim Jong Un’s crimes is not loyalty. To protect your own dignity, this is only possible when you treat all people as equal human beings without discrimination regardless of their background—not based on your political allegiance to Kim Jong Un. The target of “leading by example” is not the suryong

or the party but the people in political prison camps, remote areas, and citizens of Pyongyang, provinces, cities and counties. There is no need to become an accomplice to the Kim family destroying your own dignity to the very end.

Third, this is a recommendation for individuals who, in the capacity of overseas laborers, workers, businessmen, diplomats or secret operative agents that engage in money laundering, hacking, weapons and drug trafficking, and underground espionage activities outside of North Korea. Is it honorable for you to wear Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il badges and proudly declare your nationality as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea? If not, who is truly responsible?

You are urged to cease all illegal and manipulative acts. The suryong and the party may have brainwashed you into believing that engaging in criminal activities in the outside world—perceived as enemy state or states under enemy jurisdiction—are acts of “patriotism” and “loyalty.” However, you are also well aware that you can be easily deemed as anti-party and anti-revolutionary elements at any time. You are urged to stop actions that threaten the lives and properties of innocent people and quietly spread these messages to your families back home. The place in need of revolution is not South Korea or the international community but North Korea itself. The targets of patriotism and loyalty are your own families and neighbors. If you genuinely value them, it is hoped you will be the first to initiate the flow of freedom.

Lastly, this message is addressed to all the North Korean people. All humans have autonomy. Kim Yo Jong's rhetoric, “one's autonomy is achieved only through the suryong's guidance” is complete nonsense. You are well aware that Kim Jong Un refers to himself as the “representative of the people.” Therefore, the very fact that Kim Jong Un is leading the country is undermining your free will and autonomy.

Many members of the international community are concerned about each and every one of you. Therefore, we want to convey this message: Please do not sacrifice your lives, safety, and human dignity. It is difficult for us, who do not live in North Korea, to dare to speak of not letting go of hope. We also understand that it may not be possible to change the situation immediately. However, we can certainly promise that there are countless people who want to change the current situation and are making efforts to change it for the better.

V. 나가면서

본 연구는 반인도적범죄의 근본적 원인과 구조를 수령독재 메커니즘을 통해 논의했다. 즉 수령이라 불리는 김일성, 김정일, 김정은이 왜 반인도적범죄의 최종 책임자인지에 대해 초점을 맞춰 논증했다.

본 연구의 결론은 단순 명료하다. 북한은 수령이라는 개인에게 모든 권력이 절대적으로 집중되어 있는 독재체제이며, 이 독재에서 기인하는 반인도적범죄의 최종 책임도 수령에게 있다는 것이다. 수령독재 메커니즘 작동 방식은 매우 복잡하고 정교하다. 또한 기존의 역사적 사례에서 찾기 힘들 정도로 억압과 폭력의 강도가 매우 높다. 이에 따라 상당수의 국제사회 구성원들은 북한이 수령독재 체제라는 것을 인지하고 있었지만, 세부적인 메커니즘을 이해하기 어려웠을 뿐이다.

이 연구는 북한의 수령독재 메커니즘의 모든 부분들을 다루지는 않았다. 그러나, 이 보고서의 내용만으로도 1948년부터 현재까지 발생하고 있는 반인도적범죄의 원인과 책임은 수령에게 있다는 결론은 어렵지 않게 도출할 수 있다. 이 연구의 결론이 단순한 만큼 시사점들도 단순하다. 엔케이워치는 국제사회와 한국 그리고 북한의 수령, 당국자들, 주민들에게 아래와 같은 제언들을 남기고자 한다.

1. 국제사회에 대한 제언

첫째, 김일성, 김정일, 김정은은 북한의 조직적이고 광범위한 반인도적범죄의 핵심 피의자인 동시에 최종 책임자이다. 현재 김정은이 북한의 실질적인 최고통치자로서 모든 권력을 보유하고 있다고 해서 그에게 반인도적범죄를 해결하라고 촉구하는 것은 모순이다. 즉 범죄자에게 판사 역할을 맡아달라는 것과 동일한 의미인 것이다.

국제사회와 한국은 반인도적범죄에 대한 사법적 책임규명과 비사법적 책임규명에 대한 초점을 김일성, 김정일, 김정은에게 맞춰야 한다. 김일성, 김정일, 김정은은 6.25 전쟁, 테러와 도발을 통해 한국과 국제사회의 셀 수 없이 많은 사람들을 살해, 상해, 납치했다. 더 나아

가 그들은 자신들의 일가만의 영구적인 권력 유지를 위해 자국민에 대한 불법 살해, 초법적 처형, 자의적인 생명의 박탈, 강제실종, 강제노동을 포함한 수많은 범죄들을 자행했다.

한편, 일각에서는 김일성, 김정일, 김정은의 직접적 범죄 가담 여부에 대한 증거가 부족하다거나, 북한이 사회주의 집단지도체제로서 권력이 분산되어 있기 때문에 그들에게 최종적 책임이 없다고 주장들도 존재한다. 그러한 주장들을 하기 위해서는 이 보고서 보다 더 나은 논증으로 반론할 수 있어야 한다. (우리 연구진은 특히 노동당 정치국, 비서국, 조직지도부, 사회과학원의 공개적인 반론을 환영한다.)

무엇보다 국제사회가 과거의 국가보위상, 인민보안상들에게 직접적인 책임을 묻고 싶어도 그들의 대부분은 수령에 의해 처형을 당했거나 자살을 했다. 즉 그들도 수령독재 메커니즘에 의해 언제든지 “반당반혁명 종파분자”가 되어 사라질 수 있다. 결국 처음부터 마지막까지 왕좌를 지키고 있는 것은 김씨 일가일 뿐이다.

둘째, 국제사회와 한국은 수령독재 메커니즘의 불변성을 전제한 상태에서 대북전략을 수립해야 한다. 즉, 북한의 반인도적범죄뿐 아니라 초국가적 조직범죄, 핵무기 위협을 완전히 제거하고 싶다면, 김정은의 독재가 종식되어야만 가능하다는 것을 분명하게 인지해야 한다. 국제사회와 한국이 김정은에 대한 책임규명을 실행하지 않고 나아가 4대 세습이 이루어질 수 있도록 방관한다면, 이러한 위협들도 함께 안고 가겠다는 각오를 해야 한다.

그동안 국제사회는 제재, 관여, 자구, 억지 등 다양한 대북 전략들을 강구해 왔지만 북한은 변함이 없었다. 김일성, 김정일, 김정은은 지난 78년간 독재 메커니즘을 빈틈없이 강화해 온 반면 인권과 문명은 파괴해 왔다. 현재 김정은은 모든 결정권을 움켜쥐고 있는 수령이지만 최고작전지휘처, 서기실, 조직지도부, 외무성의 도움이 없으면 국제사회의 외교적 언어와 행위들을 이해하지 못한다. 반면, 김정은은 국제사회에 외교 보다는 정제되지 않은 표현과 행위만을 한다.

따라서 국제사회와 한국도 북한에 외교적 언어 보다는 직접적이고 단순 명료한 메시지들만을 전달할 필요가 있다. 그리고 그 메시지는 항상 수령독재를 타겟으로 해야 한다. 물론 수령독재의 불변성이 깨질 수 있는 가능성도 대비해야 한다. 국제사회는 수령이 평화적으로 권력을 포기할 때를 대비한 “출구”를 마련해두는 것도 잊지 말아야 한다.

셋째, 대북 정보 유입의 방법과 내용을 보완할 필요가 있다. 그동안 수령은 노동당 간부들에게 “사람과의 사업이 먼저다”고 강조해 왔다. 국제사회도 김정은의 태도 변화를 위해서는 “사람” 즉 김씨 일가를 제외한 모든 북한 주민들에게 초점을 맞춰야 한다. 그들에게 전달해야 할 정보에는 “수령과 당신들은 운명공동체가 아니며 별개의 존재이며, 수령이 강제로 형성한 유대가 소멸되어도 당신들에게는 그 어떤 피해도 없다”는 메시지가 포함되어야 한다.

수령은 당국자들과 인민들에게 “내가 죽으면 당도 국가도 당신들도 존재하지 않는다”

라는 세뇌를 끊임없이 해 오고 있다. 그런데, 영화 매트릭스의 대사처럼 북한 인민들이 빨간 알약을 먹고 자신들이 살고 있는 곳이 “이상한 세계”임을 명확하게 인식하게 되고, 그 “깊은 토끼굴”에서 탈출하고자 한다면 어떻게 될까? 수령의 입장에서 가장 위협적인 적은 미국이 아니라 바로 “사람” 즉 북한 주민들이다.

결므로, 중국에 대한 제언이다. 중국은 자유, 인권, 존엄을 찾으려는 사람들에 대한 체포, 구금, 고문을 당장 중단해야 한다. 더욱이 탈북민들에 대한 무조건적인 강제복송은 그 자체가 반인도적범죄이다. 북한은 중국의 속국이 아니며, 중국도 북한의 수령독재를 닮아갈 필요는 없다.

2. 북한에 대한 제언

첫째, 김정은에 대한 제언이다. 그간 선대 수령들과 본인이 자행한 살해, 고문, 학대, 강제 실종 등의 범죄 행위들을 인정하고 피해자들에게 사죄하기를 바란다. 그리고 그에 따른 처벌을 받기를 바란다. 이제는 선대 수령들이 빼앗은 권력과 존엄을 2,500만명의 주민들에게 다시 돌려줄 때가 왔다.

세계인권선언 제1조는 “모든 인간은 태어날 때부터 자유로우며 그 존엄과 권리에 있어 동등하다”고 천명하고 있다. 그런데, 이러한 보편적 명제마저 “서방만의 기준”, “이중적 기준”, “최고존엄의 훼손을 위한 모략”이라고 궤변을 할 것인가? “최고존엄”이라는 용어가 통용되는 범위는 북한 내부일 뿐이다. 또한 “존엄”이라는 단어에는 “최고”나 “최저”라는 수식어가 붙을 수 없다. 인간은 모두 존엄하기 때문이다.

둘째, 지금 이 순간에도 반인도적범죄를 직접 실행하고 있는 조직지도부, 국가보위성, 군 보위국, 사회안전성 등의 당국자들에 대한 제언이다. 북한 내에서는 유일영도와 유일사상에서 이탈하지 않는 것만이 생존을 위한 현실적인 방법이라는 것을 충분히 이해하고 있다. 또한 당신들은 수령과 당을 배신했을 때 어떠한 후과가 발생하는지 그 누구보다 잘 알고 있다. 그래서 당신들은 이러한 두려움 때문에 김정은과 같은 배를 타기로 결심했을 수도 있다.

그러나, 국제사회는 당신들과 김정은, 노동당을 하나로 보지 않는다. 즉 “사회정치적 생명체”라는 용어는 북한 내에서만 통하는 “후라이”에 불과하다. 인간은 원래 태어날 때부터 존엄한 개별적 존재들이다. 그리고 만약 당신이 범죄 행위를 했다면, 그것에 해당하는 만큼의 사법적 대가를 치르면 된다. 자유와 인권을 존중하는 일반적인 국가들에는 비법적인 처형도 이주민관리소(정치범수용소)도 가족들 모두에게 책임을 묻는 연좌제도 없다.

당신들이 김정은의 죄를 뒤집어 쓰는 것은 의리가 아니다. 당신의 존엄을 지키기 위해서는 김정은의 정치적 신임이 아니라 성분 차별 없이 모든 주민들을 동등한 인격체로 대할 때에만 가능하다. 이신작칙(以身作則)의 대상은 수령과 당이 아니라 이주민관리소, 심심산골, 평양과 지방에 살고 있는 모든 주민들이다. 무엇보다 스스로의 존엄을 파괴하면서 마지막 순간까지 김씨 일가와 공범이 될 필요는 없다.

셋째, 노동자, 상사원, 외교관, 공작원 신분으로 북한 바깥에서 돈세탁, 해킹, 무기 및 마약밀매, 지하당 공작을 하고 있는 대외 일꾼들에 대한 제언이다. 해외에서 당신들은 김일성-김정일 배지를 착용하고, 당신의 국적이 조선민주주의인민공화국이라고 밝히는 것이 몇몇한지 묻고 싶다. 만약 그렇지 않다면, 그 책임은 과연 누구에게 있는가?

모든 반합법적, 비합법적 행위들을 중단하기 바란다. 수령과 당은 외부 세계가 적구 아니면 적후이기에 그곳에서 범죄 행위를 하는 것이 “애국”과 “충성”이라고 당신들을 세뇌했을 것이다. 그런데 당신들도 언제든 반당반혁명 종파분자로 둔갑 될 수 있다는 것도 잘 알고 있을 것이다. 선량한 사람들의 재산과 생명을 위협하는 행위들을 멈추고, 이 지면의 메시지들을 고향의 가족들에게 조용히 전파해 주기를 바란다. 혁명이 필요한 곳은 한국과 국제사회가 아니라 바로 북한이다. 그리고 애국과 충성의 대상은 당신들의 가족과 이웃들이다. 그들을 진정으로 위한다면, 당신들이 먼저 자유의 물꼬를 터 주길 바란다.

끝으로, 모든 북한 주민들에게 말씀드립니다. 모든 인간들에게는 자주성이 있습니다. “수령의 영도를 통해서만 자주성이 실현된다”는 주체사상의 주장은 김여정의 표현을 그대로 빌리자면, “개나발”일 뿐입니다. 여러분들도 김정은이 스스로 “인민의 대표”라고 참칭하고 있다는 것을 잘 알고 있을 것입니다. 즉 김정은이 영도를 한다는 것 자체가 여러분의 자유지와 자주성을 훼손한다는 뜻입니다.

국제사회의 수많은 구성원들이 여러분들을 걱정하고 있습니다. 그래서 말씀드리고 싶습니다. 여러분들의 생명과 안전 그리고 인간으로서의 존엄을 스스로 포기하지 마십시오. 북한에서 살고 있지 않은 저희들이 감히 희망의 끈을 놓지 말아달라는 언급을 하기는 어렵습니다. 지금 당장 받을 갈아엎을 수 없다는 것도 잘 알고 있습니다. 하지만 현재의 상황을 바꾸고 싶어하는 수많은 사람들이 노력을 지속할 것이라는 약속은 분명히 드릴 수 있습니다.

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Korean References

※ Most of the Korean references used in this report were written in Korean. The contents have been translated into English from the bibliography written in Korean, and there may be differences between each author's legal name and the way their names are written here. In the case in which literature published in Korea is written in English, "English Edition" is written at the end. Furthermore, for the convenience of readers who may not know Korean, an identification mark for each reference and a link, if the original text may be found online, are specified.

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
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
Appendices

Appendix I-A Excerpts of Kim Jong Un's Teaching and Instructions


Appendix I-A-1




Appendix I-A-1(2)




Appendix I-A-2



Appendix I-A-2(2)



Appendix I-A-3



Appendix I-A-3(2)


...화면반주곡집 《우리의 7.27》에서 388번 노래 《새해를 축하합니다》의 화면편집이 잘못되었습니다. 그 노래 1절 부분에 가사 《행복의 날과 달을 약속합니다》라는 자막과 함께 화면에 장군님께서 1995년 1월 1일 우리 인민들에게 보내주신 친필서한을 모시면서 《내 나라 내 조국을 더욱 부강하게 하기 위하여 우리 모두 한마음한뜻으로》라는 내용을 한번 더 반복하여 모시었습니다.

장군님의 친필은 철저히 원본 그대로 보존하여야 하며 장군님의 친필을 출판선전물에 모시는 경우에는 반드시 원본 그대로 모셔야 합니다. 화면반주곡집에 장군님의 친필서한을 원본 그대로 모시지 않고 망탕 모신것은 대단히 잘못되었습니다. 누가 장군님의 친필에 망탕 손을 대는 도깨비짓을 하였는지 모르겠습니다.

...이번 계기를 통하여 장군님의 친필을 원본 그대로 모시지 않는 현상이 다시는 나타나지 않도록 일군들을 단단히 각성시켜야 하였습니다.

...

Appendix I-A-4



Appendix I-A-4(2)

경애하는 김정은동지께서 주체105(2016)년 4월 1일 당중앙위원회 책임일군들에게 하신 말씀(발췌)


군수공업부문 로동계급은 가렬한 전위의 나날로 부러 오날에 이르기까지 언제나 빈함없이 당과 생사 운명을 같이해오셨으며 불굴의 정신과 강毅한 의지를 가지고 당에서 맡겨온 혁명파업을 결사관철하고 있습니다. 그들은 조국과 인민에 대한 열렬한 사랑과 헌주에 대한 불타는 적개심을 가슴에 품고 원수들을 무자비하게 격멸소탕할수 있는 현대적인 무장장비들을 팽발 만들어내고 있습니다. 군수공업부문 로동계급이 지닌 혁명성, 계급성은 그 무엇과도 바꿀수 없는 귀중한 사상정신적재보입니다. 식량은 떨어지면 돈을 주고 살수 있지만 로동계급의 혁명성, 계급성은 그 무엇을 주고도 사지 못합니다. 우리 당은 당에 무한히 충실한 훌륭한 로동계급을 가지고있는 무자입니다. 군수공업부문 로동계급과 같은 영웅적김일성-김정일로동계급을 가지고있는 우리 당은 련승불패입니다.

...


군수공업부문 로동계급이 군자리혁명정신으로 살며 투쟁하는 구호를 높이 들고나가도록 하여야

(1)


Appendix I-A-4(3)




Appendix I-A-5




Appendix I-A-5(2)




Appendix I-A-6




Appendix I-A-6(2)



Appendix I-A-7



Appendix I-A-7(2)



Appendix I-A-7(3)

하도록 하여야 하겠습니다. 이번에 평양시안의 공원들을 한심하게 만들어놓은데 대하여 문제를 세우고 평양시일군들을 되게 비판하였더니 지방일군들도 많이 걱정하였다고 합니다.

인민군대에서 평양시안의 공원들을 보수하면서 보니 유희기재들에서 볼트와 나트까지 뿔아갔다고 합니다. 지금 공공시설들에 설치한것을 망탕 뜯어갈 내기를 하는것이 문제입니다.

평양시의 살림집지구들에 있는 오물장물에 쌓인 오물도 연유가 없다고 하면서 제때에 실어내가지 않고있다고 합니다. 어떤 사람들은 길가에 침을 뱉고 담배꽂초를 망탕 버리고있습니다. 거리와 마을, 일터를 잘 거두고 사는데서는 평양시민들이 지방사람들보다 못하다고 말할수 있습니다. 거리와 마을, 일터를 잘 거두지 않고 되는데로 사는 평양시민들의 그릇된 생활습성이 정말 부러웁습니다. 평양시민들의 그릇된 생활습성을 뿌리뽑도록 하여야 합니다. 평양시민들속에서 거리와 마을, 일터를 잘 거두지 않고 사는 그릇된 생활습성을 뿌리뽑기 위한 교양과 통제 사업을 강도높이 벌리도록 하여야 하겠습니다.

(2)

Appendix I-A-8

집대비밀

전당과 온 사회를 김일성-김정일주의화하자!

경애하는 김정은동지께서
주체102(2013)년 4월 1일
당, 국가책임일군들에게 하신
말씀

Appendix I-A-8(2)

을 토의할 때마다 이것이 과연 장군님의 의도에 맞는가 하는것을 끊임없이 자문하면서 장군님앞에서 경의를 받는 심정으로 앉아있었습니다.

...일군들이 당에서 새로운 전략적로선을 제시하는 중요한 회의에 참가하였으면 정중하고 진지한 자세를 가져야 하겠는데 까투리처럼 머리를 수그리고있으니 당의 로선을 어떻게 집수하고 관찰하겠는가 하는것입니다...

원래 회의에 참가한 사람이 눈을 감고있는것은 회의에 무슨 불만이 있다는것을 의미한다고도 볼수 있습니다. 우리 혁명발전에서 중대한 문제를 토의결정하는 당중앙위원회 전원회의에 참가하여 조는것은 사상적인 문제입니다...

당의 중대한 전략적로선을 토의결정하는 회의에 참가하여 풀거나 장난을 하는 사람들은 사상적으로 병든 사람이라고밖에 달리 볼수 없습니다.


...

사람은 짐승이 아닌것만큼 쓰면 쓰고, 달면 달다는 인상표현이 있어야 합니다. 일군들은 회의에 참가하여 토의되는 문제에 대하여 '공감도 하고 토론자


(5)

Appendix I-B Excerpts from WPK Policy Implementation Directives
(Kim Jong Un's Approved Policy Documents)


Appendix I-B-1




Appendix I-B-1(2)




Appendix I-B-1(3)




Appendix I-B-2




Appendix I-B-3




Appendix I-B-4




Appendix I-B-4(2)




Appendix I-B-5



Appendix I-B-5(2)



Appendix I-B-6



Appendix I-B-7

등록: 435 2017.8.14.

경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지의 2017년 8월 10일 비준방침
7월중 군중들속에서 제기된 대표적인 동향과 대책보고
(조직지도부)

△ 부정적현상들에 대한 동향

...
최근 일부 근로청년들속에서 인민군대입대를 기피하는 현상이 적지 않게 나타나고있다는 동향

...
대책적의견:
— 당 및 근로단체조직들과 교육기관들에서 청년들속에 조국보위는 최대의 애국이며 신성한 의무라는것을 깊이 인식시키기 위한 교양사업과 인민군대입대를 기피하는 대상들과의 투쟁을 강하게 벌리도록 하려고 합니다.

일부 주민들속에서 부모를 박대하는 현상이 우습하게 나타나 사회의 건전한 분위기를 흐려놓고있다는 동향

...
대책적의견:
— 당 및 근로단체조직들과 정권기관들...에서 주민들속에서 혁명선배를 존대하고 옷사람을 존경하는 사회적기풍을 세우기 위한 도덕교양을 짜고드는것과 함께 자식들이 부모를 박대하는 현상이 머리를 쳐들지 못하게 조직별 사상투쟁과 종업원, 주민총회를 비롯한 조직적, 사회적, 법적투쟁을 강하게 벌리도록 하려고 합니다.

Appendix I-B-8

등록: 440 2017.8.14.

경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지의 2017년 8월 10일 비준방침
전사회적으로 종교와 미신행위를 반대하는 투쟁을 강도높이 벌이기 위한 당조직지도사업대책안
(조직지도부)

1. 사회적으로 종교와 미신행위를 근원적으로 없애기 위한 조직지도사업을 강화하되도록 하려고 합니다.

① 당 및 근로단체조직들...에서 종교와 미신행위를 없애기 위한 장악통제를 더욱 강화하도록 하려고 합니다.

— 당조직들...에서 장악보고체계, 군중신고체계를 철저히 세워 종교와 미신행위를 하는자들을 제때에 장악하여 대책을 세우며 요소자들에 대한 감시, 통제를 강화하여 철저히 없애놓도록 하려고 합니다.

특히 종교와 미신행위전파자들, 남조선과 해외언론자들, 비법원경전과자들, 지난 시기 종교행위를 하여 법적체제를 받은자의 가족, 친척들을 비롯하여 적들의 마수에 쉽게 걸려들수 있는 대상들을 내적으로 장악하고 집중적으로 파고들면서 철저히 감시, 통제하도록 하려고 합니다.

— 당조직들에서 외국종장자들과 사사리행자, 독립임무를 수행하거나 무단결근, 조퇴가 많은 대상들에게 특별히 주의를 돌리면서 그들이 종교와 미신행위를 하거나 말려들지 않게 철저히 장악통제하도록 하려고 합니다.

— 당 및 근로단체조직들에서 녀성들속에서 독특한 직업이 없이 떠돌아다니거나 부양으로 있으면서 장사를 하는 대상들을 사람당, 전당 포해장악하고 조직적통제를 강화하여 그들속에서 불건전한자로부터 종교와 미신을 설교하는 불순출판선전물을 넘겨받아 남편과 자식들, 다른 사람들에게 류포시키는 현상이 절대로 나타나지 않도록 하려고 합니다.

— 당 및 근로단체조직들에서 자기 단위 종업원들과 학생들속에서 컴퓨터와 손전화기, 학습장, 수업 등에 종교와 미신적인 내용들을 입력하거나 적어가지고 다니는 현상이 나타나지 않게 장악통제를 강화하도록 하려고 합니다.

...
② 당조직들...에서 종교와 미신이 우리 내부에 침투되는 경로와 원천을 철저히 차단통제하도록 하려고 합니다.

— 당조직들...에서 성경책을 비롯한 종교와 미신을 설교하는 불순출판선전

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... 이색적인 부르조아생활문화가 우리 내부에 침투하여 사회주의본래를 흐리게 하는 현상을 없앨데 대한 내용

- 민족자존의 정신이 없이 자기것을 귀중히 여기지 않고 비비말부들 쓰거나 피외상품을 팔고사는 현상을 없앨데 대한 내용
- 우리 식이 아닌 옷차림과 머리단장을 하고 다니는 현상을 없앨데 대한 내용
- 사회공중도덕과 질서를 제대로 지키지 않는 현상을 없앨데 대한 내용

2. 사회의 모든 성인들을 정신도덕적으로 건전하고 문명한 인간으로 준비시키고 사회주의생활양식을 확립하기 위한 선전선동사업을 공세적으로 벌리도록 합니다.

- 중앙과 지방의 예술선전대, 기동예술선동대들에서 체국주의의 사상문화적 침투책동을 짓부시고 우리의 사회주의 문화와 생활양식을 고수할데 대한 내용의 작품들을 가지고 예술선동활동을 벌리도록 하려고 합니다.

3. 당조직들에서 적들의 사상문화침투책동을 짓부서버리기 위한 사상전을 강도높이 벌리도록 하려고 합니다.

- 당조직들에서 경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지께서 슬픔을 뿌리뽑는데 대하여 하신 말씀(발췌)을 해당 대상들에게 빠짐없이 제 전달침투하도록 하려고 합니다.
- 당조직들에서 일꾼들과 당원들과 근로자들속에서 사회적으로 나타나는 각종 비행들이 적지 않게 음주와 관련되어있으며 술을 마시고 안일해이하게 지내는것은 혁명하는 시대, 투쟁하는 시대의 요구와 어긋난다는것을 깊이 인식시키기 위한 선전선동사업을 힘있게 벌리도록 하려고 합니다.
- 당조직들에서 일꾼들과 당원들과 근로자들속에서 투철한 주적관, 대적관념을 깊이 심어주는것과 함께 부르조아사상문화가 우리 내부에 들어오지 못하게 하며 그 사소한 요소도 단호히 짓궂게버리기 위한 사상전을 드세게 벌리도록 하려고 합니다.
- 당조직들에서 일꾼들과 당원들과 근로자들속에서 끼리끼리 밀려다니며 술판, 락자판을 벌리는 현상과 금양봉사단위들에서 밤늦게까지 술과 맥주를 팔면서 사회의 건전한 분위기를 흐리게 하는 현상, 기관, 공장, 기업소들에서 문화후생시설들에 생일식사를 우리거나 비법적으로 상업금양봉사활동을 하는 현상들이 나타나지 않게 교양과 통제를 강화하도록 하려고 합니다.
- 당조직들에서 위대한 장군님께서 2007년 5월 31일에 주신 유훈과 경애하는 최고령도자동지께서 2014년 9월 25일, 2017년 7월 20일에 주신 비준과업

Appendix I-B-8(3)

4. 전사회적으로 종교와 미신행위를 반대하는 투쟁을 강도높이 벌이기 위한 장악지도사업을 강화하려고 합니다.

① ...당조직들에서 종교와 미신행위를 반대하는 투쟁을 강도높이 벌이기 위한 문제들을 직능과 사업계획에 반영하고 강하게 내밀어 철저히 집행하도록 하려고 합니다.

② ...각급 당위원회들에서 월마다 진행되는 군중동향을 보고받고 대책을 세우기 위한 당안전위원회에서 종교와 미신행위를 없애기 위한 사업정형을 함께 총화하도록 하려고 합니다.

Appendix I-B-9

등록: 441 2017.8.14.

경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지의 2017년 8월 12일 비준방침

적들의 포악한 제재압박과 도발책동을 짓부시고 사회주의강국 건설을 힘있게 다그치기 위한 당조직사업대책안

(조 직 지 도 부)


우리의 대륙간탄도로켓 《화성-14》형시험발사의 련이은 대성공에 혼비백산한 미국놈들과 그의 강권에 눌리워 불의에 맹종하는 어중이떠중이들이 유엔안전보장리사회의 이름을 도용하여 또다시 대조선 《제재결의》라는것을 조작해내는 국제적범죄를 저질렀으며

미국의 호전세력들이 분별을 잃고 히스테리적인 전쟁광기까지 부러대고있는것과 관련하여 조선민주주의인민공화국 정부 성명과 조선아시아태평양평화위원회 대변인성명, 민족화해협의회 대변인성명, 조선인민군 총참모부 대변인성명, 조선인민군 전략군 대변인성명이 련이어 발표되었습니다.

우리 국가와 인민을 상대로 저지르고있는 미국의 극악한 범죄의 대가를 천백배로 결산할것이라고 선언한 성명들에 접한 온 나라 일군들과 당원들과 근로자들은 위대한 당의 령도따라 주체혁명의 최후승리를 앞당겨나갈 불타는 맹세로 피를 끓이고 조선인민의 철천지원수 미제를 비롯한 적대세력들에 대한 멸적의 보복의 지는 하늘에 닿고있습니다.

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Appendix I-B-9(2)



Appendix I-B-9(3)

경애하는 최고령도자동지께서 우리 혁명을 진두에서 이끄시기에 미제를 비롯한 적대세력들의 분별없는 《전쟁불사》 광증과 포악한 제재책동도 두려울것이 없고 천만대적이 덤벼들어 도 우리는 반드시 승리한다는 드팀없는 신념을 깊이 심어주기 위한 간부개별담화교양과 군중교양을 집중적으로 벌리도록 하려고 합니다.

경애하는 최고령도자동지께서 《3.18혁명》과 《7.4혁명》에 이어 7.28의 기적적승리를 안아오시여 우리 공화국을 주체의 핵강국, 세계적 군사강국으로 강화발전시키신 불멸의 업적을 일군들과 당원들과 근로자들속에 깊이 체득시키도록 하려고 합니다.

— 당조직들...에서 경애하는 최고령도자동지의 신변안전과 안녕을 백방으로 보장하기 위한 사업에 만전을 기하도록 하려고 합니다.

주체적핵무력완성의 력사적대업을 빛나게 실현하시여 날강도 미제와의 지나긴 대결에서 최후승리를 안아오시는 경애하는 최고령도자동지의 신변안전보장사업에 모든 력량과 수단을 총동원, 총집중하도록 하려고 합니다.

행사비밀을 엄격히 지키며 중요행사지역들을 봉쇄하고 호위안전사업에 위협을 줄수 있는 인적, 물적대상들에 대한 장악통제와 감시, 안전대책을 철저히 세우도록 하려고 합니다.

중요도로와 철길강도를 높이고 정상보수, 정상관리체계를 철저히 세우며 책임일군들이 자기 지역, 자기 단위가 맡은 도로, 철길의 안전상태를 직접 확인하면서 위험개소들을 빠짐없이 찾아 즉시 대책을 세우도록 하려고 합니다.

무기와 총탄, 폭발물, 화공품, 독해물보관취급질서를 엄격히 세워 비정상적인 현상이 절대로 나타나지 않도록 하려고 합니다.

평양시거주, 숙박등록질서와 신고체계를 철저히 세우고 검열단속사업을 강화하여 강력범죄자, 비법출입자를 비롯하여 수도의 정치적안전에 지장을 줄수 있는 대상들을 모조리 찾아 대책을 세우도록 하려고 합니다.

적들이 감히 《참수작전》이라는것을 획책하고있는데 대처하여 모든 문제를 혁명의 수뇌부결사용위의 견지에서 예리하게 보고 사소한 비정상적인 요소도 놓치지 말고 제때에 장악하여 즉시적인 대책을 세우도록 하려고 합니다.

② ...당조직들에서 백두산절세위인들의 초상화, 석고상, 동상, 영상작품 등을 안전하고 정중히 모실수 있게 지하모실실의 실태를 전반적으로 료해하고 잘 꾸리며 습기방지대책을 철저히 세우도록 하려고 합니다.

2) 적들의 포악한 제재압박과 도발책동을 짓부시고 사회주의강국건설을 다그치기 위한 생산돌격전을 힘있게 벌리도록 하려고 합니다.

①... 해당 단위 당조직들에서 평화수호의 영원한 기치인 병진로선을 높이

사각형

Appendix I-B-9(4)

추켜들고 국가핵무력을 질량적으로 더욱 강화하기 위한 투쟁에 최대의 힘을
넣으며 우리 공화국을 그 어떤 제국주의 침략세력도 범접 못하는 난공불락의
요새로 철옹성같이 다지도록 하려고 합니다.

...

①...공장,기업소 당조직들에서 자기 부문,자기 단위앞에 제시된 명령분과제
들과 군수물자보장계획을 월별,분기별로 무조건 수행하도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 오늘도 전시라는 관점을 가지고 대사변전략물자들을 보충조
성하기 위한 사업을 힘있게 내밀도록 하려고 합니다.

② 당조직들에서 일군들과 당원들과 근로자들이 긴장하게 전투적으로 일하
면서 원수들을 무찌르는 심정으로 초소와 일터마다에서 련속공격,계속혁신,
계속전진의 불길을 세차게 일으켜 당 제7차대회 결정관철을 위한 올해의 총돌
격전에서 영예로운 승리가 되도록 하려고 합니다.

...

...경공업공장 당조직들에서 일군들과 근로자들이 자력자강의 정신을
만장약하고 우리의 자주권과 생존권,발전권을 빼앗아보려고 미친듯이 날뛰는
미제를 비롯한 적대세력들과 총결산하는 심정으로 갖가지 질 좋은 인민소비
품을 많이 생산하여 적들의 포악한 제재책동에 파멸구를 내도록 하려고
합니다.

...지방산업공장 당조직들에서 자강력제일주의기치를 높이 들고 원료,자재,
설비의 국산화를 실현하기 위한 투쟁을 힘있게 벌려 인민소비품문제를 원만히
해결하도록 하려고 합니다.

— ...당조직들에서 래일 당장 전쟁이 일어난다 해도 오늘 밤 12시까지
건설을 중단없이 하여야 한다는 관점과 배짱을 가지고 메기공장건설과 1개
농장을 사동구역 장천남새전문협동농장처럼 꾸리는것을 비롯하여 올해 계획한
사업들을 강하게 내밀어 무조건 집행하도록 하려고 합니다.


... 비롯하여 올해 완공할 중요건설대상들에 력량을 집중하여 무조건 끝내
도록 하려고 합니다.

— ... 비롯하여 인민경제 모든 부문,모든 단위에서 자력경쟁,자급자족의
구호를 높이 들고 내부예비와 잠재력을 총동원하여 부닥치는 애로와 난관을
자체의 힘으로 극복해나가면서 높은 생산적양양을 일으켜 적들의 포악한 제재
책동을 짓부셔버리도록 하려고 합니다.

③ 모든 부문,모든 단위에서 혁명적경각성을 높이며 정상적인 전투동원준
비를 철저히 갖추고 적들이 덤벼들면 모조리 쓸어버리도록 하려고 합니다.

① 당조직들에서 혁명적경각성을 높이고 자위경비를 강화하며 사고방지대
책을 철저히 세우도록 하려고 합니다.

Appendix I-B-9(5)



Appendix I-B-9(6)

힘있게 다그치기 위한 장악지도사업을 강화하도록 하려고 합니다.

① 당조직들에서 적들의 포악한 제재압박과 도발책동을 짓부시고 사회주의 강국건설을 힘있게 다그치기 위한 당조직사업대책안에 제시된 과업집행을 위한 사업정형을 정상적으로 총화하고 대책을 세우면서 강하게 내밀어 무조건 끝까지 관철하도록 하려고 합니다.

...

Appendix I-B-10

등록: 450 2017.8.20. 류 경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지의 2017년 8월 15일 비준방침
경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지의 2017년 8월 15일 비준방침
최근정세와 관련하여 군중들속에서 제기된 동향,류언비어와 대책보고
(조 직 지 도 부)

대표적인 동향은 다음과 같습니다.

△ 긍정동향

— 경애하는 원수님께서 제시여 우리는 무서울것도 없고 반드시 이긴다는 동향

...

— 절호의 기회를 놓치지 말고 미국놈들에게 핵폭탄을 안겨 조선사람의 본때를 보여주어야 한다는 동향

...

— 인민군대에 입대,복대하여 미국놈들을 씨도 없이 죽탕쳐버리겠다는 동향

...

— 생산에서 혁신을 일으켜 미국놈들의 제재책동을 물거품으로 만들겠다는 동향

...

△ 부정동향

— 전쟁이 일어나면 살아남을 사람이 없을것이라는 동향

...

— 고난의 행군을 해야 할것 같다는 동향

...

— 일부 주민들이 정세가 긴장해지자 돈벌이에 눈이 어두워 쌀과 연유값을 올리고있다는 동향

...

※ 이밖에 최근 여러 성명들이 발표되었는데도 꿈만해하고 돈벌이를 하려

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Appendix I-B-10(2)

다니는 사람들이 적지 않다는 동향과 ... 류언비어도 일부 제기되었습니다.

대책적의견:

— 당 및 근로단체조직들에서 당원들과 근로자들속에 경애하는 최고령도자동지께서 우리 혁명을 진두에서 이끄시기에 천만대적이 달려들어오 우리는 반드시 승리한다는 철석같은 신념을 깊이 심어주기 위한 교양사업을 더욱 짜고들어 진행하도록 하려고 합니다.

...

— 당조직들...에서 군중들속에서 제기되는 동향과 류언비어를 빠짐없이 장악하여 적시적인 대책을 세우며 민심을 소란시키는 류언비어를 퍼뜨리는자들을 모조리 색출하여 처벌하도록 하려고 합니다.

Appendix I-B-11

등록: 454 2017.8.20.

경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지의 2017년 8월 16일 비준방침

2017년 상반기기간 출판검열국 79호실에서 괴리 및 다른 나라출판선전물들을 검열한 정형과 대책과 관련한 제의서

(선전선동부)

대책적의견:

- 모든 당조직들에서 다른 나라에 공무, 사사려행 등 여러가지 목적으로 다녀오는 자기 단위의 종업원들에 대한 교양과 장악통제를 더욱 강화하여 우리 내부에 불순출판선전물들을 끌어들이는 현상이 나타나지 않도록 하려고 합니다.

- 상업봉사단위를 가지고있는 모든 단위 당조직들에서 종업원들에 대한 교양과 장악통제사업을 강화하여 수입상품들의 상표를 출판검열국 79호실의 검열을 받지 않고 판매하는 현상이 나타나지 않도록 하려고 합니다.

Appendix I-B-12

등록: 466 2017.8.28.

경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지의 2017년 8월 23일 비준방침

위대한 장군님을 조선로동당 총비서로 높이 모신 20돐을 맞으며 진행할 당조직사업대책안
(조직지도부)

1. 당조직들에서 위대한 장군님을 조선로동당 총비서로 높이 모신 20돐을 맞으며 조직정치사업을 힘있게 벌리기 위한 토의사업을 진행하도록 하려고 합니다.

① ...초급당조직들에서는 위원회에서 토의하도록 하려고 합니다.

② 토의사업은 위대한 장군님을 조선로동당 총비서로 높이 모신 20돐을 맞으며 진행할 당조직사업대책안에 반영된 문제들을 집행하기 위한 집행계획서를 구체적으로 세워 조항별로 진지하게 토의결정하는 방법으로 하도록 하려고 합니다.

2. 위대한 장군님을 우리 당과 인민의 영원한 수령으로 높이 모시며 장군님의 불멸의 혁명업적을 견결히 옹호고수하고 길이 빛내어나가도록 하려고 합니다.

① 당조직들에서 위대한 장군님을 천세만세 영원히 높이 받들어모시기 위한 사업을 더욱 짜고들어 진행하도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 금수산태양궁전을 영원한 태양의 성지로 더욱 훌륭히 꾸리

는데 필요한 설비와 물자,자재를 최우선 보장하며 결사보위하기 위한 사업에 선차적인 힘을 넣도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 백두산정세위인들의 초상화, 석고상, 동상, 영상미술작품, 현지교사관과 말잡판, 영상탑, 당의 기문구호들의 모습정형을 정상적으로 표현하고 나타나는 현상들을 제때에 바로잡으며

특히 당책임일꾼들이 비바람과 폭우에 의한 피해를 막기 위한 대책을 철저히 세워 사소한 비정상적인 현상도 절대로 나타나지 않도록 하려고 합니다.

② 당조직들에서 위대한 장군님의 사상과 업적을 옹호고수하고 빛내어나가기 위한 사업을 신속있게 진행하도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 일꾼들과 당원들과 근로자들속에 위대한 장군님께서 우리 당의 강화발전에 쌓아올리신 불멸의 혁명업적을 깊이 체득시키기 위한 건부계별당과교양과 대중교양을 집중적으로 벌리며

조선혁명박물관을 비롯한 혁명박물관들과 혁명사적관, 혁명사적교양실, 연혁소개실들을 더 잘 꾸리고 그를 통한 교양사업을 신속있게 진행하도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 자기 부문, 자기 단위에 주신 위대한 장군님의 유훈집행정형을 건별로 따져보고 집행하지 못하였거나 형식적으로 집행한 문제들을 빠짐없이 찾아 구체적인 집행대책을 세우며 집행정형을 정상적으로 엄격히 총괄하면서 강하게 내밀어 무조건 끝까지 관철하도록 하려고 합니다.

위대한 장군님의 영도업적이 깃들어있는 단위들을 전반적으로 료해하고 일꾼대렬을 당에 충실하고 실력있는 대상들로 잘 꾸려주며 현지지도과업만족을 위한 사업과 면모를 일신시키기 위한 사업을 적극 도와주어 모든 면에서 앞장서나가도록 하려고 합니다.

③ 당조직들에서 위대한 장군님을 조선로동당 총비서로 높이 모신 20돐을 맞으며 진행하는 정치행사들을 성과적으로 보장하기 위한 조직사업과 장악지도사업을 짜고들어 사소한 편향도 나타나지 않도록 하려고 합니다.

특히 일꾼들과 당원들과 근로자들이 위대한 장군님을 조선로동당 총비서로 높이 모신 20돐을 맞으며 진행하는 경축대회의 높은 정치적자각을 가지고 빠짐없이 성실히 참가하도록 하려고 합니다.

3. 조선로동당 위원장동지의 사상과 영도를 충직하게 받들어나가도록 하려고 합니다.

① 당조직들에서 조선로동당 위원장동지의 신인선전과 안면을 배방법으로 보장하기 위한 사업을 주선으로 틀어쥐고 강하게 내밀도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 행사참가자료제출반을 책임적으로 하고 그들에 대한 교양사

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업과 장악통제를 짜고드는데 함께 행사비원을 철저히 업수하여 사소한 비정상적인 현상도 나타나지 않도록 하려고 합니다.

모든 문제를 혁명의 수뇌부결사옹위외 건지에서 여러하게 보고 작성있게 대하며 무기와 총탄, 폭발물, 화공품, 목해물보관정형과 압설비실태를 전반적으로 료해하고 현상들을 시급히 바로잡는것을 비롯하여 9월초까지 호위안전사업에 지장을 줄수 있는 인적, 물적대상들을 빠짐없이 장악하여 철저한 대책을 세우도록 하려고 합니다.

... 당조직들에서 옹현말까지 당당한 도로와 철길의 안전상태를 전반적으로 료해하고 불량개소와 위험개소들을 빠른 시일안에 모두 피지하며

② 당조직들에서 조선로동당 위원장동지의 말씀과 지시, 당의 방침을 무조건 철저히 관철하는 혁명적기풍을 세우도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 조선로동당 위원장동지께서 올해안으로 집행할데 대하여 주신 말씀과 지시, 비준과업들을 건별로 따져보고 조직사업과 장악지도사업을 짜고들어 무조건 철저히 관철하도록 하려고 합니다.

당책임일꾼들이 당의 방침관철을 위한 사업을 명적으로 틀어쥐고 드세게 내밀며 행정경제일꾼들의 사업정형을 매일 구체적으로 따져가면서 요구성을 높여 그들이 당의 방침관철에서 자기의 책임과 역할을 다해나가도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 조선로동당 위원장동지의 말씀과 지시, 당의 방침을 말로만 겹수하고 그 집행을 떠꾸는 현상, 요령주의, 보신주의, 폐배주의를 비롯한 온갖 불건전한 현상과 투쟁을 강도높이 벌려 병아단계에서 철저히 짓궂게버리도록 하려고 합니다.

③ 당조직들에서 장악보고사업을 더욱 강화하도록 하려고 합니다.

... ① 당조직들에서 민심을 제때에 정확히 파악하고 계기되는 문제들을 책임적으로 풀어주어 평범한 대중이 당을 진심으로 믿고 따르도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 모든 사업을 민심에 맞게 조직진행하고 인민들이 무엇을 좋아하고 미워하며 무엇을 싫어하는가를 제때에 장악하여 대책을 세우며 민심을 의민하거나 흐리게 하는 현상들과의 투쟁을 강화해 벌리도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 모든 일꾼들이 위대한 수령님과 위대한 장군님, 조선로동당 위원장동지의 혁명적사업방편과 인민적사업작용을 적극 따라배워 사업과 생활에 철저히 구현해나가도록 요구성을 높이며

일꾼들속에서 나타나는 세도와 관료주의, 부정부패행위의 자그마한 현상도

절대로 통과하지 말고 강한 투쟁을 벌려 철저히 극복해나가도록 하려고 합니다.

4. 올해 전무투표수행을 위한 투쟁에 당사업의 화력을 집중하도록 하려고 합니다.

① 당조직들에서 일꾼들에 대한 교양사업과 장악통제를 강화하여 밀려진 책임과 본분을 다해나가도록 하려고 합니다.

모든 일꾼들이 풀끓는 전투장들에 내려가 대중과 호흡을 같이하면서 그들의 정신력을 적극 불리인력시켜 새로운 기적과 혁신을 끊임없이 창조해나가도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 조성된 정세에 겁을 먹고 우는 소리를 하면서 조건타발만 하거나 앉아공개는 폐배주의자, 요령주의자들과의 투쟁을 강도높이 벌려 철저히 극복해나가도록 하려고 합니다.

② 당조직들에서 자강력제일주의의 기풍을 높이 들고 생산적양양의 불길은 세차게 일으켜나가도록 하려고 합니다.


당조직들에서 일꾼들과 당원들과 근로자들의 정신력을 적극 발동하여 일터 마다에서 연속공격, 계속혁신, 계속전진의 불길을 세차게 일으켜나감으로써 미제를 비롯한 적대세력들에게 조선로동당 위원장동지의 영도따라 힘차게 나아가는 우리의 전진을 멈춰세울수도, 지연시키수도 없다는것을 똑똑히 보여 주도록 하려고 합니다.

... ① 경공업부문 당조직들에서 차력정쟁안이 살결이라는 확고한 관점을 가지고 예비와 가능성을 남김없이 동원하며 결약투쟁을 힘있게 벌리고 과학기술의 위력을 최대한 발양시켜 인민소비품생산에서 혁신을 일으키도록 하려고 합니다.


... ② 당조직들에서 삼지연강자구생산공장, 고압-단층철길메기공장건설과 평양무조건지공공장개건현대화를 비롯하여 올해 완공하게 되어있는 주요건설대상에 력량과 수단을 집중하여 무조건 끝내도록 하려고 합니다.

...


Appendix I-B-13




Appendix I-B-14




Appendix I-B-15




Appendix I-B-16



Appendix I-B-16(2)



Appendix I-B-17



Appendix I-B-17(2)

하기 위한 사업을 모든 사업의 첫자리에 놓고 조직전개해나카도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 중요행사참가자들에 대한 선발과 교양, 행사조직사업을 빈틈 없이 짜고들고 행사비밀과 행사규율을 엄격히 지키도록 하며 행사장들과 행사 구역들을 정상적으로 료해하고 철저한 대책을 세우도록 하려고 합니다.

특히 당조직들에서 위대한 수령님께서 조선인민혁명군을 정규적혁명무력으로 강화발전시켜주신 70돛경축 열병식을 비롯하여 2월 8일을 맞으며 진행하는 중요정치행사들에 대한 보장사업을 짜고들어 진행하도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 수도의 교통질서와 무기, 총탄, 폭발물, 압설비, 독해물들의 보관, 취급 및 리용질서를 엄격히 세우고, 담당한 도로와 철길구간의 불량개소와 위험개소들을 제때에 찾아 회치하기 위한 사업을 짜고들어 도로와 철길의 안전성을 철저히 보장하도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 조선로동당 위원장동지를 자기 단위에 언제든지 안전하게 모시고 기쁨을 드릴수 있게 준비하기 위한 사업을 책임적으로 조직진행하도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 조선로동당 위원장동지의 절대적인 권위를 훼손시키거나 그에 도전하는 자그마한 요소도 절대로 용화묵과하지 말고 맹아단계에서 짓밟개버리도록 하려고 합니다.

일군들이 자기를 특수화하고 개별적간부들을 우상화하거나 악부아침하면서 병목적으로 추종하는 현상들에 대하여 특별히 각성을 높이고 되개 문제를 제워 철저히 극복하도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 제기되는 모든 문제들을 제때에 말끔히 장악하여 조선로동당 위원장동지께 보고드리고 결론을 받아 집행하는 엄격한 직보체계, 지휘체계를 세우며 일군들속에서 책임과 비판이 두려워 중요한 문제를 당에 보고하지 않거나 사실과 맞지 않게 보고하는 현상이 절대로 나타나지 않도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 조선로동당 위원장동지의 말씀과 바준과업, 당의 로선과 정책을 결사관철하는데 중점을 두고 당생활조직과 차도를 짜고들며 당의 사상과 로선, 정책에 대하여 반신반의하거나 자기식으로 해석하면서 탄소피를 하고 흥정하는 현상을 비롯하여 온갖 부정적인 현상들과의 투쟁을 강도높이 벌리도록 하려고 합니다.

② 당내부사업에 힘을 넣어 우리 혁명의 천하지대본인 당과 혁명대오의 일심단결을 바탕으로 강화하도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 조선로동당 위원장동지께서 조선로동당 제9차 조직일군대회 참가자들에게 보내주신 역사적서한과 제1차 전당초급당위원장대회에서 하신

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력사적인 결론, 조선로동당 제5차 1차회의 위원장대회에서 하산력차적인 언설에 제시된 강령적 과업을 비롯하여 당대부사업과 관련하여 주신 말씀과 비준과업들을 일관성있게 들어주고 철저히 관철하도록 하려고 합니다. 2. 당조직들에서 조선로동당 위원장동지에 대한 충실성과 양민에 대한 친신성, 높은 실력을 지니고 당의 의도대로 일을 제낄 줄 알며 문중속에서 산망이 있는 대상들을 간부로 선발배치하도록 하려고 합니다. 3. 당조직들에서 간부개별담화교양과 충실정정도로 해연구 및 행정사업을 조선로동당 위원장동지 밖에는 그 누구도 모른다는 확고한 신념을 지니고 조선로동당 위원장동지의 사상과 명도를 충직하게 받들어 나가도록 하는데 중점을 두고 진행하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 조선로동당 위원장동지에 대한 절대적인 신뢰심을 지니고 조선로동당 위원장동지를 결사옹위하며 당의 로선과 정책관철에서 핵심적, 선봉적 역할을 하고 있는 대상들을 엄선하여 당에 받아들여도록 하려고 합니다. 2. 당조직들에서 당원중의 상품화, 당장성사업의 상업화를 철저히 없애고 입당문제를 가차고 통간질을 하는 현상과의 투쟁을 드세게 벌려도록 하려고 합니다.

3. 당조직들에서 미소속당원들과 당생활유리자들을 빠짐없이 찾아 대적하며 당원의 자격을 상실한 대상들을 제때에 제거하기 위한 사업을 짜고들어 당대렬의 순결성을 철저히 보장하도록 하려고 합니다. 4. 당조직들에서 간부들과 당원들의 당조직생활에 대한 지도를 전담을 조직사상적으로 더욱 굳게 단결시키고 혁명적당풍을 철저히 확립하는데로 지향시키도록 하려고 합니다.

5. 당생활에서 이 중규를 철저히 허용하지 않으며 일군들의 당생활에 대한 요구성을 부단히 높여 그들이 평당원의 자세에서 당생활에 정실히 참가하고 당조직의 교양과 통제속에서 긴장하게 일해나가도록 하려고 합니다. 6. 당조직들에서 모든 당세포를 충성의 세포, 당정책관철의 전위대로 만들기 위한 사업을 힘있게 벌려 당조직들의 전투적기능과 역할을 높이고 사회주의 강국건설을 다그쳐나가는데 적극 이바지하도록 하려고 합니다.

7. 당조직들에서 당세포와 관료주의를 비롯한 낡은 사업방법과 작풍을 뿌리베는데 모를 박고 혁명적당풍을 확립하기 위한 투쟁을 강도높이 벌려 당과 인민 대중과의 혈연적연계를 반석같이 다져나가도록 하려고 합니다.

8. 당조직들에서 광명성질을 맞으며 핵심군중들을 만나 교양하고 제기되는 문제들을 책임적으로 풀어주어 그들이 조선로동당 위원장동지의 명도를 받드는데서 핵심적역할을 하도록 하며 철직, 해임, 강직된 대상들 가운데서 자기 과오를 진심으로 뉘우치고 고치기 위하여 애쓰고 있는 대상들을 풀어주는

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자업을 책임적으로 진행하도록 하려고 합니다. ② 당조직들에서 혁명학원과 육아원, 애육원, 초등학교, 중등학교, 양로원의 실태를 정상적으로 료해하고 결린 문제들을 착취 풀어주도록 하려고 합니다. 당조직들에서 인민들의 요구와 이익을 기준으로 사업을 철저히 전개하며 인민들속에 깊이 들어가 교락을 같이 하면서 인민들의 마음속고층화 생활상애 로를 풀어주는데 깊은 관심을 돌려도록 하려고 합니다. ③ 당조직들에서 전사회적으로 도덕기강을 바로세우고 사회주의생활양식을 확립하며 불순출판선전물을 몰래 보거나 류포시키는 행위, 미진행위를 비롯한 온갖 비사회주의적현상을 뿌리뽑기 위한 투쟁을 끝장을 볼 때까지 강도높히 벌리도록 하려고 합니다.

③ 차위적국방력을 더욱 튼튼히 다져나가도록 하려고 합니다. 당조직들에서 나라의 국방력강화를 위한 당중앙군사위원회 위원장 명령, 국무위원회 위원장 명령, 최고사령관 명령, 당중앙군사위원회 명령을 비롯하여 자기 부문, 자개 단위앞에 제시된 명령, 지시집행정형을 건별로 따져보고 미진된 문제들을 철저히 집행하도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 위대한 수령님께서 조선인민혁명군을 정규적혁명무력으로 강화발전시켜주시는 70돐을 맞으며 진행하는 열병식에 군공되는 장비와 설비, 물자, 자재들을 최우선 보장하며 인민군대의 싸움준비와 국방공업부문에 필요한 물자들을 체계에 무조건 생산보장하도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 노동적위군과 붉은청년군위대 대원들앞 주계판을 바로카지고 미체와 피퇴들의 침략책동을 단매에 짓부셔버릴수 있게 전류정치훈련을 더욱 강화하도록 하려고 합니다.


당조직들에서 청년들이 조국보위를 최대의 애국, 국사중의 제일국사로 여기고 인민군대입태를 열렬히 환영하도록 하여 온 나라에 조국보위열풍이 차넘치게 하려고 합니다.

④ 당조직들에서 사회주의강국건설의 모든 전선에서 새로운 승리를 쟁취 하기 위한 혁명적인 총공세를 합차게 벌리도록 하려고 합니다.


당조직들에서 원산갈마해안관광지구건설과 삼지연분구라카, 단천발전소 건설, 황해남도물길 2단계공사를 비롯한 중요대상건설을 힘있게 타나치며 살림 집건설에 계속 큰 힘을 병도록 하려고 합니다.

당조직들에서 산림복구전투성파를 더욱 확대하면서 이미 조성된 산림에

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으로 교양과 통제를 근기있게 벌려나가도록 하려고 합니다.

- 모든 교육기관들에서 학생들이 우리의 표준어,문화어를 잘 알고 사용하게 하기 위한 교육교양사업을 강화하도록 하려고 합니다.
- 방송과 출판물들에서 사람들이 언어생활을 고상하고 문명하게 할데 대한 내용으로 여러가지 형식의 편집물들을 내보내도록 하려고 합니다.

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등록: 61 2018.1.28.

경애하는 최고령도자 김정은동지의 2018년 1월 26일 비준방침
괴뢰노래가사가 나오는 놀이감손전화기,손목시계와 성조기를 형상한
연이 밀매되고있는 자료와 대책보고


(중앙109련합지휘부)

로해한데 의하면 놀이감손전화기와 손목시계에는 각각 8개의 그림표식단
추가 있는데 단추들을 누르면 괴뢰노래가사인 《오빠 강남스타일》이라는
말과 남녀간의 사랑을 반영한 중국노래를 포함하여 17곡의 외국음악이 나오며
연은 삼각모양이고 원중이가 성조기를 형상한 모자를 쓰고있는 그림이 그려져
있습니다.


대책적의견:

- 당 및 근로단체조직들 에서 이색적인 놀이감들을 밀수밀매하는 자들에
대하여서는 우리 내부에 부르조아 반동문화를 끌어들이는 행위를 한것으로
보고 색출하여 엄하게 처벌하도록 하려고 합니다.

Appendix I-B-20



Appendix I-B-21



Appendix I-C "Dialogue Commentary Material" Published by the Central Committee of the WPK (May 2013)

비밀

해설담화자료

경애하는 김정은원수님의 숭고한 인민사랑의
정치를 받들어 혁명대오의 일심단결을 반석
같이 다지며 강성국가건설을 다그쳐나가자

경애하는 김정은원수님께서 이번엔 우리 당을 믿고 자기들의 범죄사실을 솔직하게 자수, 자백한 사람들의 죄과를 백지화할데 대한 크나큰 믿음과 온정을 베풀어주시었다.

이것은 이 세상 그 누구도 따를수 없는 한없이 넓은 도량과 포용력을 지니신 인덕의 최고화신 우리의 경애하는 원수님께서만이 내리실수 있는 대용단이며 우리 당과 혁명발전에서 사변적의의를 가지는 중대조치이다.

경애하는 김정은동지께서는 다음과 같이 말씀하시었다.

《우리 당의 정치는 인덕정치, 광복정치입니다. 우리 당의 인덕정치, 광복정치는 어머니가 자식들을 돌보듯이 인민들을 차별없이 대해주고 따뜻이 품어주는 사랑과 믿음의 정치이며 인민들을 당의 두리에 한마음한뜻으로 뭉쳐세우는 진정한 동지적단결, 혁명적단결의 정치입니다.》

지금 경애하는 원수님께서 취해주신 이번 중대조치에 대한 일군들과 인민들의 반향이 대단하다.

우리는 천만자식모두를 한몸에 안아 믿어주고 내세워주고 이끌어주시는 경애하는 원수님의 인민사랑의 정치를 충직하게 받들어 언제 어디서나 오직 우리 당만을 끝까지 믿고 끝까지 따르며 순결한 충정을 다 바치나가야 한다.

—무엇보다도 모든 일군들과 근로자들은 경애하는 원수님의 숭고한 인민사랑을 심장에 깊이 새겨야 한다.

돌이켜보면 장장 한세기에 걸치는 우리 혁명의 영광스러운 투쟁역사에는 백두산철새위인들의 인민에 대한 뜨거운 사랑과 믿음의 감동깊은 일화들이 수없이 새겨져있다.

지난 항일혁명투쟁시기 《민생단》문서보따리를 몰래뛰버린 이야기, 진부혈남자가족들이 운명을 지켜주고 보살펴준 이야기, 《치안대》원우자의 투명을 쓰고 오랜 세월 가슴앓이를 하던 한개 지역주민들의 억울한 힘을 맘껏 가쳐주고 애국렬사가족으로 새 삶을 안겨준 이야기, 준엄했던 지난 고난의 행군시기 원부들의 모태로 잘못 처리될뻔 했던 충신들의 정치적생명을 지켜주고 빛내어준 이

아기...

실로 위대한 대원수님들의 인민에 대한 뜨거운 사랑과 믿음의 이야기를 다 하자면 정말 끝이 없다.

위대한 수령님과 어버이장군님의 이렇듯 고결한 인민사랑의 력사는 오늘 경애하는 원수님에 의하여 이 땅우에 변함없이, 더욱 뜨겁게 흐르고있다.

이 땅에 태들 물은 사람이라면 그가 누구이건 사랑과 믿음의 한꿈에 안아 운명도 미래도 다 맡아 지켜주고 보살펴주시는분이 바로 경애하는 김정은원수님 이시다.

지금 우리 인민과 후대들을 위해 불철주야의 로고와 심혈을 기울이시는 경애하는 원수님의 전설같은 사랑과 믿음에 대한 이야기는 가정과 일터는 물론 온 나라 그 어디에서나 그칠줄 모르고 원수님을 그리며 따르는 우리 인민의 다 함없는 신뢰와 경모의 정은 하늘땅에 차고넘치고있다.

사실 이번 중대조치의 대상들은 그 무슨 루명을 쓰거나 억울함을 당해서 가슴앓이를 하던 사람들이 아니다.

명백히 당과 혁명, 조국과 인민앞에 씻을수 없는 대역죄를 지었고 또 본인 들자체가 자기들의 범죄사실을 법앞에 자백하고 그 어떤 법적처벌도 다 받겠다고 자인한 사람들이다.

한마디로 마땅히 법적으로 엄중히 처리되어야 할 죄인들이었다.

그런데 당에서는 나라와 인민앞에 씻을수 없는 대역죄를 짓고 국형을 언도 받았던 중죄인에게 그 누구도 상상조차 할수 없었던 재생의 삶을 안겨준데 이어 이번에 또다시 자기들의 범죄사실을 솔직하게 자수, 자백한 많은 사람들의 죄과를 백지화하도록 하는 특대조치를 취했다.

이것은 결코 간단한 문제가 아니다.

지구상에 국가가 생겨난 때로부터 오늘까지 죄수들에게 베푸는 가장 큰 특혜는 형기를 감형시켜주는 대사를 실시하는것이다.

그것도 몇년만에 한번이나 있을가말가한 일로 되어있다.

하지만 우리 당과 국가에서는 이번에 조국과 인민앞에 씻을수 없는 죄를 지은 사람들에게 력사상 그 류례를 찾아볼수 없는 최대의 특혜를 안겨주었다.

지금 우리 나라에 조성된 정세는 매우 침예하다.

미제와 괴뢰들의 침략적인 핵전쟁도발광풍이 극도에 달하여 우리 나라는 전시상태에 놓여있다.

전시에는 그것이 크든작든 모든 위법행위들이 전시법에 따라 즉석에서 단호하게 처리된다.

이런 침예한 정세속에서 적들의 책동에 동조한 엄중한 범죄행위들을 관대히 용서해줄뿐아니라 그것을 아예 백지화한다는것은 사실 보통의 상식으로서는 도저히 엄두도 낼수 없는 심각한 정치적문제이다.

전시법대로 한다면 일백번 처형되고도 남았을 죄행들이다.
그래서 해당 법기관에서도 이런 범죄행위에는 자수가 통하지 않는다고 하면서 법대로 처리하려고 했었다.
그러나 당에서는 그들이 저지른 99%의 죄행보다도 자기들의 범죄사실을 솔직하게 자수, 자백한 그 1%의 탐심을 더 중히 여기고 그들의 죄과를 모두 백지화해주었다.
백지화해주었을뿐 아니라 해당 당조직들에서 그들을 따돌리거나 차별하지 말고 따듯이 대해주면서 꾸준히 교양하고 이끌어주며 가정생활까지도 책임지고 안정시키도록 그 누구도 상상하지 못한 크나큰 배려를 돌려주었다.
이것은 이 세상 그 어디에도, 그 어느 력사의 갈피에도 있어본적이 없는 인민사랑, 인민중시의 최고극치이며 인민에 대한 사랑과 믿음의 최고화신인 경애하는 김정은원수님을 높이 모신 사회주의 내 나라, 내 조국에서만 펼쳐질수 있는 위대한 현실이다.
이번에 경애하는 원수님께서 안겨주신 크나큰 사랑과 믿음은 결코 자기들의 범죄사실을 솔직하게 자수, 자백한 사람들에게만 한한것이 아니다.
우리 인민모두가 받아안은 최상최대의 믿음이며 최고의 특전이다.
바로 이처럼 위대한 아버지의 환풍속에 이 나라의 천만사식이 안겨살고있고 이런 숭고한 인민사랑의 대화원속에서 우리모두가 자주적인간의 참된 삶과 행복을 마음껏 누리고있다.
하기에 오늘 우리 인민들은 누구나 우리 운명, 우리 행복 원수님께 달려있기에 천만사식의 소원은 하나 원수님의 안녕뿐이라고 목메여 노래하고있는것이다.
우리는 이것을 눈물이나 말로써가 아니라 자신들의 심장에 참된 삶의 쉼터로 깊이 새겨야 한다.
-다음으로 모든 일군들과 근로자들이 경애하는 원수님의 대해같은 믿음과 은덕에 실천행동으로 보답해나가야 한다.
경애하는 원수님의 인민에 대한 절대적이고 무한대한 사랑과 믿음을 받아안으며 자수자들 누구나가 걱정예 넘쳐 한결같이 토로한것이 있다.
환풍이 그대로 뼈가 부서지고 가루가 된다 해도 경애하는 원수님을 따라 자신의 모든것을 짊그리 바치나가겠다는것이다.
이것은 자수, 자백한 사람들의 맹세만이 아니다.
우리모두의 맹세이고 결심이다.
경애하는 원수님앞에, 우리 당앞에 다진 이 맹세, 이 결의를 어떻게 지켜가는가 하는것은 오직 실천행동만이 증명해준다.
오늘 당에서는 온 나라 천만군민이 강성국가건설을 위한 대고조진군길에서 위훈의 창조자, 시대의 영웅이 될것을 요구하고있다.

우리의 모든 실천행동은 바로 당의 의도대로 강성국가건설을 앞당기는 보람찬 투쟁에 한가지라도 실질적인 보탬을 주는것으로 되어야 한다.

위훈의 창조자, 시대의 영웅은 특별히 정해진 사람이 아니며 기적과 혁신을 일으킬수 있는 일이 따로 있는것도 아니다.

어디서 무슨 일을 하든지 자기가 일하고있는 일터, 자기가 사는 고향마을을 귀중히 여기고 거기서 자기가 설자리, 자기가 해야 할 일감을 찾고 순결한 량심과 의리를 다 바쳐가는 사람이 바로 오늘 우리 당이 내세우는 진정한 애국자들이다.

지금 경애하는 원수님의 크나큰 믿음과 사랑을 심장에 새기고 일터마다에서 기적과 혁신을 일으키고있는 사람들이 많다.

그가운데는 이번에 당앞에 지난 시기의 죄를 자수, 자백한 사람들은 물론 지난 기간 하루하루 눈치나 보면서 제살궁리만 하던 사람들도 적지 않다.

※ 자기 단위의 해당한 실례를 결부할것.

사람이 믿음을 저버리면 배신자가 되고 은혜를 잊으면 배은망덕한 인간이 되고만다.

그런 인간쓰레기가 되지 말아야 한다.

우리는 어디서 무슨 일을 하든지 경애하는 원수님께서 안겨주신 믿음과 은혜를 영원히 가슴에 새기고 그에 천만분의 하나라도 보답하기 위해 심장을 끓이고 자기 말은 초소에서 생산적양양을 일으켜나가야 한다.

모든 일군들과 근로자들은 경애하는 원수님께서 안겨주신 크나큰 믿음을 억척불변의 신념으로 새기고 인생의 새 출발을 한다는 립장에서 사업과 생활의 순간순간, 하루하루를 충정과 보답으로 이어나가야 할것이다.

조선로동당 중앙위원회

주체102(2013)년 5월

Appendix II

The Ten Principles for the Establishment of the Monolithic Leadership System

(June 19, 2013)¹

1. Dedicate your life to the struggle to imbue the whole society with the Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.

Imbuing the whole society with the Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism is considered the highest doctrine of our Party and the ultimate goal behind the task of establishing our Party's monolithic leadership system.

- 1.1. The great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism must be firmly upheld as the eternal guiding ideology of our Party and revolution.
- 1.2. Our Party, State and military must be strengthened and advanced eternally as the Party, State and military of the Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, which have been established by the great Comrade Kim Il Sung, and led by Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.
- 1.3. Dedicate your life to the struggle to safeguard and solidify our superior socialist system, established by the great Comrade Kim Il Sung and illuminated by the Suryong and the General.
- 1.4. Actively struggle to uphold the principles of the Juche ideology and self-reliance for the unification of our fatherland, the nationwide revolutionary victory, and for the completion of the Juche Revolution.
- 1.5. Fight to the end for the global triumph of Juche ideology.

2. Respect and revere the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il highly as the eternal Suryong of our Party and the people, and the sun of the Juche ideology.

Reverently upholding the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il as the eternal Suryong of our Party and the people, and the sun of the Juche ideology, is the noblest duty for the descendants of the Suryong, soldiers of the General, and their disciples. Boundless prosperity in Kim Il Sung's nation and Kim Jong Il's Korea can be found through highly upholding the great Suryong and the General.

- 2.1. The great Comrade Kim Il Sung must be highly revered as the eternal Suryong of our revolution and the eternal president of the Republic.
- 2.2. The great Comrade Kim Jong Il must be highly revered as the eternal general secretary of the

1. Translated by Kelly Hur and NK Watch. This is not an official translation of North Korea.

Workers' Party of Korea and as the eternal chairman of the National Defence Commission.

- 2.3. The Kumsusan Palace of the Sun, where the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il live eternally, must be splendidly arranged and steadfastly guarded as the sacred site of the eternal sun.
- 2.4. Uphold the slogan of belief that the "great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il are with us forever," and live and struggle with the cherished image of the Suryong and the General in our hearts.
- 2.5. Firmly defend and forever glorify the immortal revolutionary achievements of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.

3. Absolutize and steadfastly defend the authority of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and the Party.

Absolutizing and steadfastly defending the authority of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il and the Party is the supreme demand of our revolution and the revolutionary volition of our military and the people.

- 3.1. Hold a firm perspective and position that there is no one outside of our Party and the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il.
- 3.2. Firmly defend and widely propagate the authority of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and the Party, internally and externally.
- 3.3. Do not tolerate even minor elements that undermine the authority of the great Comrade Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and the Party. Defend the authority of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and the Party from attacks and criticism by all class enemies and consider it as an emergency situation and remain vigilant and uncompromising in the struggle.
- 3.4. Respectfully preserve and thoroughly protect the portraits, plaster and bronze statues, portrait badges, videos and artworks of the legendary heroes of the Mt. Paektu, and the field guidance teaching and message boards, the Towers of Immortality and the basic slogans of the Party.
- 3.5. Respectfully arrange and manage and thoroughly protect the sites of revolutionary battle, revolutionary history, revolutionary monuments and landmarks, revolution museums, museums of revolutionary activities, and the Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism Institutes imbued with the great revolutionary exploits and struggles of the legendary heroes of the Mt. Paektu.
- 3.6. Properly manage the units that embody the leadership achievements of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and the Party and pursue activities that glorify the leadership achievements.

4. Arm with the revolutionary ideology of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and the Party lines and policies that embody this ideology.

Thoroughly arming oneself with the revolutionary ideology of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, and the Party lines and policies is the most crucial requirement to become true adherents of Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism and a precondition for the victory of the Juche

revolution and the Songun revolution.

- 4.1. Internalize the great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism in our bones and flesh, and make it an unwavering belief.
- 4.2. Embrace the teachings of the great Comrade Kim Il Sung, instructions of the Comrade Kim Jong Il, and the Party lines and policies as the guiding principles of our endeavors and daily life and accept it as a creed, and apply them in our thoughts and actions, following these demands wherever and whenever.
- 4.3. Systematically and fully master the works of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il as well as the Party documents and the revolutionary history of the legendary heroes of Mt. Paektu.
- 4.4. Actively participate in collective learning activities such as study sessions and lectures to arm oneself with the great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism without any negligence. Integrate learning as a habitual part of daily life and actively oppose any elements that may hinder or disregard learning.
- 4.5. Establish a thorough system for the transmission and infiltration of Party documents, deliver and infiltrate Party's ideology, lines and policies in a timely and accurate manner, and prevent any distortions or personal interpretations in the transmission.
- 4.6. Duly and respectfully quote the teachings of the Suryong, the instructions of the General and Party documents as the basis for all contents involving reports, discussions, lectures or publications and avoid speaking or writing in contradiction to them.
- 4.7. Clearly distinguish between the Party's policies and directions and individual instructions of the officials. When it comes to individual instructions, assess if individual official's instructions align with the Party's policies and directions and handle with principles. The statements of individual officials should not be considered as a "conclusion" or "direction" and should not be systematically delivered or collectively discussed.
- 4.8. Must not tolerate any anti-Party acts that undermine or oppose our Party's revolutionary ideology, lines, and policies with no compromise or conciliation. We must vigorously oppose against bourgeois ideology, toadyism, and counter-revolutionary ideological trends and firmly adhere to the truth and purity of the Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism.

5. Strictly adhere to the principles of unconditional obedience in carrying out the behests of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, as well as the Party's lines and policies.

Strictly adhering to the behests of the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, as well as the Party's lines and policies is the fundamental requirement of loyalty to the Party and the Suryong, and the decisive condition for the victorious construction of a powerful socialist state.

- 5.1. The behests of the great Suryong and the General, as well as the Party's lines, guidelines and directions, must be regarded as the Party's laws and the supreme order that must be strictly and unconditionally adhered to without any excuses or reasons, but with endless loyalty and sacrifice.
- 5.2. Must sufficiently express emergent opinions to adhere to the behests of the great Suryong and the General, the Party's lines, policies, and directions and promptly and accurately execute issues resolved by the Party without any hesitation or delay.

- 5.3. Promptly accept and establish implementation measures for the Party's lines, policies, and directions and plan organizational and political activities while maintaining a spirit of unwavering commitment, and promptly execute and report actions.
- 5.4. Continuously deepen the standard implementation practice of the Party's lines, policies and directions to systemize, criticize and reannounce, without wavering to the end.
- 5.5. Fiercely struggle against all unhealthy behaviors, such as ostensibly accepting the Party's policies and guidelines and neglecting their implementation, displaying irresponsible and unaccountable attitudes, feigned compliance, self-protectionism and defeatism.

6. Strengthen the ideological and willful unity of the Party and revolutionary solidarity of the entire Party centered around the Supreme Leader in every way.

The unwavering steel-like unity, centered around the Supreme Leader, is the lifeblood of the Party, the source of invincible power, and a solid guarantee for revolutionary victory.

- 6.1. Safeguard and further strengthen the ideological and willful unity of the Party and revolutionary solidarity of the entire Party, centered around the Supreme Leader.
- 6.2. Elevate revolutionary camaraderie based on loyalty to the Party and the Suryong, and make the whole society into one big family that is one with the Supreme Leader's ideology, intentions, and affections.
- 6.3. Evaluate and treat all people based on their degree of loyalty to the Party and the Suryong as the criterion, and launch a sharp struggle against those who are disloyal to the Party, deviate from the monolithic leadership system, regardless of their position or merits.
- 6.4. Strictly reject illusions, flattery, and idolization of individual officials, and thoroughly eliminate the phenomenon of being suppressed by their authority or blindly following their actions in an unprincipled manner.
- 6.5. Firmly oppose and launch a struggle against any anti-Party elements that undermine the Party's unity, such as factionalism, regionalism, and nepotism, as well other forms of divergence and feigned obedience.

7. Learn from the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il to master noble moral and ethical qualities, revolutionary work methods, and a people-oriented work style.

Following the profound ideological and moral qualities, revolutionary work methods, and people-oriented work style demonstrated by the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il is a sacred duty for all officials, party members, and workers and the prerequisite for living and working in the way of the Suryong and the General.

- 7.1. Place utmost priority to the revolution of the Party and the interests of the fatherland and the people and dedicate everything to this struggle equipped with a high sense of the party, revolution, and the people.
- 7.2. Strictly adhere to the principles of the party, class, and socialism to fight fiercely with unwavering

faith and enthusiasm on the single path of Juche revolution.

- 7.3. Embody the attitude befitting the masters of revolution, fully demonstrating the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance and arduous struggle, rejecting decrepitude and stagnation, complacency and laxity, passivity and conservatism, and living a combative life filled with great determination and passion, boldly expanding and advancing in all endeavors.
- 7.4. Demonstrate a high level of innovation in all your work with a creative and proactive attitude and lead by example, embodying the revolutionary spirit of taking the initiative, and forge a path in the forefront of difficult and challenging tasks.
- 7.5. Uphold the people-centered mindset of our Suryong and the General, and adhere to the principle of prioritizing the welfare of the people above all else and in all matters and sharing their joys and sorrows.
- 7.6. Always be humble and upright, and display high moral standards in professional and personal life.
- 7.7. Thoroughly reject outdated methods and styles such as authority, bureaucracy, subjectivism, formalism, and self-centeredness.

8. Cherish the political life bestowed upon us by the Party and the Suryong, and repay the Party's trust and consideration with a high sense of political awareness and achievements in our work.

It is the greatest honor for revolutionary warriors to possess the political life bestowed upon by the Party and the Suryong. The true path lies in repaying the trust and consideration of the Party and the Suryong with a high sense of political awareness and achievements in our work that bring glory to our noble political life.

- 8.1. Consider our political life as our primary life, unwavering in our political beliefs and revolutionary spirit until our last moments and dedicate our body and mind to bring glory to our political life.
- 8.2. Consciously participate in political organizational life with a strong sense of organization and timely carry out decisions and delegated tasks, and demonstrate a spirit of collectivism.
- 8.3. Actively engage in political organizational life criticism sessions, critically examine one's own work and life from a high political and ideological standpoint, engage in ideological struggles through criticisms, and constantly refine and transform oneself through these struggles.
- 8.4. Cherish the Kim Jong Il patriotism, and devote oneself to revolutionary tasks, and strive for revolutionization through revolutionary practice and process.
- 8.5. Demonstrate revolutionary enthusiasm, continuously raise the level of competency in political theory and practical skills, and consistently excel in fulfilling the revolutionary missions entrusted by the party to repay the party's political trust that bestowed our most noble political life.

9. Establish a strong organizational discipline so that the entire Party, the entire people, and the entire military will operate uniformly under the monolithic leadership of the Party.

Establishing a strong organizational discipline under the monolithic leadership of the Party is the essential requirement to strengthen the party's monolithic leadership system and a decisive guarantee for the victory of the Juche revolution and the Songun revolution.

- 9.1. Establish a strict system in which the entire Party, State and military move in unison under the Party's monolithic leadership to execute the revolution and construction based on the guiding principles of the great Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism as the sole and exclusive leadership guideline.
- 9.2. All activities must be organized and implemented under the monolithic leadership of the Party, and establish a strong revolutionary order and rules that handle policy related issues solely based on the Central Party's decisions.
- 9.3. Firmly secure the Party's leadership on revolutionary struggles and construction projects in all sectors and units. All institutions and officials must strictly adhere to the Party's guidance and organize and implement all activities accordingly.
- 9.4. The decisions and directives of the Party and the State must be accurately implemented to realize the intentions of the Central Party. We must strongly combat any misinterpretation, alteration, or slowdown in the execution process and strictly adhere to the laws and regulations of the State.
- 9.5. Individual officials should not convene organizational meetings of the Party, government, or labor organizations at their own discretion, nor should they make conclusions that do not align with the Party's intentions. They should not arbitrarily detach or create slogans of the Party or introduce non-organizational activities related to social movements without organizational approval.
- 9.6. Oppose and actively struggle against all unprincipled actions by individual officials, such as abuse of authority or misuse of power.
- 9.7. Cadres should be evaluated and selected based on their loyalty and competence to the Party, and their placement should be determined by this basic yardstick. We must vigorously fight and thoroughly observe the party principles and establish the order of the cadre affair and should not handle issues related to cadres based on bribery or nepotistic relationships such as relatives, friends, teachers, students, alumni, or regional bonds and must not condone acts of arbitrarily hiring, dismissing, or punishing cadres.
- 9.8. We must strictly safeguard the party, state, and military secrets and fiercely combat any acts that leak or divulge confidential information.
- 9.9. Any non-organizational and unregulated practices that deviate from the Party's monolithic leadership system should be reported to the relevant party organizations at all levels, regardless of their significance, in a timely manner until they reach the Central Committee of the Party.

10. The great revolutionary accomplishments of the Juche revolution and the Songun revolution pioneered by the great Comrade Kim Il Sung and led by the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il must be succeeded and completed by hereditary succession until the end.

Inheriting and completing the revolutionary tasks of the Juche revolution and the Songun revolution, pioneered by the great Comrade Kim Il Sung and led by the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il must be succeeded and completed by hereditary succession until the end, which is an unwavering determination of our Party and a noble duty of all officials, party members, and workers.

- 10.1. Continuously deepen the efforts to establish the monolithic leadership system of the Party from

generation to generation.

- 10.2. Keep our Party and the revolution alive by continuing the lineage of the Paektu blood-line, incessantly inheriting and developing the revolutionary traditions of the Juche ideology, and firmly upholding its purity.
- 10.3. Even the smallest phenomena or factors that hinder the establishment of the monolithic leadership system of the Party, must not be overlooked and a struggle must be launched resolutely against them.
- 10.4. Ensure that not only oneself but the entire family and future generations uphold our Suryong and the General as the eternal sun of the Juche ideology and remain devoted to the Party's monolithic leadership.
- 10.5. Defend the Central Party with our lives, and share our fate with the Party to the end.

All officials, party members, and workers must firmly establish the monolithic leadership system of the Party, highly revering the great Comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il as the eternal Suryong of our Party and the people. By following the Party's leadership, we should vigorously advance along the path of Juche, Songun and socialism, to complete the revolutionary tasks of the Juche revolution and the Songun revolution to the end, pioneered at Mt. Paektu.

Research Project Participant Introduction

연구 프로젝트 참여자 소개

Project Manager: Myeongchul Ahn (NK Watch Executive Director)

프로젝트 책임자: 안명철(사단법인 NK Watch 대표)

Director Myeongchul Ahn is the 'sole survivor' that can provide accurate testimony about the political prison camps (total control zones) of North Korea. He worked as a security guard for political prison camps managed by the 7th bureau of the State Security Department from 1987 to 1994. A 'perpetrator' at that time, Director Ahn quickly found himself becoming a victim. In October 1994 after being granted asylum in South Korea, his mother, younger brother, and younger sister were all forcibly disappeared by the North Korean authorities. His family was imprisoned in a political prison camp, and to this day, there is no way to check whether they are dead or alive.

After entering Korea, Director Ahn worked as a banker until 2009 during which he made continuous attempts to inform the international community about the human rights situation in North Korea. He has testified about the North Korean human rights situation to the UK parliament (1996, 2007), the German parliament (1997), the US congress (1999), Japan's parliament (2013), and the UN Commission of Inquiry hearing (2013). Director Ahn has served as the executive director of NK Watch from December 2012 to this day. He possesses unrivaled information about total control zones and is continuously collecting further information about North Korean Human Rights through his vast network of defectors.

안명철 대표는 북한의 정치범수용소(완전통제구역)에 대해서 정확한 증언을 할 수 있는 '유일한 생존자'이다. 그는 국가안전보위부 7국이 관리하는 정치범수용소 경비대원으로 근무했다.(1987-1994년) 그는 한 때 '가해자'이기도 했으나 이제는 '피해자'가 되었다. 그가 1994년 10월 한국으로 망명한 후 그의 어머니, 남동생과 여동생은 북한 당국에 의해 강제 실종 되었다. 그의 가족은 정치범수용소에 구금되었으며 현재까지 생사를 확인할 수 없다.

안명철 대표는 한국에 입국한 후 2009년까지 은행원으로 근무했으며, 아울러 북한 인권 상황을 국제사회에 알리기 위한 노력도 지속해 왔다. 그는 영국 의회(1996년, 2007년), 독일 의회(1997년), 미국 의회(1999년), 일본 의회 (2005년), 유엔 북한인권조사위원회 청

문회(2013년)에서 북한 인권 상황들을 증언했다. 안명철 대표는 2013년 12월부터 현재까지 사단법인 NK Watch 대표직을 수행하고 있다. 그는 완전통제구역과 관련한 독보적인 정보들을 보유하고 있고, 탈북민들과의 지속적인 네트워킹을 통해 북한 인권과 관련한 정보들을 상시적으로 수집하고 있다.

Research Manager: Dr. Kwanhyung Lee (NK Watch Program Director)

이관형(사단법인 NK Watch 사무국장, 북한학 박사)

Dr. Kwanhyung Lee is an expert on North Korea who has been conducting research on North Korea and interviewing defectors since 2006. His particular field of specialization is North Korea's crimes against humanity and transnational organized crime (drug production and trafficking) as well as North Korean power mechanisms.

Dr. Lee has been working as the NK Watch program director since 2019. Before that, he was the director of the Gyeonggi-do Provincial Institute for Lifelong Learning's Civic Education Support Center from 2018 to 2019, and from 2009 to 2016, he worked as a researcher for the Korean Education Development Institute's Education Support Center for North Korean Migrant Youths. Dr. Lee was a cofounder of the non-profit Korean Analysis and Strategy Consultancy (KAS) and served as its first director. KAS was established in November 2017 as a research organization that analyzes research and information related to North Korea and conducts policy consulting on the premise of realizing liberal democratic unification specified in the Constitution of the Republic of Korea.

The following are Dr. Lee's recent publications:

"North Korea's 'Drug Business' Operation and Expansion: Focusing on the 1970s and 1980s," *Strategic Studies*, 29(1) (2022). [Korean Edition]

"The Origins of North Korea's Drug Production and Trafficking: From the Perspective of North Korea's Revolutionary Strategy toward South Korea, 1945~1959," *Journal of Korean-Japanese Military and Culture*, 33 (2021). [Korean Edition]

A Study of North Korea's Drug Problems: From the Perspective of State-Led Transnational Organized Crime (Seoul: Korea University Graduate School, Ph. D. dissertation, 2021). [Korean Edition]

Effects of International Advocacy toward Human Rights of North Korea (Seoul: NK Watch, 2020). [English Edition]

"A Study on North Korean Spies: Interviews with Former Elite Secret Agents of North Korea,"

Korean Journal of Military Art and Science, 76(1) (2020). [Korean Edition]

“North Korea’s Illegal Drug Use and Abuse: Current Situation and Solutions,” East Asian Studies, 37(1) (2018). [Korean Edition]

이관형 박사는 2006년부터 현재까지 북한 연구와 탈북민 인터뷰를 지속해 오고 있는 북한 전문가이다. 그의 세부 전문 분야는 북한의 반인도적범죄와 초국가적 조직범죄(마약 생산 및 밀매) 그리고 북한의 권력 메커니즘이다.

이관형 박사는 2019년부터 사단법인 NK Watch 사무국장직을 맡고 있다. 그는 2018-2019년 경기도평생교육진흥원 민주시민교육지원센터 센터장, 2009-2016년 한국교육개발원 탈북청소년교육지원센터 연구원으로 재직했다. 그는 비영리민간단체 카스 컨설턴시 (Korea Analysis & Strategy Consultancy, KAS)의 공동 설립자이며, 초대 대표를 역임했다. 카스 컨설턴시는 대한민국 헌법에 명시된 자유민주적 통일 실현을 전제로 북한 관련 연구와 정보들을 분석하고, 정책 컨설팅 등을 수행하는 연구 조직으로 2017년 11월 설립되었다.

이관형 박사가 최근 발표한 논문과 글들은 다음과 같다. “북한의 ‘마약사업’ 운영과 기반 확장: 1970-1980년대를 중심으로,” 『전략연구』, 29(1) (2022); “북한의 마약류 생산 및 밀매의 발단: 1945-1959년 대남혁명 활동을 중심으로,” 『한일군사문화연구』, 33 (2021); 『북한 마약 문제 연구: 국가주도형 초국가적 조직범죄 특성을 중심으로』(서울: 고려대학교 대학원 박사학위논문, 2021); Effects of International Advocacy toward Human Rights of North Korea (NK Watch 2020 Reprot) (Seoul: NK Watch, 2020); “북한 공작원 연구: 전직 공작원들과의 인터뷰,” 『한국군사학논집』, 76(1) (2020); “북한주민의 마약 사용 및 중독: 실태와 대책,” 『동아연구』, 37(1) (2018).

Co-researcher: Dr. In Su Kwak (Korea Analysis & Strategy Consultancy Executive Director)

곽인수(Korea Analysis & Strategy Consultancy 대표, 북한학 박사)

Dr. In Su Kwak is the foremost expert on North Korea’s power mechanisms, the strategy to revolutionize South Korea, and South Korean counter intelligence strategy, and served as a former North Korean spy to South Korea. To Korean and foreign media, he was once known as Dong Sik Kim. He was selected by the Central Party’s Liaison Department during his fourth year of secondary school at the age of 15, and was selected to be a spy in South Korea after finishing the first semester of his fifth year. He received a special education in

military and operative affairs from the Kim Jong Il Political-Military University from 1981 to 1985. He penetrated South Korea from May to October 1990 to establish underground parties and return to Pyongyang with spies that had previously been deployed. For his distinguished service, Dr. Kwak was awarded the title hero of the republic and a medal of the order of the flag 1st degree from Kim Il Sung himself. He again entered South Korea in August 1995 to establish a contact network with South Korean leading presidential candidates and rendezvous with other deployed spies. However, in October of that year, he was shot and arrested by a joint taskforce of the South Korean army and police. At that time, a spokesperson for North Korea's Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland denied the existence of Dr. Kwak and announced their stance that the incident was staged by the South Korean government. Afterwards, his entire family was purged in North Korea.

Now, Dr. Kwak serves as the director of the South Korean non-profit KAS Consultancy. From 2008 to 2021, he served as a senior research fellow at the Institute for National Security Strategy under the National Intelligence Service of Korea. Furthermore, from 1999 to 2006, Dr. Kwak worked as an analyst for the ROK Defense Security Command. For his contribution to Korea-US defense policy, Dr. Kwak was awarded certificates of appreciation from the Army Counterintelligence Center (July 2000), United States Forces Korea (September 2004), Special Operations Command Korea (July 2011), and the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) (June 2017), as well as a personalized thank you letter from a Major General of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (June 2000).

The following are Dr. Kwak's recent publications:

"Kim Jong Nam Assassination: Background and Impact," Issue Briefing, 17-7 (Seoul: Institute for National Security Strategy, 2017). [Korean Edition]

Nobody Turned Me In: A Story of Secret Agent from North Korea (Seoul: Guiparang Publishers, 2013). [Korean Edition]

The Realities of North Korea's South Korea Strategy (Seoul: Guiparang Publishers, 2013). [Korean Edition]

A Study of the Development and Changes in North Korea's Revolutionary Strategy against South Korea (Seoul: University of North Korean Studies, Ph.D. dissertation, 2013). [Korean Edition]

A Study of the party's guidance of the Korean worker's party (Seoul: Graduate School of North Korean Studies of Kyungnam University, M.A. dissertation, 2004). [Korean Edition]

곽인수 박사는 북한의 권력 메커니즘, 대남혁명 전략과 한국의 방첩 전략 분야의 최고 전문가

가이며, 전직 북한 대남 공작원이었다. 한국과 해외 언론에는 김동식이라는 인물로 알려져 있다. 그는 고등중학교 4학년(15세) 중앙당 연락부 공작원으로 발탁되어 5학년 1학기를 마친 직후인 1981년 대남공작원으로 선발되었다. 그는 1981년부터 1985년까지 김정일정치군사대학 특공대반에서 군사 및 공작 교육을 받았다. 그는 1990년 5월-10월, 한국 침투해 지하당 구축을 했고 고정간첩을 데리고 평양으로 복귀했다. 이 공로로 그는 김일성으로부터 공화국 영웅 칭호와 국기훈장 1급을 받았다. 그는 1995년 8월, 한국의 유력 대선후보와의 연락망을 구축하고, 고정간첩을 접선 목적으로 다시 한국으로 침투했다. 그러다 1995년 10월 한국군과 경찰의 합동 작전으로 피격되어 체포되었다. 한편, 1995년 11월 1일, 북한 당국은 조국평화통일위원회 대변인 성명을 통해 광인수 박사의 존재를 부정했으며, 이 사건도 한국 정부의 조작이라는 입장을 발표했다. 이후 그의 북한에 있는 가족들은 모두 숙청당했다.

그는 현재 한국의 비영리 연구단체인 카스 컨설턴시 대표를 맡고 있다. 광인수 박사는 2008년부터 2021년까지 한국의 국가정보원 산하 국가안보전략연구원에서 책임연구위원을 역임했다. 또한 1999년부터 2006년까지 한국 국군기무사령부에서 분석관으로 재직했다. 그는 한국과 미국의 안보 정책에 대한 기여로 2000년 6월 미국 육군 정보보안사령부, 2000년 7월 미국 육군 방첩사령부, 2004년 9월 주한미군, 2011년 7월 주한미특전사, 2017년 6월 미국 육군 제1특전단 등으로부터 표창과 감사장을 받기도 했다.

광인수 박사가 발표한 논문과 글들은 다음과 같다. “김정남 암살 배경과 파장,” 이슈브리핑 17-7(서울: 국가안보전략연구원, 2017); 『아무도 나를 신고하지 않았다』(서울: 기파랑, 2013); 『북한 대남전략의 실체』(서울: 기파랑, 2013); “북한의 대남혁명전략 전개와 변화에 관한 연구”(서울: 북한대학원대학교 박사학위논문, 2013); 『조선노동당의 당적 지도에 관한 연구』(서울: 경남대학교 북한대학원 석사학위논문, 2004).

Research Assistant: David R. Kay (NK Watch International Affairs Manager)

연구 프로젝트 보조: 데이비드 R. 케이(사단법인 NK Watch 국제업무매니저)

Mr. David R. Kay received a B.A. in political science from the University of Washington in 2015, and an M.A. in international studies from Korea University in 2023. He speaks both English and Korean which greatly helps NK Watch produce material in English and communicate with members of the international community. He played a significant role in the administrative process of this project taking charge of financial records and making

preparations for the briefing event. His primary research focus is nuclear proliferation, but he has also conducted or participated in various other research projects on the SDGs effects on human rights in North Korea as well as inter-Korean relations and history.

데이비드 R. 케이 매니저는 2015년 워싱턴대학교에서 정치학 학사, 2023년 고려대학교 대학원에서 국제학 석사학위를 취득했습니다. 그는 영어와 한국어를 모두 구사하여 NK Watch의 영문 자료 발간 및 국제사회 대상 커뮤니케이션을 담당하고 있습니다. 그는 연구 프로젝트의 시작부터 끝까지 연구 보조 뿐 아니라 행정 및 재무 업무의 중요한 역할들을 수행했습니다. 그의 주요 연구 포인트는 핵확산 문제이지만 SDGs가 북한 인권, 남북 관계 및 역사에 미치는 영향에 대한 다양한 다른 연구 프로젝트를 수행하거나 참여했습니다.

Translation: Dr. Kelly Hur (Duksung Women's University Professor)

번역: 켈리 허(덕성여자대학교 교수, 북한학 박사)

Kelly U. Hur is an assistant professor at Duksung Women's University. She earned her Ph.D at the University of North Korean Studies in North Korean Studies with a specialization in North Korean society, culture and media. She received her M.A. from the University of Hawaii at Manoa in Korean Studies. Her research interests focus on North Korea and diaspora relations, North Korea's public diplomacy, the Korean Diaspora and multiculturalism. Her recent publications include, "North Korea's Ping-Pong Diplomacy?: Revisiting the 1979 Pyongyang World Table Tennis Championships," and "North Korea's People-to-People Engagement with the Koreans in the United States, 1980-1989." She has been teaching and researching about North Korea since 2012 and has over fifteen years of translation experience with expertise on North Korea affairs.

켈리 허 교수는 University of Hawaii at Manoa에서 학사 및 한국학 석사를 취득한 후, 북한대학원대학교에서 북한 사회, 문화 및 미디어 전공의 북한학 박사 학위를 취득했다. 현재는 덕성여자대학교 조교수로 다양한 교양과 한국학 관련 과목을 강의하고 있으며 주요 연구분야는 한국학과 북한학, 특히 북한의 대외관계, 공공외교, 디아스포라관계 등이 있다. 최근 논문으로는 "North Korea's Ping-Pong Diplomacy?: Revisiting the 1979 Pyongyang World Table Tennis Championships," and "North Korea's People-to-People Engagement with the Koreans in the United States, 1980-1989" 등이 있다. 이외에도 15년 이상의 북한 및 다양한 분야의 번역 경험이 있다.

NK Watch 2023 Report

The Suryong Dictatorship Mechanism

Who Is Ultimately Responsible for Crimes Against Humanity?

수령독재 메커니즘 연구: 북한의 반인도적범죄 최종책임자 규명을 위한 시사점



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